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Introduction 
 
 
The idea for this thesis grew out of a dichotomy in the way that environmental problems are 
often discussed.  Politically, there is an increasing demand that we frame environmental 
problems in the language of rights and justice, with ‗environmental rights‘ forming the 
content of declarations and bills of rights.  This appears to clash with a view presented by 
some environmental philosophers that the language of rights is simply not up to the task of 
addressing environmental problems.  It is claimed that the way that we characterise individual 
rights is part of the problem, not part of the solution. This is because rights are often 
formulated from an individualistic and overly humanistic stance which will not enable us to 
see beyond the concerns of white western human individuals. 
Each of these views has a certain appeal.  The everyday language of rights has a 
nuance of importance and urgency.  It is one thing to say that we ought to protect the 
environment for the sake of the inhabitants of this planet, but to say that those inhabitants 
have a right that action should be taken sounds like a call to arms.  This particular ‗ought‘ 
makes a special kind of moral and political demand that cannot be ignored.  Rights have been 
employed to good effect in many struggles for equality, freedom and recognition, and it may 
appear that they should be employed in this way once again, especially when the scale of 
right-violations that might occur appears to be so great.  Related to this is the fact that many 
environmental problems affect some communities and geographical areas to a greater extent 
than others.  The inhabitants of some areas of Africa will probably experience the impact of 
climate change in a much more devastating way than the inhabitants of some areas of Europe.  
This suggests that the demands of justice call upon us to address these problems.  Not to do 
so would be to exploit certain groups of people for our own material comfort, and to deny 
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them their right to equal treatment, or to the kind of liberty that they would require to lead 
flourishing lives.  This would suggest both that rights are an indispensible element of the way 
that we articulate environmental concerns, and that they could be a powerful tool in 
environmental activism. 
 The opposing view is also compelling.  It might be suggested that we cannot address 
the environmental problems without looking to their root causes, and that one such cause is a 
dominant ideology based on putting the human individual ahead of community and global 
concerns, and ahead of our responsibility to other creatures, ecosystems and the planet.  It 
might then be said that if the concept of rights is necessarily bound up with such a world-
view, then we cannot properly address environmental concerns unless we either jettison the 
role of rights altogether or give them a much more minor role than they currently play in 
moral and political deliberation. There is a popular view in the field of environmental ethics 
that many conventional moral theories such as utilitarianism, Kantianism and so on are not 
the appropriate tools for considering the interaction between mankind and the natural 
environment.  Instead, many environmental ethicists seek to employ ways of talking about 
our relationship with the world that are less humanistic, individualistic and anthropocentric.  
Rights theories occupy much of the same ground as these conventional moral theories, often 
epitomising the features that many environmental ethicists critique.  They are generally 
centred on human activity and moral status (some theories do this more than others, as we 
shall see) and are usually concerned with the relationships between individual human beings 
with respect to aspects of the world, rather than with relationships between people and the 
natural world. As right-holders, people are to an extent alienated or set apart from other 
features of the planet, something which apparently contradicts the holistic nature of 
environmental ethics.  Thus a consideration of the compatibility of rights-theories and 
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environmental ethics might lead to further things we can say about the general question of 
which types of moral theory can properly be applied to environmental questions. 
Purpose and Methods 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine moral and political environmental issues in the 
context of rights, particularly moral or natural rights.  The central question will be whether 
anyone can have a right to a particular kind of environment or minimal environmental 
standard.  I will also consider which beings (if any) can have their moral demands articulated 
in this way.  While I am largely concerned with the idea of moral rights, I hold that when we 
employ rights-talk, the moral and the political cannot be fully extricated from each other.  
This is partly down to the history of rights, which gives them a distinctive dual moral and 
political character, and partly that when dealing with issues of widespread moral concern, the 
moral is rarely entirely separable from the political.  However, I will not look in detail at the 
task of implementing such rights through political and constitutional systems.  My interest is 
rather in the underlying justifications of such rights and how they should be articulated. 
I aim as far as possible to remain neutral between different moral theories, since 
working within a particular theory would significantly narrow the application of the thesis.  
The methods used also do not strictly conform to any one school or style of philosophy.  In 
much of this thesis a broadly analytic approach is applied to the questions that are being 
considered, but in other places different approaches are appropriate, both in terms of the 
method employed and the sources used.  I would argue that were we to adhere too rigidly to 
one approach, there is a danger that adherents of opposing views would often simply ‗speak 
past each other‘ and fail to engage with the substantive issues upon which they differ. 
Chapter One 
 
A large portion of the first part of the thesis will be historical in character, examining the 
development of the various theories of rights that exist today.  The first chapter will be 
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concerned with the early history of rights theories and their development into a form roughly 
equivalent to modern-day theories.  I will say a little more at the start of the chapter about 
why this approach is justified, arguing that we must have some understanding of the 
historical origins of rights theories in order to understand what purpose they serve and how 
they should be understood in the present day.  I also address some of the difficulties with 
taking such an approach. 
In this chapter I identify some prominent features that we can see in many theories of 
rights, and trace their emergence.  One of the major conclusions of this chapter is that the 
concept of rights is broad, varied and dynamic.  It would therefore be a mistake to consider 
the question of environmental rights in terms of one narrow conception of what a right can 
be.  We must therefore adopt the considerably more ambitious task of examining the 
possibility of environmental rights of many different kinds, even accepting the possibility that 
new ideological challenges may prompt further developments and refinements of the concept 
of a right. 
Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two moves on to look at two of the famous critiques of rights, offered by Jeremy 
Bentham and Karl Marx.  I argue that the objection that rights have no foundation because 
there is no natural lawgiver would require more justification than we can find in the works of 
Bentham, but that it does raise important questions about whether there can be a natural basis 
to rights that I engage with later in the thesis.  Marx‘s claim that they are a socially divisive 
force is in many ways more of an obstruction, especially to the project of assigning 
environmental rights.  This leaves us with a number of options.  One would be to go against 
Marx and claim that the individual must be the sole locus of concern, while another would be 
to modify our theory of rights so that it can account for the rights of groups.  A final option 
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would be to apply different moral concepts alongside rights in a way that might account for 
the value of community and collective goods. 
Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three is largely an outline of some of the forms that more recent theories of rights 
have taken.  This is necessary in order to furnish us with the detail we need when applying 
these theories to environmental problems.  While the notion of moral rights has been around 
for a very long time, it is only really in the twentieth century that rights were integrated into 
rigorous and complex formulations.  This approach has the advantage of allowing us to apply 
a more detailed and formal analysis to specific questions about who might have rights and 
what those rights might be, but it also arguably has the disadvantage of applying an overly 
dry and rigid structure, more suited to legal questions than to aspects of our moral lives.  I 
explore the concept of right-based moralities (and Raz‘s criticism that they cannot 
accommodate an adequate account of ‗collective goods‘) and Dworkin‘s concept of rights as 
‗trumps‘.  I examine the distinction between ‗choice-based‘ and ‗interest-based‘ theories of 
rights, which will have a strong bearing on the remainder of the thesis.  I also look at some of 
the different types of rights that we may have, particularly the distinctions between positive 
and negative rights and active and passive rights. 
Chapter Four 
 
Chapter four begins to articulate what we might expect a theory of environmental rights to be.  
In order to do this, I consider how we might go about attributing environmental rights to 
presently existing human individuals.  This involves articulating what ‗environmental‘ might 
mean in this context.  I choose to focus on the sense of ‗environmental‘ that applies to the 
environment of the person in question, rather than to wider and more nebulous senses of the 
environment.  This is not to undermine the importance of global environmental causes and 
issues, since they will impinge on the environments of many people.  I also distinguish 
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between two different things that we might mean when we talk about an environmental right.  
We may mean a right to life, liberty, property or one of the other ‗conventional‘ rights when 
they are violated or honoured through environmental means.  I call such rights 
‗instrumentally‘ environmental rights.  I also suggest here that there may be a sense of an 
environmental right that cannot be articulated in terms of other more widely discussed rights.  
I call these ‗essentially‘ environmental rights.  I examine two arguments for instrumentally 
environmental rights, concluding that environmental rights based on interest theories of rights 
may be more promising than those based on choice theories.  I also address the question of 
how we might deal with environmental rights that are in conflict with other rights, focusing in 
particular on the right to liberty and Mill‘s ‗harm condition‘.  I conclude that if rights theories 
are to have any broad or global applications, then there can be instrumental environmental 
rights.  I maintain that it is also at least plausible that there are some essentially 
environmental rights. 
Chapter Five 
 
Following from chapter four, which examines the environmental rights of currently existing 
human individuals, chapter five considers whether we can attribute rights to what I regard to 
be more difficult human cases: future people and groups.  This involves an examination of 
some of the usual problems afflicting the attribution of moral status to future people, and a 
consideration of whether these are particularly problematic for theories of rights.  I suggest 
that if we are to do this adequately, we must give some consideration to their ontological 
status.  This involves giving some attention to the metaphysics of time.  This is not examined 
in detail here, but some opposing views about the ontological status of future people are 
mentioned, and the possible moral implications of these views are drawn out.  I argue that an 
interest based theory of rights is the most promising approach if we want to talk about the 
rights of future people, and also that questions concerning the rights of future people become 
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less problematic if we adopt an approach to rights that grounds people‘s identities in 
relationships and networks of social meaning.  I also argue that allowing groups to be 
considered right-holders might help with some of these difficulties, because groups that 
currently exist may then be said to have rights concerning their futures, even when the future 
memberships of those groups are not yet determined.  I examine some possible problems with 
the concept of group rights, but suggest that each of these either presents a problem only for 
choice theories of rights, or for theories of group rights which are formulated in such a way 
that they eclipse the rights of individuals. 
Chapter Six 
 
Chapter six explores what rights we may be able to attribute to non-human animals.  I note 
that questions of animal rights are not always in line with wider environmental concerns, but 
that animals play an important role both as elements of our environments and as fellow 
inhabitants of them.  I also observe that there is no easy leap from a view that attributes moral 
status to animals to one that claims that they are subjects of rights.  I argue that the choice 
theory of rights, combined with a view that rights are ‗trumps‘ or very demanding 
requirements of some other kind, cannot sufficiently account for the interests of non-human 
animals when they conflict with certain human interests.  Instead I suggest that an interest 
theory of rights, or a theory of rights based on benefit, might do a better job of capturing the 
moral demands that animal place upon us.  However, even some accounts of interests may 
not be able to account for many animals.  Theories of interest that rely on notions of 
autonomy or agency may not be able to hold that non-human animals can have interests. 
Chapter Seven 
 
The aim of chapter seven is to pull together many of the strands that have been examined in 
the previous six chapters, summarising many of the key problems and suggesting what forms 
solutions to them might take.  I suggest that the problems that we have encountered with the 
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attribution of environmental rights (and the attribution of rights in general to the ‗hard cases‘ 
explored in chapters four to six) rely on a notion of rights which displays certain features.  
None of these features, I argue, are essential to what I identify in chapter one as core concepts 
of the notion of a right.  I argue that rights are focused on particular subjects (right-holders), 
that they are to the advantage of those subjects, that they do not rely on legal or political 
frameworks and that they entail duties.  They are also often associated with rationality, 
autonomy and individualism.  The latter three are however merely associations, and are not 
evident in all theories of rights, and might be regarded as accidental nuances of rights, rather 
than core features.  I propose that one conception of rights that might do the work that we 
require is one that is based on needs, with needs understood in terms of the identity of the 
right-holder. 
Chapter Eight 
 
Chapter eight starts to unpick how we might understand the identities of right-holders, and 
makes the case for essentially environmental rights based on the fact that environment is 
crucial to (and in some cases partially constitutive of) identity.  I examine biological, 
psychological and narrative understandings of identity, and explore the crucial role of 
environment on each of these levels, as well as the fact that the three levels are often 
inextricably entangled with each other.  I argue that narrative and psychological identity can 
certainly be thought to confer essentially environmental rights, but also raise the possibility 
that we may also be able to derive them from biological identity too (although these would 
necessarily be less demanding than rights founded on an interweaving of narrative, 
psychological and biological identity).  Nonetheless, such an account would accommodate 
the rights of future people, groups and some non-human animals, and would help to explain 
the ways in which other elements of our environments can be part of the content of our rights 
even if they are not instrumental to more conventional rights. 
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The account that I will provide in the following chapters leaves a number of questions 
unanswered, some of which I will mention in the conclusion as avenues for further 
investigation.  In many ways the thesis sets up what we might expect from a theory of 
environmental rights, rather than attempting to develop all the details of one.  There are many 
questions still to be asked about the resolution of conflicts of environmental rights, and about 
whether such rights are negative or positive, active or passive, and so on.  The theories of 
identity explored in chapter eight also require further elucidation, together with an 
examination of whether biological identity can confer rights (a question that I do not commit 
myself to answering in this thesis).  However, I hope to have begun a process of bridging a 
gap that currently exists between the two positions that I mentioned at the start of this 
introduction.  It seems at least possible that we can describe environmental problems in terms 
of rights and justice without embracing an overly human-centred or individualistic world-
view. 
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Chapter 1 – Historical Introduction 
 
 
1. Rights and History
1
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, this chapter will be concerned with the history of the 
language of rights.  The historical approach needs to be defended, since it is not an approach 
favoured by everyone.  Mary Midgley picks out this example from Ted Honderich‗s memoir: 
Would philosophy not be better if it was like science, which left at least most of its 
past behind in museums? (Honderich 2002, p. 164) 
 
While the strictest of analytic approaches might discard the history of ideas from moral 
theory in favour of pure conceptual analysis, I feel that this would be a serious mistake.  
Moral theories are deeply rooted in the specific cultural and political contexts in which they 
developed, and a real understanding of rights must involve an understanding of why they 
were thought necessary or useful in the first place.  As Midgley argues, the history of our 
ideas has explanatory power: 
The past has a special importance of its own because it helps to explain the present.  
Past thought always has much more influence than we recognize on current ideas- 
including the ideas of those who most sharply disown it…  There could be no such 
thing as a philosophy that was purely contemporary. (Midgley 2005b, p. 69) 
 
Our current social and political life is shaped by history, and a failure to understand the 
development of moral and political terms in times that were crucial to the formation of our 
current moral and political thinking could lead to an impoverished understanding of the 
society that we currently inhabit.  We cannot have a full and rich understanding of moral 
terms such as ‗right‘ without some insight into their development and the historical 
background of our ethical frameworks in general.  The importance of regarding ourselves as 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks for the helpful comments and suggestions I received after presenting papers on this subject to 
Eidos (Durham‘s postgraduate philosophy society) and to Durham‘s Early Modern Postgraduate Discussion 
Group. 
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beings situated in a world and society with a past, present and future will be a recurring 
theme throughout this thesis. 
(1a) Pitfalls to Avoid 
There is a tendency in the history of rights theory (and the history of ideas in general) to 
attempt to find the one true originator of the modern understanding of the term in question 
and to make the case for that thinker‘s unique role as the father of the concept.  In the 
literature on the history of rights, various people have had this honour attributed to them, 
ranging from ancient Greek and Roman thinkers, through medieval philosophers such as 
Aquinas and Ockham, to the more familiar candidates such as Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. 
 While it makes for a snappy soundbite to argue that Joe Bloggs was the founder of 
modern rights theories, I am not convinced that this would be either useful or possible.  
Firstly, this is because there is not one unique modern theory of rights.  Jeremy Waldron‘s 
excellent anthology Theories of Rights shows how broad the range of contemporary rights 
theories can be, and if anything the last twenty-five years has proved to broaden this range 
(Waldron 1984).  Any attempt to argue that these theories have one single common originator 
would immediately seem doomed to failure. 
 Secondly even if there were a single current understanding of rights, it could be 
suggested that attempting to identify the point at which it sprang into existence would be 
rather like attempting to identify the point at which a man becomes bald.  In other words, the 
Sorites paradox might apply here.  I suspect that much of what has been said about vagueness 
might apply very well to the evolution of terms such as ‗right‘ and ‗modern meaning of 
right‘. 
 Thirdly, it would be both misguided and arrogant of the philosopher to claim that he is 
the sole progenitor of meaningful moral and political discourse.  The way that we use moral 
and political language changes, sometimes imperceptibly, over the years, decades and 
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centuries, and many people have a causal influence on this process.  Our current use of 
language in philosophy (as well as in the everyday discourse to which philosophy often bears 
very little resemblance) is shaped not only by the history of philosophy, but also by the 
histories of politics, economics, religion, the media, mythology and of course by the history 
of the language spoken by all sorts of ordinary people.  For these reasons, any attempt to find 
a sole father of modern rights among the books on the philosophy shelves would be a fruitless 
search.  Even if we could arrive at a ‗best candidate‘, this would be to present a flimsy 
representation of the history of rights. 
 Another thing which is best avoided is the tendency to look at the word ‗right‘ or its 
equivalent in isolation.  We are not searching simply for a history of dictionary definitions.  
This would do very little to enlighten us about the role or nature of the concept.  Instead, we 
need a much thicker, more nuanced understanding, placed in the context of the surrounding 
ideas and theories of the time.  As Richard Tuck puts it ―the meaning of a term such as a 
right is theory-dependent‖ (Tuck 1979, p. 2) and thus requires examination in terms of 
relevant theories in order to understand its meaning.  However, this can only be done to a 
small extent in the whistle-stop tour of rights that is possible in a single chapter, and for 
histories of rights examined in the detail that they deserve, we must turn elsewhere.
1
 
(1b) Understanding the Past 
Another difficulty arises when we ask whether we can understand how moral language was 
employed in the past.  However desirable the historical approach might be, we cannot gain 
this thicker understanding of moral language unless it is actually possible, at least to some 
extent, to understand how this language was used.  Moral life is emotional and nuanced, and 
thus deeply entangled with culture. Is it possible to understand moral terms without being 
deeply entangled in that culture ourselves?  The culture of the distant past, although it has 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Tuck 1979, Brett 1997 and Tierney 1997, and for a briefer summary, see Kelly 1992, pp. 
144-147, 226-233, 268-282 and 425-432. 
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shaped our own, differs dramatically from it. As L.P. Hartley famously said, ―The past is a 
foreign country, they do things differently there‖ (Hartley 1953).  Of course, if the past is a 
foreign country, it must be seen as one with extensive cultural and economic ties with our 
own.  As I have argued, we are not living in an isolated bubble called the present.  Our 
current culture and the world around us are products of our history.  However, societies, 
cultures, and the language that accompany them have changed dramatically over time, so 
there is a certain problem of inaccessibility. 
A useful approach may be (as I will attempt to do) to identify particular features of the 
modern concept of rights, and trace the emergence of those features in older concepts.  This 
does not commit me to saying that there was a particular point at which a definitive modern 
rights theory emerged, but it does allow me to attempt to shed light on what is distinctive 
about contemporary theories of rights.  However, what this does not do is explain how we can 
truly understand the older concept with all of its nuances, social connections and meanings.  
Even if we can see how some external features of the historical concepts might resemble 
those of the contemporary ones, this does not deal with the extreme ‗otherness‘ of past 
cultures, and how we are to gain a nuanced understanding of them
1
.  To some extent, this task 
must be left to those who are examining the historical issues here in more detail, as I cannot 
do justice to the richness of this language (especially given that much of it was originally 
written in Latin).  However, as the themes of otherness and continuity, and of the relationship 
                                                          
1
 I will make several references to ‗the other‘ or ‗otherness‘ in this thesis.  However, it is a slightly slippery term 
that can be used in a multitude of ways, and is sometimes used to muddy the waters when theorists do not wish 
to be too specific about what they mean.  Among other things, ‗the other‘ can sometimes refer to: 
a) A constructed view of the negative aspects of those people or ideas against which the self wishes to 
assert itself.  These are parts of the social environment of the self, and so not entirely alien. 
b) A rejected or unacknowledged aspect of the self, which is projected onto others but subconsciously 
recognised as part of the self (Jung calls this the ‗shadow‘ (Jung 1919)). 
c) Something opposed or antipathetic to human life as a whole (such as dragons in mythology).  Some 
have taken this ‗other‘ to represent biological death or hostile nature. 
I am grateful to John McKinnell for discussing these distinctions with me.  A fuller discussion of these 
ideas can be found in his book Meeting the Other in Norse Myth and Legend (2005) especially in chapter 
two. I will use the term to refer to something which is assumed to be external to the self, and sometimes 
more generally external to the human or the rational.  However, it is important to remember that this 
concept can hide a multitude of distinct ideas. 
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between past, present and future, will recur throughout this thesis, something must be said 
about this. 
 Questions concerning ‗otherness‘ have arisen in political and environmental 
philosophy as well as in many other subjects, but probably above all other subjects, social or 
cultural anthropology recognises the difficulty with encountering and understanding ‗the 
other‘.  To take a slightly outdated cliché of the anthropologist, can the white middle class 
academic really understand the language and other cultural practices of the native tribesmen 
who he encounters?  The historical problem of understanding rights seems to share some of 
the same features, but without the advantage of direct contact with the people concerned.  
Clifford Geertz examines questions of cultural distance, both geographic and temporal, in his 
book Available Light: 
Postmodernists have questioned whether ordered accounts of other ways of being in 
the world - accounts that offer monological, comprehensive, and all-too-coherent 
explanations - are credible at all, and whether we are not so imprisoned in our own 
modes of thought and perception as to be incapable of grasping, much less crediting, 
those of others.(Geertz 2000, p. 102) 
 
Obviously, the anthropologist can have no chance unless he attempts to fully immerse 
himself in the language and culture of the people who he studies, and it seems that the same 
must be the case for attempting to understand the past meanings of moral terms.  To take an 
example, someone wishing to gain a thick and nuanced understanding of Aquinas‘ usage of 
the word ius (which we will look at shortly) must have a command of medieval church Latin, 
a knowledge of the practices and theology of the Dominican and Benedictine orders, of 
Aristotelianism and of Islamic philosophy and theology, and a familiarity with the 
contemporary art and literature of the time.  Sadly I don‘t qualify on those counts, and few 
people would qualify on all of them.  Perhaps the best that we can say is that we should do 
the best we can in the time that we have to access the surrounding culture of a figure that we 
study, and that the more we do this, the deeper our understanding of their thought will be. 
15 
 
 But this still doesn‘t really escape the charge that we are ‗imprisoned‘ in our culture.  
It may still be the case that our insight is too coloured by our own culture to be of any use.  
Geertz does not see this as too much of a problem.  We should try to immerse ourselves in the 
culture concerned, but also acknowledge our own cultural perspective: 
We look back at these two ―peoples,‖ [the eighteenth century Hawaiians and 
European navigators] and their legendary ―first contact‖ encounter, through the haze 
of the modern order of life (or, now that the Euro-American empires and the ―East-
West‖ world divide have weakened or disappeared, that of the postmodern order).  
We look back on them, moreover, from our particular positions within that order.  We 
make of them what we can, given who we are or have become.  There is nothing fatal 
in this, either to truth or fairness.  But it is inevitable, and foolish to pretend otherwise. 
(Geertz 2000, pp. 104-5)
1
 
 
It should also be said that even if the culture of the past is very different from the one we 
experience today, it is not so radically different that it is unrecognisable.  After all, I only 
began to consider the history of rights in order to make sense of our current understanding of 
them.  To continue Hartley‘s ‗foreign country‘ metaphor, our modern cultural wealth has 
come to us on trade winds blowing from the past.  We have some understanding of the way 
that things once were, because without this we would have no understanding of who we are.  
So we must understand ourselves to understand our history, and vice versa. 
So there do seem to be ways in which we might approach a solution to these apparent 
problems of thoroughly understanding moral concepts from the past.  We must immerse 
ourselves in past culture while acknowledging our own viewpoint, and accept the otherness 
of the past without treating this otherness as total alienation.  However, even if this points the 
way forward, it makes very demanding claims on us; claims that most moral philosophers do 
not have the time or skills to meet.  If it is true that an understanding of present moral 
concepts hinges on an understanding of past ones, then it looks like a good moral philosopher 
may also have to be a good historian and a good anthropologist.  Either that or moral 
                                                          
1
 In fact, some would maintain that our own subjective perspective is essential to the project of understanding 
and structuring ideas from other times and cultures.  This idea is evident in Gadamer‘s positive understanding of 
prejudice as ‗pre-judgement‘ (Gadamer 2004) 
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philosophers will have to talk to historians and anthropologists a lot more than they do at the 
moment. 
2. Some Features of Contemporary Rights Theories 
It may be useful to begin by picking out some of the features that we tend to associate with 
contemporary theories of rights.  The idea here is not so much to arrive at a definition of ‗a 
right‘, according to which we can categorically identify the emergence of the first true ‗rights 
theory‘, but rather to identify some salient aspects of the ways in which we think about rights 
that will be useful in tracking the emergence of our current patterns of thought.  While I 
mention these features before I track their emergence, their role in theories of rights was in 
many cases only evident from looking at the ways in which they developed.  The first three 
features that I mention may arguably be regarded as features of any contemporary theory of 
rights, but the last five may arguably not, although they are frequently observed in theories of 
rights. 
(2a) Subjective Rights 
We generally hold that rights are held by or attached to particular people
1
.  Such rights are 
often therefore referred to as ‗subjective rights‘, meaning that they apply to particular 
subjects.  Subjective right differs from objective right in that it describes rights which attach 
to a particular person.  When I am owed money, it is specifically I who have the right to be 
repaid.  Even when we consider those rights which are held to be universal, we talk about 
each person’s right.  Rights to life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness are thought to be held 
individually by each person. 
 Objective right (an older notion) is more like our use of the adjective ‗right‘.  It refers 
to the right thing to be done and does not attach to any individual (in that there is no 
                                                          
1
 I use the word ‗people‘ here for the sake of simplicity, although in later chapters I discuss the possibility that 
there are subjects of rights that we do not necessarily regard as people.  For example, I look at the rights of 
groups (chapter five) and animals (chapter six). 
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identifiable right-holder of an objective right).
1
  The words ‗subjective‘ and ‗objective‘ are 
not ideal in this context, as it might be taken to suggest that the debate concerns moral 
subjectivism, with which this idea has no connection.  However, as it is employed in so much 
of the literature I will use it to avoid confusion. 
(2b) Advantageous to the Right-Holder 
It is generally thought that the content of a right (i.e. what it is a right to) must be to the 
advantage of the right-holder.  For example, it is commonly thought that all people have 
rights to things like life and liberty, but it would generally be considered odd to say that I 
have a right to pay taxes.  As we shall see later on, this aspect is sometimes central to the way 
that the concept of a right is formulated.  So-called ‗interest theories‘ and ‗benefit theories‘ of 
rights say that a person has a right when some other person, a group of people, or people in 
general have an obligation to do something (or refrain from doing something) in order to 
benefit the right-holder or serve their interests.
2
 
(2c) Linked with Duty 
This brings us on to a third feature of rights.  Rights are correlated in some way with duties or 
obligations.  This is not the same as the claim that ‗with rights come responsibilities‘, which 
suggests that the holder of rights also has duties or obligations.
3
  What is meant here is that if 
an individual has a right, some other person, group, or people in general have a duty.  My 
right to be repaid a loan implies a duty of the borrower to repay me, and my right to life 
implies (at the very least) a prima facie duty of everyone else not to kill me.  Rights that 
correlate with a duty held by a specific person or group are known as rights in personam, and 
rights that correlate with a general duty imposed on everyone are known as rights in rem. 
 As we have seen, benefit or interest theories of rights articulate the connection 
                                                          
1
 This distinction is nicely summarised by Lahey (1997) 
2
 See, for example, Lyons (1969). 
3
 Although some theories of rights do maintain that in order to be the type of being that can have rights, one 
must be the type of being who can have duties, obligations and moral responsibility (see chapters four, five, six 
and seven) 
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between right and duty in terms of the benefit that the duty confers on the right-holder, or the 
extent to which the duty serves the right-holder‘s interests.  Another prominent theory is the 
‗choice theory‘ of rights, which articulates it in terms of the power that the right-holder has 
over the duty that corresponds to her right. 
(2d) Moral/Natural Rights 
While the concept of legal rights is very much in use today, rights are also used in a moral 
sense.  Statements such as ‗Everyone in the world has a right to be educated‘, ‗Women have a 
right to equal treatment with men‘ and ‗The people of North Korea have a right to freedom of 
speech‘ are perfectly coherent, even if the speaker acknowledges the absence of legal rights 
to ensure these things.
1
  Traditionally these kinds of rights are regarded as natural rights, 
rights that we have in virtue of being born, and which are contingent on some important 
feature of the right-holder, such as rationality, sentience and so on. 
 (2e) Linking Ethics to Justice, Law and Politics 
These moral rights are often thought to be prior to legal or political institutions in the sense 
that they can override laws and obligations that such institutions impose.  This means that 
(according to some theories) where the state violates or fails to protect our rights, we are 
entitled to commit acts of civil disobedience or rebellion.  Even if we hold that rebellion or 
civil disobedience are not justified, we might see rights as one of the ways of measuring the 
extent to which a government is legitimate, or doing the things that it ought to do. 
In this sense, moral rights are often linked to institutions of law and politics to a 
greater extent than other moral concepts.  Rights serve as limitations on how governments 
ought to behave and as benchmarks for the standards that they ought to meet.  This is 
especially the case with the concept of human rights, which acts very much as a bridge 
between moral and legal concepts. 
                                                          
1
 Unless one adopts a Benthamite stance, arguing that non-legal rights are incoherent.  Even so, the Benthamite 
would understand the meaning or intent of the statements. 
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(2f) Moral Urgency/ Strength 
To say that someone has a right to something seems to be a stronger statement than 
maintaining that they ought to have it or have a moral claim upon it.  Sometimes rights are 
characterized as ‗trumps‘ over other moral considerations.  In other theories, rights can be 
prima facie.  They can be defeated in extreme circumstances, but these circumstances are 
ones in which other rights or moral considerations have great strength.  To say that I have a 
right to something means that either the person who is denying me the content of my right 
must dispute my right, or (for theories under which rights are defeasible) that he must provide 
extremely good reasons for denying me the content of my right. 
(2g) Liberal Individualism 
Rights are generally associated with a tradition that is both liberal and individualistic.  The 
language of rights is usually less popular with the communitarian left.
1
  Perhaps this is 
because of Marxist criticisms that rights are responsible for creating boundaries between 
individuals which force us to hold each other at a distance, and thus contribute to alienation.  
This is a criticism that we will examine in more detail in the next chapter.  Some conservative 
thinkers are also sceptical about the language of individual rights, due to arguments (like one 
made by Bentham) which state that the emphasis on individual rights dissolves or undermines 
the associations that we have with the state and the law of the land.  Thus rights are often 
thought to sit most comfortably in the liberal camp, as they are thought to be too 
individualistic to fit with theories that advocate strong communal links or a strong 
identification with one‘s nation, government and cultural heritage. 
(2h) Autonomy, Liberty and Rationality 
Relating to the association with the liberal tradition, rights are often associated to some 
degree with notions of autonomy, liberty and rationality.  This is not just in the sense that 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Guttman (1985) and Mulhall and Swift (1992). 
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people are seen as having rights to liberty: many theories of rights have the notion of liberty 
and autonomy at their very foundation.  Rationality is closely linked with these concepts.  
The importance of liberty is often stressed because of the ability of human beings to make 
rational autonomous choices about how to live their lives. 
3. Ius and Subjective Right 
Having made these points, we have a difficulty with where to start.  I have said that the 
modern view of rights did not one day spring fully formed from the mind of one philosopher.  
It would be very strange if it had done.  Rather, we can trace the ancestry of modern rights 
back as far as the emergence of thought, or as recently as the latest published paper which 
makes a new contribution.  Ultimately, as with any moral concept, the historical origin of 
‗rights‘ must be in the broader sense of ‗right‘, good or obligation, since nearly all theories of 
rights, whether they are legal, moral or political, depend on a concept of something being 
right. 
 The emergence of ideas of right and wrong is probably lost forever in the mists of pre-
literate time
1
, but until comparatively recently in human history most western moral codes 
have regarded the term ‗right‘ or its equivalent as an adjective to be applied to a person or an 
act, not as a noun applying to what can be held or claimed by a particular individual (as has 
often been pointed out, there are ten commandments, not ten rights
2
).  The closest early 
approximation of our noun ‗right‘ that is used in the Western literature is probably the noun 
ius in Roman jurisprudence, which some people translate as ‗right‘.  Rather pleasingly, it can 
also refer to a soup or broth, but there are also alternative legal interpretations of the term.  
The study of law and its application became very important during this period, as the rapid 
expansion of the Roman empire prompted questions about how law and order should be 
upheld and maintained.  Roman jurists developed new systems of law, and these systems 
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 Although for some discussion of this, see Midgley (1991) 
2
 For example, see Fortin (1996, p. 364) 
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relied on a glossary of carefully articulated legal terms. 
 Ius was later adopted and interpreted by many medieval thinkers as they tried to make 
sense of and develop the ancient texts, and it is a term which has as much of a place in 
medieval church Latin as it has in classical Latin texts.  As we have seen, there are a number 
of different dimensions to the debate concerning when and whether the concept ius became 
equivalent to our concept of a right.  One such dimension concerns the notion of subjective 
and objective right. 
 Ius, by a standard interpretation, has classically been used in the objective sense in 
jurisprudence, in order to describe the right or just state of affairs.  In these uses, it does not 
attach itself to particular individuals, but rather to what should be done.  It is perhaps useful 
here to make a distinction between ius and lex, the two components of Roman law.  There is 
much debate concerning the distinction between these two components, and in some places 
they appear to be used synonymously.  However, some suggest that ius can describe the state 
of affairs that the law should protect or bring about, while lex describes the laws which 
govern this.  These terms might thus be considered roughly similar to their descendents 
‗justice‘ and ‗legislation‘.  The salient point here is that the objective sense of ius is that 
which the institutions of law should bring about. 
 Michel Villey (1975) and Brian Tierney (2002) among others argue that there is no 
subjective sense of ius in Roman jurisprudence.  Villey, who believes that the modern sense 
of rights came from William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, claims that ius cannot be 
meant subjectively in the Roman texts (particularly focusing on the work of Gaius and 
Ulpian) because the term ius simply would not make sense in many contexts if we translated 
it to mean subjective right.  He also makes the more philosophical argument that the notion of 
individual subjective ius is associated with nominalism, the view that there are no universals 
and only individual entities are real.  Brian Tierney disputes the association between 
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subjective ius and nominalism, and instead describes an earlier genesis of subjective ius as 
occurring gradually, beginning in the twelfth century in commentaries on Gratian‘s 
Decretum. 
 Complicating the debate about the origin of subjective rights even further, John Finnis 
argues that the concept is evident in the work of St Thomas Aquinas (Finnis 1998 and 2002).  
Aquinas follows Aristotle in his conviction that human nature is the basis for understanding 
how human behaviour should be directed.  This is the basis of Aquinas‘ ius naturale or 
natural law theory, thought by some to be the basis of natural rights.  This was part of the 
scholastic project of connecting the role of political institutions with divine will, and was 
based in the concept of God‘s eternal rationality, which ordained that we should pursue the 
good for humanity in accordance with our God-given human nature.
1
  Ius here can be 
understood in two ways: we can take it to mean a rough equivalent of a scientific law, simply 
describing the rules of human behaviour, or how we naturally do live.  However, Aquinas‘ 
natural law uses the  notion of human nature to describe what is a good human life, so this ius 
takes on moral aspects as well: God‘s eternal law which prescribes how we should live.  
Aquinas also stresses the need for human laws, although these should always be in 
accordance with the natural law (in this sense he is a precursor to thinkers like Grotius and 
Locke). 
 Again, there is dispute over whether Aquinas‘ ius is equivalent to modern concepts of 
rights.  With Michel Villey (1975), Tierney (2002) argues that, as with the work of the 
Roman jurists, Aquinas‘ meaning is objective, not pertaining to a subject, with ius simply 
meaning ―what is just‖ or ―what is right‖ (p. 391).2  He also argues that there are further 
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 Much of Aquinas‘ thought on Ius naturale is presented in the Summa Theologiae (Aquinas 2006) 
2
 Although it is important to note where Tierney and Villey diverge significantly here.  As we will see later, 
Villey argues that subjective rights are incompatible with Aquinas‘ natural law theory.  Tierney argues that, 
while Finnis does not demonstrate adequately that Aquinas employed rights theory, he has shown that rights 
theory and traditional natural law theory are not incompatible.  This contention will be discussed later when we 
look at rights in the context of natural law theory. 
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aspects of current rights theory which are not embraced by Aquinas‘ usage.  Subjective 
rights, he argues, are generally conceived to be something that are of benefit to the right-
holder, and are associated with autonomy.  This is not so with the Roman concept of ius 
embraced by Aquinas: 
Aquinas‘s own definition did not have any reference to other persons‘ rights.  Finnis 
therefore emphasised another usage of Aquinas, his acceptance of the Roman law 
definition of justice as a steady willingness to give others ―what is their right‖ {ius 
suum}.‖  But the word ius as used here did not have the same meaning as our English 
word ―right‖ used in a subjective sense.  The modern word implies a certain freedom 
of choice, a freedom to act or not to act in the relevant sphere.  The ius of an ancient 
Roman, what was due to him, might be a punishment. (Tierney 2002, p. 392) 
 
Finnis responds that Tierney‘s analysis is lacking for three reasons (Finnis 2002).  He 
suggests that Tierney makes the mistake of suggesting that if something is objective 
(pertaining to an object) then it cannot also be subjective (pertaining to a subject).  He also 
thinks that Tierney‘s analysis of Aquinas scrutinises the language at the expense of having a 
regard for its intellectual context.  He also suggests that Tierney ―employs a simplistic 
understanding of the modern idea of rights‖ (p.407).  He argues that Aquinas uses the term 
ius in a subjective sense as well as an objective one.  He takes Aquinas‘ thought that ―justice 
is distinguished by directing us in matters that concern other persons‖ (p. 407) and develops 
this to argue that the ius, being a requirement of justice, is a requirement owed by an agent to 
another person: 
Thus the Tierney-Villey characterization of iustum (and so also of ius) as the ―right 
thing or state of affairs… that justice [seeks] to achieve‖ omits an essential element in 
Aquinas‘s conception: one cannot properly think of ius without thinking of the other 
to whom an act, forbearance, or acceptance is, in justice, owed. (Finnis 2002, p. 408) 
 
Finnis backs up this assertion with the evidence that Aquinas makes frequent reference to a 
person having a particular ius, which matches the current usage of the term right, which has 
the same syntactic relations.  However, this point is a fairly weak one.  The words ‗grudge‘, 
‗debt‘, ‗crush‘ or ‗photograph‘ might be used in similar ways (i.e. describing something that 
someone has against, on, or of another person).  Finnis has demonstrated that ius, at least in 
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some sense, is used in Aquinas to describe the relations between people, and that it has a 
syntactical role which is compatible with this, but this is not tantamount to saying that it is the 
same as the modern concept of rights.  As we have seen, Tierney argues that subjective rights 
involve freedoms, and the Roman ius (adopted wholesale, he claims, by Aquinas) does not. 
4. Rights and Duties 
However, it might be argued that Tierney is adopting a rather narrow conception of what it is 
to have a right.  Tierney is using H. L. A. Hart‘s definition of a right as being strongly 
associated with autonomy and freedom
1
, but as Finnis argues, this is not a universally 
accepted modern way of understanding rights (Finnis 2002, p. 409).  There are many rights 
cited in modern declarations of rights which do not make reference to freedom and 
autonomy.  Finnis gives the examples of a right to life and a right not to be tortured. 
Even advocates arguing in court for suicide and euthanasia make little or no attempt 
to claim that the autonomy they are pleading for is entailed by the logic of the modern 
concept of ―a right to‖.  Judges, lawyers, and contemporary legal theorists, thoroughly 
attuned to ―modern thought,‖ know that rights are simply not constrained within the 
straitjacketed conceptual structure which Tierney, Villey, Strauss, Fortin et al. assert 
is ―the modern concept of rights‖ (Finnis 2002, p. 409) 
 
However, it could still be difficult to argue that Aquinas‘ concept is identical to any of those 
modern theories.  As I have mentioned, and as we will see in more detail when we examine 
the range of the modern literature on rights, most major contemporary rights theories divide 
into the two categories of ‗choice‘ theories of rights, and ‗benefit‘ or ‗interest‘ theories of 
rights.  The ‗choice‘ theories explicitly involve the notion of autonomy.  Having a right 
implies that one has a power over the duty that corresponds with the right.  So if I have a 
right to be returned the book I lent you, and you therefore have a duty to return it, I am 
entitled to release you from that duty if I so choose.  Obviously this is incompatible with the 
Thomistic ius that has been discussed, since an ius can also be a punishment that I am 
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 See, for example Tierney (1997, pp. 68 and 79).  Hart‘s approach, originally mentioned in The Concept of Law 
(1961) will be discussed further (and largely rejected) in chapter four and later chapters. 
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‗owed‘, and punishment is not usually something that can be chosen by the person who is 
owed the punishment. 
 Similarly, if the Thomistic ius is to be interpreted as a subjective right, we cannot 
understand it in terms of benefit theories.  Benefit (or interest) theories are based on the idea 
that a duty is correlated with a right where (among other things) the performance of the duty 
will benefit the right-holder, or be in their interests.  Again, we can see that ius cannot refer to 
a right by this understanding, since it is not always beneficial to, or in the interests of, the 
person whose ius it is. 
5. Moral and Political Rights 
So while something vaguely similar to a right seems to have existed in Roman jurisprudence, 
this was not modern subjective right in the sense that it is commonly understood.  By some 
stage in the high to late middle ages the notion of right has been lent a subjective sense.  
However, more than this is needed to characterise some of the senses in which the term 
‗right‘ is used in the present day. 
The first clear occurrence of the idea of moral rights is as natural rights.  However, 
when this concept emerged is another area of controversy.  As we have seen, Finnis asserts 
that this notion is present in Aquinas and in natural law theory.  The view that natural rights 
originate with natural law (just as legal rights are considered a product or aspect of human 
systems of law) is very common, and we will later see how this forms the basis for a family 
of criticisms of the idea of natural rights. 
 However, it has also been argued that natural law theory, in the form that it existed in 
Aquinas, was incompatible with natural rights theory.  According to Brian Tierney, Villey 
―maintained that the idea of subjective rights was ―logically incompatible‖ with the teaching 
of Aquinas…he wrote that ―There is no place in the system of St Thomas for the idea of 
subjective rights considered as a power or liberty of the individual‖‖ (Tierney 2002, p. 391).  
26 
 
As we have seen, Villey‘s view, along with Brian Tierney, was that while there was a concept 
of rights that existed in Aquinas‘ natural law theory, this was the objective sense of right 
taken directly from Greek and Roman thinkers, and not a sense that applied to individual 
subjects.  However, Villey‘s view was stronger than Tierney‘s in that he proposed that not 
only was Aquinas‘ sense of ius an objective one, but that a subjective sense would be entirely 
incompatible with Aquinas‘ wider natural law theory.  It appears that the basis of this 
argument lies in the fact that Villey makes an association between subjective rights and a 
nominalist view of metaphysics.  This is not the thesis for an in-depth exploration of Thomist 
metaphysics, so I will leave open the question of whether subjective natural rights could be 
present in Aquinas.  What cannot be doubted is that the Thomist natural law tradition is one 
of the many strands that have contributed to modern conceptions of moral rights.  However, it 
could be argued that rights as they subsequently developed would not have taken the form 
that they did without the rise of Renaissance Humanism, which was in many ways a direct 
reaction to scholasticism.  Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola‘s Oration on the Dignity of Man, 
published in the 1480s, and subsequent works that it influenced, emphasized notions of 
autonomy and self-creation to an extent that would not have had a place within Thomistic 
philosophy. 
6. Vitoria and Grotius – Political Rights in Natural Law Theory 
Grotius was among those responsible for cementing the intuitive link between rights theory 
and the natural law tradition.  The major text concerning this topic is De Jure Belli et Pacis, 
or The Law of War and Peace (sometimes translated as The Rights of War and Peace) which 
came out in 1625 (Grotius 1625/2005).  Grotius draws heavily from earlier thinkers, 
particularly from Francisco de Vitoria, whose De Jure Belli and De Indis were published 
seventy two years earlier (Vitoria 1991).  Vitoria helped to edit some of the work of Aquinas, 
who was a major influence.  Vitoria‘s interpretation of Aquinas‘ ius was much closer to what 
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was to become the basis of the natural rights theory of the renaissance.  Annabel Brett (1997) 
argues that Vitoria‘s reading of Aquinas is fairly radical, reinterpreting what appears to her to 
be only an objective ius as a subjective one.  Vitoria is also important in that he wrote 
extensively on international law, largely in response to the conquest of the Americas that was 
happening at the time.  De Indis and De Jure Belli both deal with the issues raised by the 
discovery of the Americas and the ethics of colonisation.  Ius is extended, not just in the 
theory of ius naturale, but also in practical political terms, beyond the boundaries of a single 
society or legal system (Vitoria‘s ius naturale was applied in his writings on the proper 
treatment of native people in the New World) bringing us closer to a contemporary political 
notion of universal human rights. 
 With Grotius we see an unquestionable (although questionably original) synthesis of 
many of the strands that we are looking for in a rights theory, and also a new emphasis given 
to rights as a central concept.  Grotius gives us a rights-based theory which is political and 
moral as well as legal, which espouses individual subjective rights, which is universal to all 
humans through a universal human nature, and which is discoverable through reason.  It is 
also quite possibly the case that Grotius, as someone involved in both legal and political 
disputes, was partially responsible for the beginning of the popularisation of the concept of 
natural rights.  In some ways it is unsurprising that a theory of this nature should come from 
the mind of a man like Grotius.  Grotius was a lawyer, and very aware of the classical 
jurisprudence that informed a great deal of legal practice at the time.  Ius will have been a 
very familiar concept to him.  In addition, he was a political prisoner and exile, which may 
have contributed to the sense of individual moral injustice which for some necessitates 
theories of individual rights.
1
  He was also influenced by the growing need for more detailed 
accounts of property rights.  His Mare Liberum argued that the sea was international territory 
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 See Butler (2009). 
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that people of all nations had a right to use for trade (Grotius 1972).  This justified the Dutch 
attempts to use its naval force to break up various trade monopolies that existed at the time.  
Once again, theories of rights were reformulated to address new political concerns. 
 Like Aquinas and Vitoria, Grotius is a natural law theorist.  Aquinas maintains that 
God, in his perfect rationality, knows what is the ultimate good, and that he determines the 
eternal law for the purpose of achieving that good.  The eternal law is discoverable to human 
beings because they can rationally partake in God‘s eternal reason.  This human immersion in 
the eternal law is what Aquinas calls natural law.  By this view, human nature is determined 
in accordance with God‘s eternal plan, and God knows our ultimate good and creates a law 
accordingly.  While the natural law is in a sense determined by human nature (because God 
decides the natural law in accordance with the good for mankind) God is necessary to this 
view as the ultimate lawgiver: 
If Aquinas's view is paradigmatic of the natural law position, and these two theses -- 
that from the God's-eye point of view, it is law through its place in the scheme of 
divine providence, and from the human's-eye point of view, it constitutes a set of 
naturally binding and knowable precepts of practical reason --- are the basic features 
of the natural law as Aquinas understands it, then it follows that paradigmatic natural 
law theory is incompatible with several views in metaphysics… it is clear that the 
natural law view is incompatible with atheism: one cannot have a theory of divine 
providence without a divine being. It is also clear that the paradigmatic natural law 
view rules out a deism on which there is a divine being but that divine being has no 
interest in human matters... whereas the paradigmatic natural law view involves a 
commitment to God's existence. (Murphy 2002) 
 
This goal-based view with its emphasis on God‘s will has its roots firmly in Aristotelianism.  
Grotius differs starkly on this point.  Like Aquinas, he believes in a natural law discoverable 
to man through reason, but for him this natural law is independent of God‘s existence.1  
Grotius made the controversial assertion that rights ―would take place, though we should 
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 This is true of Grotius‘ later works, although in his earlier writings he does support the Thomistic view, 
arguing that natural law is the revelation of God‘s will.  This view is not entirely divorced from his later writings 
in that he takes God‘s goal for mankind to be based in man‘s social nature, but it does still contain the theistic 
bent of earlier natural law theories.  However, by the time of the publication of De Iure Belli et Pacis, he had 
completely abandoned this view in favour of a theory based entirely in human nature.  See Tuck (1979, chapter 
three) for an account of the development of Grotius‘ thought throughout his career. 
29 
 
even grant, what without the greatest wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or 
that he takes no care of human affairs‖ (Grotius 2005, p. 89).  Grotius was a member of the 
Arminian school of theology, which rejected predestination and had a strong emphasis on the 
freedom of human beings to accept or reject the Word of God and to control the shapes that 
their lives took.  It also held that Christ‘s death was for all people who chose to repent of 
their sins.  This theological outlook has both an emphasis on human autonomy and a 
universal application.  Grotius was also writing against a background of massive religious 
upheaval and war in Europe.  Since Grotius was keen to avoid war, and took an approach that 
had practical implications for governments, we can understand even more why his approach 
to rights did not rely on theological origins.  While Tierney argues that this idea is not 
original to Grotius
1
 the fact that such an idea has arisen by this point marks a movement into 
a new secularist realm of ideas that paved the way for modern conceptions of rights.  It also 
marks the beginning of a massive promulgation of works in the theory of rights that is to last 
more than a hundred years and permanently alter the landscape of political thought and 
practice. 
 Grotius distinguishes between the objective right (what is right) and the specifically 
subjective sense (a right proper).  Although we have seen it argued that earlier thinkers held a 
concept of subjective right, Grotius is certainly the first person to formally categorise the 
notion of right in this way.
2
  In his Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland he states that 
rights proper (subjective rights) will be his central concern.  He goes on to say that a right 
proper is a relationship that exists between a rational person and what is appropriate to him 
through merit or property.  The area of rights discourse concerning what is owned, Grotius 
terms ‗commutative justice‘, and he calls the area concerned with what is merited 
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 He argues that the idea of natural law that would exist independently of God is evident in the work of many 
late scholastic thinkers, naming Suarez as an example (Tierney 1997, pp. 319-320). 
2
 Knud Haakonssen claims that Grotius had a transformative role in the creation of subjective right, although as 
we have seen there are also earlier contenders (Haakonssen 1985). 
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‗distributive justice‘, so here we see a notion of rights that involves jurisprudence, moral 
thought and political thought.  It is not so much that Grotius develops individual theories of 
rights for all of these areas, but rather that for him, all realms of normative thought are 
intrinsically related: 
 an entirely different aspect of Grotius' method concerns his refusal to divide ethics, 
politics and law into separate subjects. These days, compartmentalization is the norm; 
ordinarily, we study one of these subjects while paying scant attention to the others. 
Now, it is true that Grotius does often identify ways in which legal norms differ from 
moral or political ones (see, e.g., the discussion of laws at the beginning of DIB I.1). 
At the same time, he does not think that law, politics and ethics are entirely distinct 
domains... A fundamental tenet of his thought is that moral, political and legal norms 
are all based on laws derived from or supplied by nature. (Miller 2005) 
 
For Grotius, the sociability of human nature furnishes us with natural rights.  In political 
terms, the rights that a sovereign possesses derive originally from these natural rights (they 
are handed over to the ruler) and this includes the natural right to punish those who disregard 
the natural law (a view whose origins are often falsely attributed to Locke).  Hence we can 
see how law, politics and morality are essentially parts of the same picture for Grotius, as the 
basis for each of them proceeds from the natural rights that are held under the natural law. 
 One central question that arises with regard to Grotius is that of how individual rights 
can be a direct result of man‘s sociable nature.  As Tuck points out ―If we consider those 
theories that have traditionally stressed communitarian principles (such as classical 
utilitarianism), we can see that they have been precisely the theories which placed rights in a 
subsidiary position‖ (Tuck 1979, pp. 68-69).  For example, in the next chapter we will look at 
Marx‘s claim that the concept of rights is damaging to communitarian ideas because it sets us 
apart from each other by giving each of us claims against all the others.  Natural rights 
theorists are often individualists, and communitarians often dislike theories of natural rights.  
Thus it may seem a little odd to make the claim (as Grotius does) that individual rights have 
their origin in a shared and sociable human nature. 
On the other hand, it might be difficult to see how a theory of individual rights could 
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arise from an extremely individualistic view of human nature, since the concept of natural 
rights would be empty if there were no possibility of people respecting other people‘s rights.  
Theories of rights link people through networks of rights and duties, and this would be a poor 
way to try and make sense of a human nature that did not link us to each other at all.  It would 
thus appear that a theory of natural rights requires a conception of human nature that is 
individualistic in the sense that each individual has moral worth or moral status, and 
communitarian in the sense that each individual has a strong natural social relationship with 
other individuals, leading us to form communities.  This does not narrow the range of 
philosophers who can hold rights-based theories all that much, as I expect that everyone from 
Karl Marx to Robert Nozick would acknowledge our individual moral worth and our social 
behaviour.  However, it does perhaps illustrate that Tuck is rather quick to deny that Grotius‘ 
theory of ‗rights‘ is akin to a contemporary conception.  Grotius argues that rights are derived 
from our common social nature, and few of us would doubt that we hold theories of rights to 
be necessary because of our desire to live co-operatively with others. 
7. Hobbes 
Given these points about human nature and individualism, this would probably be a very 
good point to mention Hobbes.  Hobbes‘ conception of man‘s natural condition as ‗solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short‘ is so well known it is almost embarrassing to quote, but it is a 
good illustration of Hobbes‘ description of human nature.  It would therefore seem 
unsurprising that Hobbes writes about each individual‘s ‗right of nature‘ which allows him to 
aim for his own preservation in the turbulent state of nature, a notion that was probably 
influenced by the rise of mercantilism with its emphasis on competition for goods.  However, 
this right deserves a deeper analysis, since it is not at all clear that it shares all the features of 
the rights that we have been discussing up to this point.  We also need to consider what rights 
Hobbes thinks that people retain once they live under the power of a sovereign. 
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 It might be said that Hobbes‘ ‗right of nature‘ denotes not so much a moral concept, 
but rather a lack of one.  Natural man has a right to do whatever he pleases in order to aim at 
his own preservation precisely because of an absence of a moral framework imposing 
restrictions on people‘s behaviour.  Thus it might be said that Hobbes‘ right is not a moral 
idea in the sense that natural rights based in the intrinsic moral status of mankind are moral 
ideas. 
 But it is not as simple as this.  Some rights theorists would claim that many moral 
rights imply absences of moral restrictions.  These would generally take the form of rights to 
do things.  For example, if we were to claim that there is a moral right to bear arms, it would 
mean that there is no moral restriction on bearing arms.  A right to free speech would mean 
that there is no moral restriction on what I can say, and so on.  Rights to perform actions can 
be seen as implying moral permissions, or absences of moral restrictions.  They generally 
operate in the sphere of actions which are not proscribed but also not necessarily prescribed, 
and this is one of the reasons why they are frequently associated with liberty and liberalism.  
This is not dissimilar to what Hobbes had in mind.  After all, he regarded law and right as 
mutually exclusive concepts: 
THE right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man 
hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that 
is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own 
judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.  By liberty is 
understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external 
impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what 
he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his 
judgement and reason shall dictate to him. A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or 
general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is 
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that 
by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this 
subject use to confound jus and lex, right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, 
because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and 
bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, 
which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. (Hobbes 1985, p. 189) 
 
It might be argued that natural right is an opposite concept to natural law in that natural law 
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and natural right define each other‘s boundaries: natural right is the area of natural man‘s life 
that is not dictated by a natural law (a view that we will return to shortly).  If we were to take 
a right do something to mean merely the absence of a prohibition against doing it, then this 
would appear to be the very sense intended by Hobbes when he writes about a ‗right of 
nature‘.  A moral right taking this form is a moral concept, precisely because it describes the 
ground that is not covered by moral restrictions, just as a legal permission is a legal concept 
because it defines the area within which we are free to move without legal constraints. 
 However, this would not be an adequate definition even for the most minimal modern 
rights theories.  A right to perform a particular act must of course imply a moral permission, 
or absence of moral restriction.  But this is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.  The 
most important feature that a modern theory of rights requires that is lacking in Hobbes is a 
correlative duty.  While the right of nature means that no man is prohibited from doing what 
is necessary to aid his own preservation, no other man is required to do anything or refrain 
from doing anything in order to protect this right.  It is simply an absence of prohibition and 
is not active on anyone other that the right-holder.  Rights in the modern sense dictate moral 
relations between individuals, and not simply the sphere of activity of one individual.  In this 
sense we might say that Hobbes‘ notion of a right is even more individualistic than the rights 
theories of modern libertarians such as Robert Nozick.
1
 
 Another way in which Hobbes‘ right of nature does not correlate with modern rights 
theories is that it is debatable whether the right of nature is a moral right at all.  Let us assume 
that we understand the right of nature as occupying the area that is not dictated by the laws of 
nature, and that the domain of morality is to be understood purely in terms of those laws.  
This would suggest that the right of nature would be a moral right in the same way that legal 
rights to freedoms are can be said to be legal (because they define the area of human activity 
                                                          
1
 See, for example Nozick (1974). 
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ungoverned by positive law).  However, neither of those conditions has clearly been met. 
It is not obvious that the boundaries of Hobbes‘ right of nature are defined by the 
boundaries of his natural laws.  Additionally, it is not at all clear that the laws of nature 
themselves are moral concepts.  The sole concern of the laws of nature is the survival of the 
individual, and not the individual‘s interactions with others.  The laws of nature are what 
reason tells us is best for our own survival, not what is best in terms of the overall good.  The 
egoistic, self-contained and individualistic nature of these laws would seem to prohibit them 
from being moral laws.  Thus even if we could show that laws of nature implied the right of 
nature, this would not demonstrate that they implied moral rights. 
8. Locke 
A good place to end the first part of our story of the development of rights theories is with 
John Locke.  Widely regarded as an important figure in the histories of liberalism and 
individualism, Locke is massively significant to the development of political philosophy and 
political practice, and his view of natural rights and their connection with natural law is an 
essential element of this.  However, as we shall see, a great deal of what Locke had to say 
was more influential than it was original, and most of the central features of his theory of 
rights were already in place by the time that Locke proposed them.
1
 
 Locke famously claimed that there were three main natural rights: rights to life, 
liberty and property, and that these rights were inalienable and thus must be protected within 
a state as well as in the state of nature.  Unlike Hobbes and Grotius, for whom the notion of 
rights arguably did not depend upon the existence of a deity, Locke‘s natural rights are 
explicitly theological in origin.  Since God wills man‘s survival, he ordains natural laws and 
natural rights best suited to this goal. 
 However, other than with regard to this theological dimension, Locke shares many 
                                                          
1
 Much of Locke‘s thought on this is to be found in the Second Treatise of Government (Locke 1960) 
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features with Grotius in particular.  For both thinkers, moral, political and legal theories are 
inseparable and we need to understand all three of these strands in order to understand each 
of them.  For both Locke and Grotius, natural rights are intimately connected with natural 
law, and in civil society positive law must be aligned with the natural law.  In fact, many of 
the views on natural rights and natural law that Locke is so famous for are distinctly Grotian 
in character, even down to the ‗natural right to punish‘ those who offend against the natural 
law. 
 So why is Locke frequently regarded as such a major contributor to the present-day 
notion of moral rights?  This may well be down to some rather non-philosophical 
explanations.  Locke wrote the Second Treatise at a time when some would say that it was 
badly needed.  The exclusion crisis and King James‘ subsequent unsuccessful reign prompted 
a need for an account of royal succession other than the concept of the Divine Right of Kings.  
Locke‘s view was that earthly rulers and earthly laws and rights were instituted to protect the 
divine laws and rights apportioned to each citizen.  While by no means an original thought, 
this was voiced at precisely the time that many felt the need for this kind of justification.  In 
addition, like Hobbes, Locke wrote in English.  This made his writings accessible to a wider 
non-scholarly audience.  His writing is also exceptionally clear and succinct.  This meant that 
the Second Treatise was not only accessible to many people, but it was also easily 
comprehensible.  Locke‘s language can be seen echoed in the American Declaration of 
Independence, the French constitution and many other political documents.  As is often the 
case when ideas are clearly articulated, Locke‘s defence of natural rights has been the subject 
of many attacks.  Two of these traditional critiques of rights will be the main subject of the 
next chapter, after which we will examine more recent theories of rights. 
9. Chapter conclusion 
Of course, the history of the concept of rights did not end with John Locke, but in a 
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sense his theory is a clear encapsulation of all the characteristic features of theories of rights 
that I mentioned in section two of this chapter.  Many of the subsequent developments and 
refinements of theories of rights have been either in response to or catalysts of major 
historical events, such as the American War of Independence and the French Revolution.  As 
such, people recognized the appeal of rights language as a way of making moral demands on 
political institutions, and some of the content of rights became more concrete and less 
abstract.  For example, Thomas Paine defended the natural rights to education and an old-age 
pension. (Paine 1995, pp. 424-425).  This has also been the case more recently with the 
growth of the concept of human rights.  This has led to a certain suspicion that there is an 
unnecessary proliferation of rights, or that the rights chosen are in some sense arbitrary.  
While policy makers and political theorists have been increasingly concerned with concrete 
human rights to concrete things, much of the philosophical literature has become increasingly 
abstract, dealing with the foundations and proper analysis of a right (we will look at the 
details of this in chapter three).  To some extent there has therefore been a divergence 
between the more practical and the more philosophical rights advocates, with some of the 
theory of rights moving very far away from the practical concerns and needs that writers like 
Paine were keen to protect (although there is a lot of evidence that these two strands have 
started to converge once again in recent years). 
This chapter has really only been able to scratch the surface of the ways in which 
theories of rights have developed.  This is partly due to the fact that any thorough analysis of 
the history of the concept would have to be more heavily contextual than can be achieved in a 
single chapter.  However, several key points have emerged.  Firstly, we must recognize that 
the concept of rights cannot be summed up in one definitive statement or theory.  It is a 
concept with a very mixed ancestry, and as such can vary greatly in meaning and nuance.  
Perhaps to some extent a ‗family resemblance‘ approach might be the best way to 
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characterise what a theory of rights must be.  For example, Grotian approaches to rights may 
be less individualistic than we take to be typical of rights theories, but in other senses they 
have a great deal in common with many of the rights theories in contemporary western liberal 
thought.  It is also an extremely dynamic and alterable concept.  Rights have meant different 
things to different thinkers at different times, varying according to the philosophical 
inheritance of the thinkers involved, their other background beliefs, but also the social and 
political contexts of the time.  The way that we use moral language varies according to the 
purposes that it has to serve.  There is no reason to suppose that this process has come to an 
end.  We have not reached the end of history, and new problems, challenges and ways of 
relating to the world may prompt further evolutions in the concept of a right. 
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Chapter 2 – “The Second French Disease”1 
 
 
This short chapter focuses on two famous and influential criticisms of the language of rights.  
These criticisms will highlight some of the problems with rights discourse that will have to be 
addressed if we are to develop a coherent idea of environmental rights.  While the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw rights theories gaining popularity and credibility, 
the nineteenth century was dominated by scepticism regarding the existence of rights and the 
appropriateness of rights discourse.  This criticism was not confined to any one area of the 
political spectrum, as the two main focuses of this chapter, Bentham and Marx, make clear. 
 Criticisms of rights tended to fall into two distinct categories: those that maintained 
natural rights were false, illogical or non-existent; and those that claimed that they were 
dangerous or harmful in their effects.  Bentham rejected rights both on an ontological and a 
causal level, claiming that rights were both ―absurd in logic‖ and ―pernicious in morals‖ 
(Bentham 2004, p. 26). 
1. Jeremy Bentham – „Nonsense Upon Stilts‟ 
Bentham was famously sceptical (and arguably rather rude) about the notion of moral or 
natural rights.  His first argument, that rights are ‗absurd in logic‘, attacks the theoretical 
cogency of natural rights: 
It shall be seen, how from real laws come real rights: and then it will be seen, how 
from imaginary laws, come imaginary ones. Right, the substantive right, is the child 
of law: and when once brought into the world, what more natural than for poets, for 
rhetoricians, for all dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, to give the child a 
spurious parentage, to lay it at Nature‘s door, and set it up in opposition against the 
real author of its birth. Then comes a bastard brood of monsters, ‗Gorgons and 
Chimæras dire‘. (Bentham 2002, p. 400) 
 
                                                          
1
 Bentham‘s uncharitable estimation of the French understanding of rights (Bentham 2002, p. 400). 
Many thanks to the members of Eidos for their helpful comments on a paper that formed the embryonic stages 
of this chapter. 
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Bentham‘s basic argument is that rights are intrinsically legal entities (that is, they are 
meaningless unless governed by a law) and that there is no natural law.  The argument relies 
on two main premises, firstly that rights depend on a framework of laws, and secondly that 
there is no natural law.  The first would be accepted by many proponents of rights, although 
we must bear in mind the view that we encountered in chapter one which maintains that 
natural rights theory is incompatible with the early natural law tradition. 
(1a) Bentham on Duty 
Jonathan Gorman suggests that Bentham‘s first premise (that right is the child of law) is 
―supported by the view that rights are claim-rights that correlate with duties, so that they exist 
only in so far as there are laws imposing those duties‖ (Gorman 2003, p. 102).  The explicit 
categorisation of rights into groups including claim-rights, and the correlation of those rights 
with interconnected concepts came along later on in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld‗s 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919), but it does have some relevance.  As we saw in the 
first chapter, Grotius made explicit connections between natural rights and moral duties.  
Bentham certainly did hold that duties, like rights, were an important legal concept, and that 
they were intimately connected with rights: 
Right being one of the fruits of law, and Duty another, it occurred to the second set of 
constitution makers, that a Declaration of Rights would be but a lap-sided job, 
without a Declaration of Duties, to match it on the other side.  A first Declaration of 
Rights having driven the people mad, a Declaration of Duties, it was hoped, might 
help bring them to their senses… 
What seems to have been no better understood by the second set of constitution-
makers than the first, is that rights and duties are inseparable - that so sure as rights 
are created, duties are created too, and that though you may make duties without 
making rights… yet to make rights without making duties is impossible. (Bentham 
2002, pp. 380-1) 
 
This would imply that as well as rejecting natural rights, Bentham must reject ‗natural duties‘ 
on the basis that there is no natural law, and duty - like right - is ‗one of the fruits of law‘.  
Certainly, Bentham is consistent with this view in his Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (Bentham 1948) in which the term ‗duty‘ is constricted to the legal 
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sense.  He does accept elsewhere that there may be other ways of using the word ‗duty‘.  In 
his Fragment on Government, Bentham defines a duty as that ―which I am liable to be 
punished, according to law, if I do not do‖ (Bentham 1988, p. 109).  However, also in the 
Fragment, he accepts that there are two forms of sanction that are not punishments under law, 
and that these sanctions all correspond to different types of duty: 
1.  One may conceive of three sorts of duties: political, moral, and religious; 
correspondent to the three sorts of sanctions by which they are enforced… 
2.  Political duty is created by punishment; or at least by the will of persons who have 
punishment in their hands; persons stated and certain,-political superiors. 
3.  Religious duty is also created by punishment: by punishment expected at the hands 
of a person certain,-the supreme being. 
4.  Moral duty is created by a kind of motive, which from the uncertainty of the 
persons to apply it, and of the species and degree in which it will be applied, has 
hardly yet got the name of punishment: by various mortifications resulting from the 
ill-will of persons uncertain and variable,-the community in general: that is, such 
individuals of that community as he, whose duty is in question, shall happen to be 
connected with. (Bentham 1988, pp. 109-110n) 
 
While he emphasises the uncertainty and variability of the persons who apply the moral 
sanction, suggesting perhaps that it might be weaker than the political or religious sanctions, 
Bentham still states that there is such a thing as a moral duty that is enforced by this sanction.  
The moral sanction is a ―motive‖, which is the unhappiness resulting from the disapprobation 
of society, and when such a sanction is brought, even if it is not governed by an actual law, 
one can be under a duty to perform the act that prevents that sanction from being brought.  
This being the case, we can conclude from Bentham‘s position that duty is not simply the 
fruit of law (or at least of positive law) after all. 
 However, moral duty does not necessarily mean the same thing as natural duty, and it 
is unclear whether this presumption of a moral duty leads to the possibility of a moral (or 
natural) right.  We‘ll leave the first question to one side for now, and look at how a ‗moral 
duty‘ might correspond to a moral right.  Bentham‘s original argument against natural rights 
takes the form: 
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1) Right is the child of law 
2) There is no natural law 
so 
3) There are no natural rights 
Jonathan Gorman suggested that (1) is supported by the view that rights and duties are 
correlated and only exist to the extent that there are laws imposing those duties (p. 102).  We 
have concluded that this approximates Bentham‘s thinking, in that he acknowledges that 
duty, like right, is the child of law, and that a right cannot exist without a corresponding duty.  
He does however state explicitly that a duty can exist without a corresponding right.  This 
means that the fact of moral duty does not in itself prove the fact of moral right, since the 
moral duty could exist in the absence of moral right.  However, it does weaken Bentham‘s 
original argument.  If we accept (1) that right is the child of law and (2) that there is no 
natural law and that this demonstrates that (3) there are no natural rights, what are we to make 
of Bentham‘s view that there is moral duty?  Bentham has already stated that duty, like right, 
is a fruit of law.  We can imagine a parallel of Bentham‘s argument against natural rights, 
levelled at moral duties: 
1a) Duty is the child of law 
2a) There is no moral law 
so 
3a) There are no moral duties 
Bentham explicitly states (1a) that duty is the child of law, but his view as stated elsewhere 
contradicts (3a) in that he believes that there are moral duties.  If Bentham‘s original 
argument against natural rights is valid, and the argument above takes the same form, then 
this must lead to the denial of (2a) that there is no moral law, since the conclusion that there 
are no moral duties would follow if (1a) and (2a) were both true, and Bentham does not want 
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to accept this.  Bentham, in other words, must hold that there is a moral law if his arguments 
are to remain consistent.  If we accept the existence of a moral law (even if this is different 
from the natural law that Bentham is so keen to deny) Bentham‘s argument against natural 
rights cannot be levelled against such things as moral rights, since the argument would take 
the form: 
1b) Right is the child of law 
2b) There is no moral law 
So 
3b) There are no moral rights. 
We have already established that, given what Bentham says about duty, he cannot accept (2b) 
that there is no moral law, so (3b) that there are no moral rights cannot be proven in this way.  
To avoid this and reject moral rights, Bentham would either have to deny that there are duties 
that are defined according to moral sanctions or devise a different argument against moral 
rights that did not depend on the non-existence of a moral law.  This is not to say that 
Bentham must accept the existence of moral rights, all we have demonstrated is that his 
argument against natural rights cannot be used against moral rights if we are to accept what 
he says about a duty that is subject to a moral sanction. 
(1b) The Moral and the Natural 
So is there a distinction between moral rights and natural rights?  When Bentham talks about 
moral duties, he means duties created by the motive to avoid the disapprobation of society.  
This means that the precise nature of a moral duty in this sense varies according to social 
norms.  Unless Bentham‘s view of morality were culturally relative, this would be a very 
bizarre use of the term ‗moral‘, since it pertains to the nature of society rather than to the 
nature of right and wrong.  However, it is fairly clear that Bentham is not a relativist.  Quite 
apart from the fact that his thinking long predates the rise of relativism in moral theory, much 
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of his writing is often critical about moral codes and practises in other cultures, in fact his 
opinions on the growing belief in rights in America and France are good evidence of this.  So 
it seems that what Bentham must mean by ‗moral duty‘ is actually something more akin to 
‗social duty‘, something resembling the duty to observe cultural norms and etiquette.  This is 
not what is usually meant by the term ‗natural‘ when applied to natural rights and natural law, 
although the term itself deserves some fleshing out at this point.  ‗Natural‘ could be taken to 
mean a number of different things.  For example, in his Treatise of Human Nature David 
Hume (often mentioned by Bentham, sometimes less than favourably, but certainly an 
influence) is concerned with whether human virtues are natural (Hume 1985).  He discusses 
different possible interpretations of natural, contrasting what is natural with what is artificial, 
what is civil, what is cultural, what is supernatural, what is miraculous and so on.  Many of 
these ideas overlap or cover a range of grey areas so it might be helpful to clarify a few 
specific categories or types of use to which the word ‗natural‘ might be put:1 
1. A first sense of natural might be ‗not man made‘.  This sense contrasts nature with 
artifice.  It might be argued that Bentham‘s ‗moral duties‘ are man-made, because they are 
duties based on sanctions imposed by other people.  However, this is fairly ambiguous, 
because social attitudes and norms, while relating entirely to humans, are not ‗made‘ in the 
way that we make a knife or a house.  They are not the product of any person‘s (or group of 
persons‘) conscious design or plan.  Rather, they develop seemingly organically over time.  
This puts Bentham‘s moral duties in a rather ambiguous area with respect to this sense of 
natural.  If we regard all human practices as man-made as opposed to natural, this must 
include such things as hunting and eating.  This would seem very odd, since these things are 
not isolated to humans.  Certainly social norms which have sanctions attached to their non-
                                                          
1
 I am broadly following Hume‘s analysis here, but it is worth noting that there have been many other attempts 
to extricate the different possible meanings of ‗natural‘.  In the historical literature for example, Erik Wolf 
identifies seventeen meanings and Arthur Lovejoy found sixty-six!  See Wolf (1964) and Lovejoy (1935) cited 
in Tierney (1997, p. 48).  For a more philosophical analysis of the term, see for example Cargile (1989) and 
Spiegelberg (1951). 
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observance are not a purely human phenomenon.  We can observe simple versions of this 
type of behaviour among most social mammals.
1
  So this would seem to be a somewhat 
vague and unhelpful sense of ‗natural‘ for our current purposes. 
2. Another sense of ‗natural‘ which might be applied contrasts nature with society.  For 
example, this is the kind of ‗nature‘ that is meant by ‗state of nature‘ in the works of several 
political philosophers including Hume.
2
  If this is what Bentham means by ‗natural‘ when he 
makes reference to natural law, right and duty, then ‗natural duties‘ are in direct contrast with 
what Bentham means by ‗moral duties‘.  In fact, when Bentham characterises duties as 
political, religious and moral, this sense of natural is immediately excluded from the political 
and moral categories. 
3. ‗Natural‘ can also be contrasted with ‗supernatural‘.  That is, what is natural is 
anything that is not magical or miraculous.  This sense of natural obviously applies to 
Bentham‘s ‗moral duty‘ and his ‗political duty‘ but possibly not to his ‗divine duty‘, since the 
sanction on which that is based (divine retribution?) is decidedly supernatural in character.
3
  
However, many of the natural law theorists on whom Bentham will have drawn characterise 
the natural law as that which is given by God, and therefore divine.  This would suggest that 
‗not supernatural‘ is not necessarily what is meant by ‗natural‘ in the case of natural law, 
natural duty, and natural right, although for some natural rights theorists this is an important 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of this, see Bekoff and Pierce (2009).  Bekoff (a cognitive ethologist) and Pierce (a 
bioethicist) come to the rather radical conclusion that morality is a trait shared by humans and some other 
animals.  Whether or not we agree with their conclusions, it must be accepted that some non-human animals live 
in communities with norms, the breaking of which is responded to by violence, isolation or some other 
‗penalty‘. 
2
 For Hume the ‗state of nature‘ is used as a merely rhetorical device, since he believes human beings to be 
naturally social: ― ‗Tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, 
which precedes society; but that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem‘d social. This, however, 
hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos‘d state of nature; 
provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and never cou‘d have any reality.‖ 
(Hume 1985, p. 554) 
3
 Although if we accept the interpretation that Bentham was an atheist, he may have been referring more to the 
fear of divine retribution, than the retribution itself.  Interestingly this would suggest that a sanction is not 
needed for something to be a duty (as Bentham‘s wording seems to suggest) and that the belief that there is a 
sanction is sufficient. 
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aspect of their thought.
1
 
4. Another sense of ‗natural‘ distinguished by Hume contrasts what is natural with what 
is mental.  What is natural is what exists in the real world, the physical nature outside of our 
minds.  The only one of Bentham‘s duties which could plausibly be entirely independent of 
human minds is his ‗divine duty‘, although even this must be understood in human minds to 
be to any purpose.  On the other hand, no duty can be entirely internal, since all duties relate 
to something that must be done in the physical world (unless we allow for ‗thought-crimes‘).  
Certainly, Bentham‘s concept of a duty as characterised by a correlating sanction requires 
some non-mental existence.
2
 
5. In the Aristotelian tradition ‗natural‘ means pertaining to something‘s internal nature 
or essence.  This is the sense of ‗natural‘ that is intended in Aquinas‘ ‗natural law‘ theory.  
This would not exclude Bentham‘s ‗moral duty‘ from being ‗natural duty‘ after a fashion.  
All we would have to accept is that it is human nature to form societies that have social and 
cultural norms protected by sanctions.  We would also have to accept, however, that the 
precise nature of these norms varies between cultures, and that there is no one set of rules for 
living that is really true to our nature.
3
  If we did not accept this, then Bentham‘s ‗moral duty‘ 
would be quite different from ‗natural duty‘, since it depends on the things that a specific 
society places sanctions upon.  Most theories that use this sense of ‗nature‘ do however argue 
for a single human nature.  They also equate the fulfilment of that nature with the good for 
the person whose nature is fulfilled.  Since Bentham is not an ethical relativist, he does not 
equate the fulfilment of what he calls the ‗moral‘ law with the good for man.  So even if 
Bentham‘s ‗moral duty‘ is taken to be a ‗natural duty‘ in this sense, it would bear very little 
                                                          
1
 For example, Grotius‘ assertion that natural rights ―would take place, though we should even grant, what 
without the greatest wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no care of human 
affairs‖ (Grotius 2005, p. 89). 
2
 In any case, I shall argue in chapter eight that the distinction between the ‗mental‘ and ‗the world‘ should not 
be drawn so sharply as this. 
3
 Although some deny that this disagreement is as deep or as widespread as we might suppose.  See, for example 
Walzer (1994) and Küng (1996). 
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resemblance to natural law theories of this kind, most prominently in the sense that it would 
not be a moral theory. 
This suggests that the ‗moral rights‘ that Bentham cannot easily disprove do not bear 
more than a passing resemblance to the ‗natural rights‘ that he is very keen to dismiss, unless 
we are to employ an implausible sense of ‗natural rights‘.  This means that Bentham‘s 
premise that right is the child of law is not (as it initially appears that it might be) threatened 
by his concept of a ‗moral duty‘.  Bentham‘s moral duties do not resemble what we would 
normally regard as a moral code, but rather a set of merely social norms, and if there were 
corresponding moral rights in this theory, they would also be rights given by social 
conventions.  Thus even if we can demonstrate that Bentham‘s critique of rights cannot apply 
to such a thing as ‗moral rights‘, these rights would not resemble the ones with which this 
thesis is concerned. 
(1c) Bentham and Natural Law 
We have got this far by unpicking the notion that Bentham‘s first premise (1) that right is the 
child of law, is related to the idea that, as Gorman puts it, ―rights are claim-rights that 
correlate with duties, so that they exist only in so far as there are laws imposing those duties‖ 
(p. 102).  So what of Bentham‘s second premise, that there is no natural law?  Bentham will 
have been responding to the kind of natural law theory developed by Locke around a hundred 
years beforehand, which was very influential in the writings leading up to and surrounding 
the French and American revolutions of Bentham‘s time, such as Thomas Paine‘s Rights of 
Man (Paine 1995).  Why then does Bentham reject the notion of such a natural law? 
 If like Bentham we held that pleasure was the only good and pain the only evil, and 
that therefore the morally right action was that which maximised pleasure, we could still 
believe in some form of natural law.  In fact, the seemingly normative quality that pain and 
pleasure display in this view might be seen to present us with a ready-made natural law of a 
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certain kind.  Admittedly, rights that would be granted under a natural law such as this would 
be fairly limited, including perhaps a right to be given equal consideration in the utilitarian 
calculus, but utilitarianism does not seem to contradict natural law by its very nature.  Rather, 
it might be seen to support a form of it.  Ronald Dworkin makes an argument along these 
lines, arguing that utilitarianism has what appeal it does because of a fundamental right to 
equal consideration that lies at the heart of it (Dworkin 1984, pp. 154-159).  So, against 
Bentham, we might want to assert that natural law and natural rights are the basis of what 
utilitarianism is about. 
 It has been suggested that Bentham‘s view that there is no natural law derives from 
his view that laws require a legislator and there is no natural legislator.  Bentham‘s view that 
a law requires a legislator is expressed in his ‗Of Laws in General‘.  Bentham states that a 
law is meaningless unless it is an expression of the will of a sovereign exercised over those to 
whom his sovereignty applies.  The argument that there is no natural law maker, and 
therefore no natural law is something that is more difficult to track down in Bentham.  In a 
footnote near to the beginning of Of Laws in General Bentham just decries ‗laws of nature‘ as 
an example of ―fictitious entities‖ (Bentham 1970, p. 3n).  He does not appear to make the 
explicit claim that there is no divine natural lawmaker, but he does arguably claim that it is a 
mistake to call upon natural laws when we cannot appeal to God as a lawmaker: 
What is the true source of these imprescriptible rights, these unrepealable laws?- 
Power turned blind by looking from its own height: self-conceit and tyranny exalted 
into insanity.  No man was to have any other man for a servant: yet all men were for 
ever to be their slaves.  Making laws on pretence of declaring them: giving for laws, 
any thing that came uppermost and those most unrepealable ones, on pretence of 
finding them ready made.- Made by what?- Not by a God, they allow of none: but by 
their Goddess, Nature. (Bentham, 2002 p. 331) 
 
Let us assume that this is Bentham‘s argument for the non existence of a natural law: 
4) A law requires a sovereign (Bentham does say this) 
5) There is no natural sovereign (It is not clear that Bentham says this explicitly) 
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Therefore, 
2) There is no natural law 
There is a hidden assumption here that a natural law would require a natural sovereign.  This 
would probably be a fairly safe assumption if by ‗natural‘ we mean ‗not man made‘ or ‗not 
social‘ or possibly ‗not mental‘, but it would not be a reasonable assumption if natural means 
‗not supernatural‘ or ‗pertaining to the nature of a thing‘.  If we assume the truth of this 
hidden premise, then (2) there is no natural law does seem to follow from (4) and (5). 
 The definition of a law as requiring a sovereign perhaps makes Bentham‘s argument 
somewhat shallowly self-validating because it simply defines a law as part of a conventional 
legal system.  Bentham is just stating what it is for something to be a law under a judicial 
system and then saying that a natural law is not one of those.  Perhaps Bentham is claiming 
that there can be no law without a sovereign (a conventional legal system) and that therefore 
there is no natural law, but this does not derive anything new from its original premise.  The 
claim that there is no natural sovereign would initially seem to be one that Bentham would 
accept, since he is widely thought to be an atheist, but even this does not preclude the 
possibility of there being some other kind of natural legislator, perhaps, for example, human 
rationality itself.
1
  So this argument, often attributed to Bentham, although not easily 
discovered in his writings, would require a lot more work and argumentation.  This will be 
made especially clear in the next chapter, when we survey the wide range of contemporary 
moral rights theories, most of which do not depend on a natural law theory, and none of 
which rely on a natural legislator of a divine nature.  However, it does prompt us to ask 
whether there is a natural basis or grounding for rights. 
 However, this does not deal with Bentham‘s claim that rights are ‗pernicious in 
morals‘.  This related to Bentham‘s association of the idea of natural rights with much of the 
                                                          
1
 This might be regarded as a Kantian view. 
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turmoil and chaos that followed the French revolution.  Bentham‘s main contention here is 
that the idea of natural rights means that there is something more important, and more 
demanding on people‘s actions than the law of the land (as is the case in Locke, when the 
individual has a right to rebel when the state breaches his natural rights to life, liberty and 
property).  This, Bentham maintains, undermines state control and stability, and is likely to 
lead to anarchy.  I will not spend a great deal of time on this claim of Bentham‘s, because in 
most respects it is false.  When we examine the contemporary world, nations which are built 
on a strong articulation of natural human rights seem to be among the most stable nations in 
the world in terms of a lack of violent revolution and political upheaval.  However, there may 
be a sense in which these nations are less successful, namely (in a claim related to but 
different from Bentham‘s criticism) that rights make us put the individual over the state or the 
society in a way that does not threaten political stability, but is damaging to communities and 
communal attitudes.  This Karl Marx‘s claim, which we shall now address. 
2. Karl Marx – „The Separation of Man from Man‟ 
Unlike Bentham, Karl Marx did not claim that rights were false or logically absurd.  For him 
it is arguably the case that value systems are relative to the social and economic conditions of 
the society in which they are held.  If we take this interpretation, we can see why Marx is not 
concerned with whether rights theories encapsulate any genuine moral truths or make 
coherent claims.  His criticism is concerned with the relationship that theories of rights have 
to his overall critique of capitalism and social atomism.  It is not clear whether Marx‘s 
criticism is meant to be applied to any possible theory of rights, or simply to what he would 
characterise as a bourgeois capitalist conception of rights. 
(2a) Some Context 
Marx‘s critique of rights is closely related to his critique of capitalism in general, and this is 
not the place for a detailed analysis of Marxist theory.  However, the strands which relate 
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most specifically to Marx‘s analysis of rights should probably be drawn out at this point.  The 
Marxist concept of alienation has an important part to play here.  Marx claimed that under a 
capitalist system, individuals were alienated in various respects, and that this ultimately 
resulted from the mode of production.  The worker is alienated from his labour, his product, 
his fellow workers and even from his humanity. 
These different senses of alienation are all intricately entwined, but the important 
aspect for our purposes is the idea of alienation from other human beings.  Marx argued that 
people were alienated from each other because they were participants in a system which they 
did not own, and which forced them to relate to each other as objects or instruments in a 
machine, rather than on a genuinely interpersonal level.  One of the many ways in which 
Marx argues that this occurs is in relation to the capitalist urge to acquire property, which 
results in individuals viewing each other as enemies or obstacles which stand in the way of 
the acquisition of goods, rather than as fellow human beings.  Religion also has a role in 
Marx‘s conception of alienation.  Marx sees religion as a poor imitation of a genuine 
interpersonal relation, since all relationships between individuals are arbitrated through God. 
This analysis of religion is important to Marx‘s early writing On the Jewish Question 
in which Marx argues that ultimately people should arrive at freedom from religion, instead 
of freedom of religion, and only then would they experience true human emancipation (Marx 
1975).  The central question of On the Jewish Question is whether German Jews can achieve 
political emancipation (i.e. equality before the law with other German citizens) when they 
have not yet achieved this human emancipation.  The article was written in response to Bruno 
Bauer‘s 1843 article of the same name, which argues that Jews cannot be emancipated by 
granting political rights, since this would simply make them slaves to the German law, which 
since it had a Christian basis, would be contrary to emancipation.  They would simply go 
from being one type of slave to being another.  Thus until the state system had changed, the 
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Jews could not truly be emancipated whether or not they had equality before the law. 
Against Bauer, Marx argues that it is possible to secure political emancipation without 
having achieved human emancipation (i.e. emancipation from religion).  He supports this 
with reference to countries where religion is taken out of the public sphere and becomes the 
concern of the private individual, citing France and America as examples.  The individual is 
not emancipated in human terms, because of the capitalist system that he inhabits- he suffers 
the alienation from his fellow man of which Marx believes that religion is a direct result.  
Thus freedom of religion is only necessary in a society which alienates the individual and 
prompts him to seek comfort through fantasy.  With the emancipation of people from an 
alienating capitalist system will come true human emancipation and freedom from religion.  
Recall that for Marx, human emancipation is not merely political emancipation (the process 
of achieving equality before the law). 
(2b) Rights and Alienation 
Here it should already be clear that Marx does not support the system of rights and liberties 
put forward by thinkers such as Locke.  Lockean rights to liberty are worthless if the liberty 
that is being championed fuels alienation and social atomism, and rights to property are even 
worse, since ideas such as this give a natural justification for the acquisitiveness and greed 
which, to Marx‘s mind, support the capitalist mode of production.  Even rights such as 
freedom of religion will become empty and worthless once capitalism is replaced by a system 
which will allow people the human emancipation and genuine human relationships which 
will render religion unnecessary.  Marx makes a distinction between the ‗droits de l‘homme‘ 
(rights of man) and the ‗droits du citoyen‘ (rights of the citizen): 
These rights of man are partly political rights, rights which are only exercised in 
community with others.  What constitutes their content is participation in the 
community, in the political community or state.  They come under the category of 
political freedom, of civil rights, which we have seen by no means presupposes the 
consistent and positive abolition of religion and therefore of Judaism.  It remains for 
us to consider the other aspect, the droits de l’homme as distinct from the droits du 
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citoyen. (pp. 227-228) 
 
Among the rights of man distinct from rights of the citizen are ―freedom of conscience, the 
right to practise one‘s chosen religion‖, which is the main focus of Marx‘s attention in this 
text (p. 228).  Marx claims that the distinction between the rights of man and the rights of the 
citizen is itself an alienating one.  The fact that a man is encouraged to think of himself as an 
asocial atomised being who has moral rights that go beyond the rights that he has as a 
member of his society or political community serves to isolate him from other human beings 
and fuels his egoism.  This is in some respects remarkably similar to the criticism levelled by 
Bentham when he argues that natural rights are a dangerous concept because they are seen as 
having priority over the state and legal systems.  In both cases, rights are seen as putting 
individual interests above the interests of the social or political community. 
(2c) Liberty 
This criticism is not confined to the overall analysis of the concept of rights.  Marx also 
applies this on a more detailed level to the content of the individual rights of man.  For 
example, the natural right to liberty is regarded as particularly alienating, because it is based 
on the idea that a man is an ‗isolated monad‘.  A right to liberty describes the realm in which 
individuals are allowed to do whatever they want, and this is generally described in terms of 
avoiding harm to others, or to the rights of others.  Thus boundaries are drawn between 
individuals, marking off their own permissible area of freedom and separating them from one 
another ―just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a stake‖ (p. 229).  Bauer 
argued that Jews could not acquire the rights of man because their Judaism would transcend 
their human nature and prevent them from forming any kind of relationship with non-Jews, 
but on the contrary Marx argues that: 
the right of man to freedom is not based on the association of man with man, but 
rather on the separation of man from man.  It is the right of this separation, the rights 
of the restricted individual, restricted to himself. (p. 229) 
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(2d) Property 
Unsurprisingly though, one of Marx‘s biggest attacks on rights relates to the idea of property 
rights.  In fact, one of his biggest criticisms of the notion of rights in general is that all rights 
are limited by and dependent on property rights.  For example, he maintains that the right to 
equality before the law works in this way because the law exists in order to protect people‘s 
property rights, and thus the man with no property has no place before the law.  The same is 
ultimately true of liberty, because in capitalist systems liberty amounts to the liberty to 
acquire, use and dispose of property at will, so property rights are the only practical 
application of the bourgeois right to liberty. 
 Marx argues that property rights are alienating because the right to property means 
―the right of man to enjoy and dispose at will of his goods‖ (p. 229).  Marx suggests that the 
fact that the right permits men to do this ‗at will‘ encourages them to regard others as mere 
objects or obstacles that stand in the way of their accumulation of property.  People are set 
apart from each other because instead of seeing other human beings, we only see what other 
people can provide us with or hinder us from having for ourselves. 
(2e) Marx and Standards of Justice 
There is something of a question of how we can relate all of this to what Marx says about 
justice.  Allen Wood argues that for Marx, standards of justice are relative to the mode of 
production under which those standards are held (Wood 1972 and 1981).  He uses this 
interpretation to argue, against Ziyad I. Husami (1978), that Marx cannot be calling for the 
overthrow of capitalism because it is unjust.  Wood argues that by Marx‘s view, a system 
cannot be unjust so long as it conforms to its own standards of justice. 
 So where does this leave Marx‘s analysis of rights?  If Wood is correct, then Marx 
cannot be suggesting that the bourgeois conception of rights is unjust, or that this gives us 
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another reason to reject capitalism.  Perhaps the best approach here is to remind ourselves 
that rights (at least in the form that Marx is attacking them) are one aspect or element of the 
bourgeois standard of justice that exists under a capitalist mode of production.  Rights are 
part of the capitalist standard of justice, which itself reflects and supports capitalism, and this 
is the ground of Marx‘s critique.  However, this does prompt us to ask exactly what Marx‘s 
criticism of capitalism, and thus of rights, can be based upon if not an external standard of 
justice. 
However, while this may be a problem for Marx, I do not wish to examine this 
difficulty, since Marx‘s criticisms of rights can stand alone without any such presumption of 
relativism.  If we hold that systems of justice can be better or worse according to some 
standard then we can coherently criticise rights on the grounds that they cause social atomism 
or alienation, and that this social atomism or alienation is a bad thing. 
 It might be argued that critiques of rights of this kind have particular relevance to the 
case of the environment.  The claim that certain conceptions of rights fail to take account of 
the interdependence of people takes on a whole new level when we consider it in the context 
of environmental issues such as climate change, which is caused by elaborate networks of 
human actions and affects everyone.  This is heightened even further when we consider the 
role of humanity in general in the complex physical and biological systems which comprise 
our planet.  It could be that any theory that is irretrievably atomising and individualistic is not 
going to be fit for the purpose of examining global environmental issues, even if it is able to 
deal with areas of human life that are understandable in terms of simple relationships between 
individuals. 
(2f) Examining the Marxist Critique 
So what of the general claim that rights theories regard individuals as isolated monads?  
There is certainly some evidence for this in the contemporary way of characterising rights.  A 
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right can be seen to take the form: 
A has a right to x, against B 
A is the person who has the right, x is the content of the right, whatever it is that it is a right 
to (e.g. life, liberty, property etc.) and B is the person who has the corresponding duty, the 
person whose job it is to make sure the right is not violated.  We can see how this might 
appear to isolate the person whose right it is from the person whom the right is held against.  
B becomes an obstacle in the way of A being granted his right, someone of whom something 
has to be claimed or demanded.  A becomes someone to whom B owes something, and who 
stands in the way of A doing whatever he would otherwise be doing if the right was not 
constraining his activity.  It may then be argued that rights are both individualistic and 
adversarial in character.  We can contrast them with relationship-based ethics, for example 
the feminist ethic of care or maternal approaches to ethics.  These are based on reciprocal 
relationships and communal attitudes which would, it might be suggested, foster social 
cohesion rather than atomisation and alienation. 
 But are rights truly adversarial in this sense?  It is certainly the case that rights are 
regarded as things that we can claim from each other, and that we need to grant other people.  
However, in the case of what are commonly thought to be universal natural rights (rights to 
things like life and liberty) it may be argued that this is not the case.  After all, these are rights 
that everyone holds, and they are held against everyone else.  It might be suggested that rights 
that are based on a shared humanity or shared nature draw us together by recognising the 
moral worth that we all share, and that we grant others their human rights through a 
recognition of fellow humanity, quite the opposite of granting rights grudgingly with the view 
that the one claiming the right is a mere object or obstacle.  In addition to this, there has 
recently been quite a lot of published work on the notion of group rights, rights that are held 
by groups of people communally, such as cultures or nationalities.  If these rights are 
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plausible, it might suggest that rights do not necessarily separate people from each other as 
isolated monads. 
 However, in reality it is often the case that rights are used in an adversarial way.  The 
fact that there are situations in which they have to be claimed and are not automatically 
granted suggests that the one who the right is held against does not grant the right out of some 
commonly shared sense of humanity.  If it were the case that we fulfilled each other‘s needs 
and respected each other automatically out of some form of common sentiment, it might be 
argued that we would have no understanding of a concept such as rights, since it is only 
necessary to conceptualise rights if those rights sometimes have to be claimed.  This would 
suggest that, even if rights are not in themselves individualistic and atomising, they certainly 
might be a product of a society that is. 
 The appeal to group rights is not necessarily going to solve our problems unless we 
approach it very carefully.  If it is the case that individual rights build barriers and divisions 
between individuals, might it not also be said that group rights build barriers and divisions 
between different groups?  Perhaps the notion of one nation or culture making rights claims 
of another is a dangerous one that leads people within both groups to regard human life in 
terms of their people and ‗the other‘, with those who are in the other group merely 
representing barriers to the needs or desires of their own people.  One suggestion for how we 
might deal with this is to have groups that operate on a number of different levels.  We might 
attribute rights to individuals, families, cultural groups, nations, and even species or 
ecosystems.  This would create a complex network of rights claims that could arguably be at 
least as cohesive as it is divisive, reflecting the different moral bonds and allegiances that we 
experience.  More will be said about this in chapters five and eight. 
 However, to the extent that theories of rights do not commonly reflect these bonds, it 
may be that Marx‘s claims about the individualistic and atomising nature of rights theories 
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has some merit.  To examine this claim further we must look at Marx‘s more detailed 
analysis of the content of many natural rights theories, or what it is claimed that there is a 
right to.  One of the major contentions here is, as I outlined earlier, the claim that all other 
rights are limited by property rights, and then the ensuing critique of such property rights. 
 The claim that liberty, or freedom of, is generally lived out in terms of property rights 
in capitalist societies seems to have some merit.  Freedom is often (in reality) the freedom to 
make use of one‘s material possessions in a manner that one desires.  An individual‘s right to 
liberty is often seen as being breached by legal or physical obstructions to an individual‘s 
behaviour, but a lack of the material conditions necessary to live as one chooses is not often 
seen as a breach of the right to liberty in the same way.  There are some rights theories now 
that have a more welfarist and positive freedom related viewpoint
1
 but rights as they stood in 
Marx‘s time were understood in such a way that a lack of material wealth would not 
generally be seen as a violation of the right to liberty. 
 What of the claim that the right to equality before the law is limited by the right to 
property?  If Marx‘s intention is to criticise the idea of a general right to equality, then this 
seems rather less convincing than the general critique of rights that he offers, however it 
might be a valid criticism of what Marx might have regarded as a bourgeois notion of rights.  
The argument is that the right to equality before the law is flawed because the law exists only 
to protect property rights, leaving the person without property with no place before the law.  
However, Marx clearly thought that protecting private property rights was not the sole reason 
for which we could have laws.  Under a socialist system, individual private property would 
be virtually abolished, and the purpose of the law would be, among other things, to protect 
this status quo, at least until the ‗withering away of the state‘.  Thus it seems that if this 
                                                          
1
 The literature on this is fairly widespread, but some such ideas are explored by various authors in Pogge‘s 
edited volume, Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (2007), and by 
Elizabeth Ashford (2006). 
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criticism is to make sense it must be leveled at either a ‗bourgeois‘ political philosophy, or at 
the idea of rights as considered within a capitalist system.  As we have seen, Marx thought 
that rights were consistent with and contributory to capitalism, and measured up to a 
capitalist understanding of justice, so the subject of this criticism must be what Marx would 
consider to be bourgeois political philosophies (but remember that, as we saw in the last 
chapter, many features of rights predate capitalism). 
 Locke would appear to be the philosopher most subject to this criticism.  His concept 
of rights and his analysis of the purpose of the law and the state seem to approximate most 
closely the ideas that Marx is attacking.  Locke believed that the reason that the state was 
initially instituted was because of difficulty in administering justice.  Whilst in Locke‘s state 
of nature, people would have a natural right to punish those who breached the law of nature, 
this natural right would ultimately be unable to deal with all disputes.  The reason that 
eventually the natural right to punish would become insufficient is that the invention of 
money would allow people to accumulate wealth in a way that they were unable to before.  In 
a rush to accumulate more money, people would put more pressure on natural resources, and 
scarcity would result, leading to more disputes over ownership, theft, and other issues relating 
to money and property.  Thus the state and the rule of law were, according to Locke, created 
to prevent these disputes. 
 So in a sense, Locke does maintain that the law exists to protect private property.  He 
implies that without private property or money there would be no need for a state and a 
human legal system.  However, although he thinks that property and money were causally 
responsible for the creation of legal institutions, he does not regard the protection of private 
property as the sole purpose of the law and the state.  He thinks that the invention of money 
and the resulting scarcity would not just jeopardise the individual‘s natural right to property, 
but also his natural rights to life and liberty.  The state and the law would have been created 
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to protect all three of these natural rights and to uphold the corresponding natural law.  Thus 
it would seem that the right to equality before the law would not simply apply to those with 
property, but to anyone who has an interest in the protection of their life or liberty. 
3. Chapter Conclusion 
It does seem fair to say that, at least in a limited sense, there is some validity in Marx‘s claim 
that rights, or at least a certain conception of rights, can be socially alienating.  This is hardly 
surprising, considering the prominent role of rights and the individual in much of liberal 
political thought, and is perhaps only a major problem if we place a strong focus on the idea 
of the political or social community.  However, most political thinkers regard both the 
thriving of the individual and the cohesion of society at large to be important issues - it 
needn‘t be the case that we consider ourselves merely as individualists or merely as 
communitarians: 
the whole idea of a single favoured, exclusively real unit was mistaken in the first 
place.  Life goes on on various scales, each of which is real and has to be thought of 
in its own terms. (Midgley 2005c, p. 371) 
 
We will also apply theories of rights to environmental ethics, and many of the approaches 
that are taken in environmental philosophy are deeply suspicious of valuing life only on the 
level of the human individual.  If their suspicion is well founded, then it would seem natural 
to suppose either that the different levels on which life functions may best respond to 
different ethical and intellectual tools, or that the ways that we use to think about the 
individual must be extended to accommodate different ‗units‘ of life.  These notions will be 
considered in greater detail later on, but it may be that rights as they are commonly currently 
conceptualised are not well suited to considering wider social interests (more will be said 
about this claim in chapters three and five).  We may respond to this either by ruling that 
rights-talk is inapplicable in certain cases, abandoning it altogether, or modifying or selecting 
theories of rights in a way that makes them more applicable to these ways of thinking. 
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Chapter 3 – Theories of Rights in the 20th and 21st Centuries 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a broad overview of some important areas of theories of 
rights.  The aim at this point is not so much to reach a conclusion about the relative merits of 
the different theories, but rather to pull out dominant features of these theories which can be 
applied to environmental ethics and politics.  Thus the role of this chapter, while critical to a 
small extent, is more explanatory and expository, providing the groundwork for the applied 
philosophy which will dominate the next section of the thesis. 
 From the examination of eighteenth century theories of rights, and their nineteenth 
century criticisms, we see the emergence of the basic features of modern rights theories that I 
identified in the last chapters.  These are theories espousing rights that are not just legal, but 
also natural or moral, which are generally applied in political spheres, and which are usually 
associated with a liberal and individualistic school of thought.  We also see a basic idea of the 
structure of a right outlined: the association of a right with some kind of law or duty which 
correlates with the right, where the duty is associated with moral agency, and the right with 
the moral patient or the focus of moral agency. 
 However, until the twentieth century, this analysis was very crude, based on a vague 
notion that rights were in some way associated with duties.  The precise nature of this relation 
was still unclear.  The twentieth century saw, as with many other areas of philosophy, an 
increased rigour in the analysis of theories of rights, with the various different connections 
between right and duty clearly delineated.  At the same time, rights parlance has become 
increasingly popular in everyday moral discourse.  Rights have entered the general moral 
terminology of our society, sometimes perhaps in ways that lead to an unreasonable 
proliferation of what can be considered the content of a right, but also in ways that have 
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lasting and important effects upon the ways that social and public policy develops.  The idea 
of rights has become more analytic and abstract within philosophy, and more intuitive and 
popular outside it.  In some ways it is almost as if the concept of moral rights has forked into 
two distinct strands, each with a life of its own.  Having said this, towards the end of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, it might be argued that these strands 
have started to converge again, with an increasing interest in applications of moral rights to 
concrete moral, political and social issues.
1
 
 The beginning of the divergence probably occurred with the publication of Hohfeld‘s 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1919).  Whilst Hohfeld‘s 
concern was with legal rights, his categorisation of different types of right and their relation 
to duties has been very influential on work on moral rights.  This raises an important question 
about how well these detailed legal analyses can be carried over to the field of ethics, which 
is, some might suggest, rather more fluid: 
We need to recognize that when we apply the Hohfeldian analysis in the moral 
sphere, we must expect claims about moral rights to reflect the vagueness and 
indeterminacy afflicting claims about moral duty and obligation in general.  Once 
again, this need not be taken as a criticism of the idea of moral rights, but it gives us 
fair warning of the degree of precision we are entitled to expect with this subject-
matter. (Waldron 1984, p. 8) 
 
Rather than regarding morality as being ‗afflicted‘ by vagueness and indeterminacy, it may 
be that the plasticity of moral concepts is a reflection of the richness of human experience, 
something which cannot be easily pinned down by a simple set of formulae.  While a theory 
of rights that accounts for this may be a difficult thing to formulate and work with, it could be 
suggested that this is as much an opportunity as it is a crisis.  There is no reason why we 
ought to regard morality as a branch of science or mathematics, and it could be argued that 
even modern science has better resources to deal with vagueness and indeterminacy than 
                                                          
1
 For example, a lot of work has been done in recent years concerning the applications of moral rights in global 
political theory (see Caney 2005, Ignatieff 2003, and Pogge (ed.) 2007).  There has also been an increase in the 
application of theories of rights in bioethics (see for example Warnock 2002 and Wellman, 2005) 
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some of the more legalistic approaches to moral philosophy, as we shall see in the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
 Another characteristic of the twentieth century rights debate has been the concern 
with deeper metaethical questions about the grounding or justification of rights, and how this 
relates to their compatibility with various types of moral theory.  Related to this is the notion 
that a moral theory could be ‗right-based‘ or have rights as its foundational or central concept 
from which other moral concepts such as duties, goals and virtues are derived.  Some 
theorists find the concept of a right-based theory appealing because it is patient-centred: that 
is, the concept of a right focuses on the recipient of moral agency rather than the moral agent 
himself (in this respect, theories of rights share a structural similarity with needs-based moral 
theories, which are currently being given some consideration).
1
  For some, this patient-
centred aspect provides a vital justification for moral duties and draws attention to the real 
purpose of moral obligations and prohibitions.  However, as we shall see, it has been argued 
that a right-based theory is an impoverished one which can‘t capture the richness of moral 
agency, or indeed the richness of community and the common good. 
 These criticisms may only apply to a right-based morality, and not to the concept of 
rights altogether.  If they are successful, several options remain open.  Firstly we could 
abandon the concept of moral rights as having a role in a moral theory.  This may be done for 
reasons of intellectual economy.  Perhaps there can be a perfectly explicable moral theory 
which is based on a simple principle or set of principles and has no need for the complexity 
that a theory of rights would introduce (although perhaps given what has been said about the 
complexity and indeterminacy of our moral lives, we should be suspicious of over-simplistic 
monolithic moral theories).  On the other hand, there may be stronger reasons why we would 
abandon the concept of rights altogether.  Perhaps they are, as Bentham puts it, ‗absurd in 
                                                          
1
 See, for example Brock 2004, Reader 2007 and O'Neill, 1998. 
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logic‘ or ‗pernicious in morals‘.  We may alternatively wish to retain rights as a derivative or 
subsidiary notion in a moral theory which is based on something else (duties, goals, needs 
etc.).  Or we may prefer to propose a moral theory which is based on multiple foundational 
concepts.  According to this solution, rights are part of the basis of morality, but they hold 
this place alongside other moral concepts and principles.  We will examine these alternatives 
towards the end of this chapter. 
1. The Force of Rights Discourse 
What is it that gives moral rights added moral significance that distinguishes them from other 
morally relevant aspects of the moral patient, such as interests, needs, claims and so on?  
Rights are often called upon as an argument stopper.  Once an individual has appealed to his 
right to something, the only available responses are to deny that he has such a right, or to 
acknowledge the duty that the right entails.  An acknowledgement of a right often seems to 
be taken to be the acknowledgement that a certain course of action must be taken, no matter 
what other moral considerations are at stake.  Rights then seem to have some special force or 
demandingness which gives them a particular kind of moral priority over other salient 
features of a situation. 
 One way to understand this is to say that rights are absolute.  That is, if X has a right 
that Y performs some action, there can be no outweighing reason why it is a morally 
justifiable thing for Y not to perform it.  If I have a right to something, no other moral 
considerations can get in the way of the granting of my right.  This view of rights captures 
one of the intuitively appealing aspects of a right, the idea that rights are an expression of 
some kind of inviolable human dignity, that there are certain aspects of a person which 
simply must never be trampled on, even as a means to a morally admirable end.
1
  Despite this 
                                                          
1
 It is for this reason that some have claimed that a strong doctrine of rights is implicit in the moral philosophy 
of Immanuel Kant, although he never makes direct reference to rights. See Waldron (1984, p. 1) and Mackie 
(1984, p. 169), and see Melden (1980, pp. 189-190) for a rejection of this view.  It can be argued that while Kant 
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intuitive appeal, this approach does have its difficulties. 
 These mostly relate to two points.  Firstly, there are sometimes conflicts between 
different rights (or even between different people‘s claiming of the same rights).  Secondly, 
there are conflicts between what outcomes or decisions the granting of a right would involve, 
and those outcomes or decisions that we might regard as preferable for the sake of other 
moral reasons and justifications which are not rights.  If it is genuinely the case that rights can 
conflict with each other, then it must be the case that not all rights can be absolute in the 
sense that they must always be granted.  However, this would not mean that absolute rights 
are impossible.  It might mean that only some rights are absolute, a position taken by Alan 
Gewirth (1984). 
 More complicated in some ways is how we deal with situations in which rights 
conflict with other principles that we hold dear.  An example that is often given is the 
example of torturing an innocent person to prevent a terrorist attack that will kill thousands.  
In this case, some would argue that the utilitarian considerations of the situation overcome 
the individual‘s right not to be tortured1.  It could of course be that some rights are not 
absolute, and can be overcome by these other principles, whereas other rights are absolute 
and take priority.  However, this leads to a further question of what it is that gives some rights 
special force over others, as well as what it is that gives rights special force over other 
interests.  If some rights are absolute, but others are not, this still does not seem to tell us 
anything about what the special force of rights is. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
does place central importance on the essential dignity of mankind and the view that one should never be treated 
as a mere means to an end, that this is not sufficient grounds for recognising his moral philosophy as a right-
based or even a right-accommodating theory. 
1
 Although it can of course be argued that the terrible thing about the terrorist attack that is to be avoided by the 
act of torture is the massive violation of rights that it involves, in this case the violation of thousands of 
individuals‘ rights to life, so it may be that this is simply a case of a conflict between different rights after all.  It 
could be responded that were we to abstain from torture, we would not be violating anyone‘s rights, we would 
simply be allowing the terrorist to do this, but this seems to be straying away from the question of what 
principles can conflict with rights, and more into the ground of the moral distinction between acts and omissions 
(or perhaps even the doctrine of double effect) that have been dealt with in plenty of other places. 
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 One solution comes from Ronald Dworkin, who argues that rights act as a kind of 
‗trump card‘ in legal, political and moral decision making. Dworkin‘s writings on rights are 
largely discussions of jurisprudence, but since he rejects legal positivism and proposes the 
view that legal propositions are supported by moral propositions about individual human 
rights, jurisprudence and moral and political philosophy are never far removed from each 
other in his works.  Dworkin proposes that 
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals.  Individuals have rights 
when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying 
them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification 
for imposing some loss or injury upon them. (Dworkin 1977, p. xi) 
 
So an individual has a right when his prima facie entitlement should be granted even when it 
outweighs the prima facie demands of general social (in Dworkin‘s case utilitarian) 
considerations.
1
  So if we hold that an individual has a right to publish pornography (an 
example from Dworkin‘s ‗Rights as Trumps‘ (1984)) this means that it is wrong for political 
or legal institutions to breach that right, even if doing so would have general benefits in terms 
of utility for the wider community.  In Dworkin‘s scheme, there is a ―background justification 
for political decisions‖, namely the good of the community, and rights stand out against this 
background when deeper underlying considerations deem the individual‘s interest to take 
priority (Dworkin 1984, p. 153). 
 So what are the deeper underlying considerations that underpin both the background 
justification, and the grounds for making exceptions to it in the form of rights?  According to 
Dworkin there are two answers to this question.  Firstly we can adopt a pluralistic approach 
under which, for example, there are utilitarian principles that show pornography to be a bad 
thing, but also stronger outweighing non-utilitarian principles which mean its publication 
should be permitted.  Secondly, we can look to the deep principles which justify 
utilitarianism in the first place, and say that in this case, even though utility is not served by 
                                                          
1
 See also Wasserstrom (1977) 
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the publication of pornography, forbidding its publication would be in breach of the deeper 
principles which justify utilitarianism in the first place. 
 Dworkin takes the second approach, arguing that utilitarianism garners its appeal from 
its egalitarianism.  A utilitarian theory which sought to maximise the welfare, happiness, 
preferences etc. of an elite would seem to lose all of the appeal of utilitarianism.  Therefore 
there are some cases where, even though the greatest number or the community as a whole 
would be best served by a particular action, carrying it out would be in contravention of the 
egalitarianism which is the deeper justification for utilitarianism.  Rights act as a kind of 
buffer, protecting utilitarianism from extremely inegalitarian consequences.  However, this is 
not the same as an absolute right, because such a ‗trump‘ can be overcome by overwhelming 
considerations of utility.  Thus what characterises a right for Dworkin is its ability to 
contradict the background justification, and what gives it its special force is the underlying 
consideration of egalitarianism. 
The problem with this is that it seems that Dworkin‘s entire notion of a right is 
founded upon one presupposed right: the right to equality: 
The force of this underlying right, and of other rights which are derived from it 
directly, is not captured either by the trumping image nor explained by the external 
preferences argument
1
 (Waldron 1984, p. 17) 
 
This is not necessarily a damning criticism though, provided we claim that rather than a right, 
it is founded on an underlying interest in equality, or some feature of our humanity or identity 
that entitles us to equal treatment.  It would seem very intuitive to claim that, if they can be 
founded on anything, rights are founded on those things that we most fundamentally value 
about human (and perhaps other) life. 
Another point to bear in mind here is that while Dworkin‘s wider moral and legal 
                                                          
1
 There is not time here for the external preferences argument.  Internal preferences are the preferences that we 
have regarding our own welfare or happiness, and external preferences are the preferences that we have 
regarding the welfare or happiness of others.  Dworkin argues that external preferences must not be a factor in 
legal and political decision making, as they are likely to corrupt the egalitarian character of decisions. 
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theory should not be regarded as individualistic, his theory of rights is individualistic by its 
very nature, because it is a theory that tells us which individual interests can be taken as more 
pressing than the interests of the wider community.  It may be possible to adapt this theory to 
the rights of groups, but it would need to be rephrased in terms which Dworkin himself 
would not employ.  The notion of group rights will be explored in chapters five and eight of 
this thesis. 
 Another consideration that we might wish to highlight because of the relevance that it 
will have later in the thesis is the scope of the egalitarianism which underpins Dworkin‘s 
argument.  Arguments about equality have been made in western cultures for centuries, but 
the class of moral patients to be counted as equals has gradually expanded.  We no longer 
consider equality among white middle-class men to be sufficient.  So there is a question about 
who should be included and who excluded as equals.  I will explore some of the ‗hard cases‘ 
for the ascription of rights later in this thesis, looking among other things at animals, future 
people and groups.  If a right is a recognition of equality, it may be that a being cannot have a 
right unless it is to be considered of equal moral status as other beings to whom we ascribe 
rights.  This make the task of ascribing rights to some of these hard cases rather more 
difficult. 
2. Hohfeld‟s Categories 
At this point we need to turn more to the analysis of the structure of a right.  Hohfeld 
identified four main categories of legal rights, and these categories have often been carried 
over (with a greater or lesser degree of success) to the moral sphere.  These types of rights are 
defined in terms of their relation to duties, and Hohfeld builds a complex interrelation of legal 
concepts around this categorisation.  Most legal rights (and probably also most moral rights) 
can be seen as combinations of related Hohfeldian rights, but examples of each category can 
also count as rights on their own.  The first category is what Hohfeld terms a ‗privilege‘, or 
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‗bare liberty‘.  For X to have a privilege to do something just means that X has no duty not to 
do it.
1
  If one of my neighbours leaves a crate of apples outside his gate with a sign reading 
‗help yourself‘, I have a privilege to take some apples.  However, I have no grounds for 
complaint if someone comes along before me and takes all the apples.  I cannot demand 
recompense against either my neighbour or the person who has taken the apples, since my 
privilege relates only to my lack of a duty not to take the apples, and does not imply any duty 
incumbent on anyone else. 
 The second category is claim rights.  This is when X‘s right to something imposes a 
duty on some other agent.  Claim rights are probably the dominant sense of ‗right‘ in moral, 
political and legal thought, and can be further separated into many different categories which 
we will come to shortly.  Claim rights and privileges are what can be understood as ‗first-
order‘ rights, relating directly to what people can and can‘t do and have. 
Hohfeld‘s final two categories both describe ‗second-order‘ rights, which relate to the 
ability or inability to alter existing rights and duties.  The first of these is a ‗power‘ which 
refers to the ability to alter existing legal arrangements.  So in the case of a contract made 
between two people, each of those people have certain rights and duties under the contract, 
but one or both parties may have the right to terminate the contract. 
 The final category is immunities.  The immunity in question is an immunity from 
changes in existing legal arrangements as detailed above.  In this sense it is the opposite of a 
power.  If person X has no power to alter existing legal arrangements with respect to person 
Y, then Y has an immunity.  This may be the case when a constitution protects individuals 
against unfair legislation, or in the case of a customer whose rights concerning their purchase 
cannot be changed at will by the company that they are buying something from. 
                                                          
1
 Waldron points out that Thomas Hobbes‘ right of nature is sometimes regarded as a Hohfeldian privilege, 
although he suggests that it is probably actually something stronger: ―the idea that it is perfectly rational for P to 
do X and that he cannot be criticized in that regard‖ (Waldron 1984, p. 6). 
69 
 
 Hohfeld‘s analysis then gives each of these four categories a jural opposite and a jural 
correlative.  The jural opposite is what an individual must lack if they have that category of 
right, so an individual in possession of a privilege lacks a duty.  An individual who has a 
claim right lacks what Hohfeld calls a ‗no-claim‘ (which is precisely what it sounds like), an 
individual who has a power lacks a ‗disability‘ (the inability to change legal relationships), 
and an individual who has an immunity lacks a ‗liability‘ (the liability to be subject to 
changes in legal relationships).  The jural correlative of each of the categories is what another 
individual must have if an individual has each type of right, so if A has a claim-right, then B 
has a duty towards A, if A has a privilege, then B has a ‗no-claim‘ (it is impossible for B to 
have a claim-right to something if A has a privilege or bare liberty to it), if A has a power, 
then B has a liability, and if A has an immunity, then B has a disability. 
 This describes not just how these different categories of rights can be understood in 
terms of duties, but also how they might relate to each other through the complex 
relationships of their opposites and correlatives.  The focus of most of this thesis will be on 
claim rights, but it is important to bear in mind that while this is the dominant concept of a 
moral right, the other senses may creep into our moral discourse.  It may be that when people 
argue about their right to have children, to pick one example, they may be talking past each 
other because one is talking about a claim-right and the other is talking about a privilege (or 
bare liberty). 
3. The Analysis of Claim Rights 
As I have already mentioned, most rights (legal and moral) are considered to be largely 
claim-rights, but involving bundles of interrelated Hohfeldian rights.  Leif Wenar gives the 
example of a property right that you have over your computer (2005, p. 5).  In terms of first 
order rights, you have both a claim against others using your computer and a privilege to use 
it, but you also have a power to alter these rights (by selling the computer, giving it to 
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someone else, or simply by letting others use it) and an immunity against others altering these 
rights (you are the only person who is entitled to forfeit the claim right you have against 
others using the computer). 
(3a) Rights in Rem and Rights in Personam 
Claim rights, the dominant concept in theories of moral rights, also divide into a number of 
different categories.  We have claim rights in personam, and claim rights in rem.  Claim 
rights in personam are rights held against a particular individual, whereas claim rights in rem 
are those held against everyone.  So what we generally consider to be human rights (rights 
not to be killed, tortured, imprisoned etc.) are rights in rem, as is your claim right against 
others using your computer.  An example of a right in personam would be my right that you 
honour your promise to me, and perhaps rights that we have against politicians, doctors, and 
other people who are in a position which gives them a particular responsibility to act in our 
best interests.  Whether a claim right is a right in rem or in personam depends on who bears 
the duty that correlates with that claim right.  If the bearer of the correlative duty is some 
named individual, it is a right in personam, and if it is people in general, it is a right in rem.  
Of course, if we understand moral rights as ‗bundles‘ of Hohfeldian concepts, they may be 
rather more complicated than this, implying a range of duties and obligations. 
(3b) Negative and Positive Rights 
Another distinction that needs to be made here (and one which is related to the in rem/ in 
personam distinction) is between negative and positive rights.  Again, this distinction is based 
on the nature of the correlative duty.  A claim-right is positive when it is correlative with a 
duty to act, and negative when it is correlative with a duty to refrain from acting.  Whether 
this distinction is morally significant depends on one believes there is a morally significant 
distinction between acts and omissions.  This has been the subject of much philosophical 
discussion (particularly on the question of whether there is a morally significant difference 
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between killing and letting die) and I cannot do it justice here.  As Joel Feinberg observes 
―Typically, in personam rights are positive, and in rem rights are negative‖ (Feinberg 1973, p. 
59).  So usually, if there is a right which is held against everyone, it generally implies that we 
all have a duty not to kill, not to trespass, not to steal, and so on.  If there is a right which is 
held against a particular individual, it is generally a right that they repay a loan, help a 
patient, and so on.  Whether this is the case with examples such as environmental harm is 
debatable.  It may be that we all have certain positive in rem duties to recycle, to make 
changes in our lifestyle, etc. (although many of these could equally be translated as negative 
duties to refrain from dumping in landfill, not to drive short distances, etc.). 
(3c) Active and Passive Rights 
Another distinction that has been made is between active and passive negative rights.  The 
terminology is perhaps somewhat confusing, since positive rights seem to imply activity and 
negative rights inactivity, but the ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ labels refer to the role of the right-
holder, not the duty bearer: 
Active rights are rights to act or not to act as one chooses; passive rights are rights not 
to be done to by others in certain ways.  Among one‘s active rights may be such as the 
rights to go where one will and say whatever one pleases, often referred to concisely 
as ―the right to liberty‖.  Among one‘s passive rights may be such as the rights to be 
let alone, to enjoy one‘s property, to keep one‘s affairs secret, or one‘s reputation 
undamaged, or one‘s body unharmed.  These are often characterized collectively as 
―the right to security‖ (Feinberg 1973, p. 60) 
 
Feinberg applies this distinction to negative rights, giving us active negative rights (rights 
against some other person doing something to restrict our negative liberty) and passive 
negative rights (rights against some other person doing something to harm our security).  
However, it is also the case that we can have active positive rights: giving us a right to 
positive assistance to do something, such as a disabled person‘s right to be helped to attain an 
education.  Whether there can be a passive positive right is a harder case.  This would be a 
right to positive assistance to ensure that we are not ‗done to by others in certain ways‘.  
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Things like the right to police protection and other rights involving duties to prevent harm 
from third parties might fall into this category, but negative rights theorists in the libertarian 
spectrum would probably resist this by claiming that we have a negative right against crime, 
and the police are there to protect that right, rather than it being our right that they are there to 
assist us actively.  However, this does perhaps suggest that, if rights can, in at least some 
cases, be transitive with regards to the means by which the right is fulfilled, a negative right 
might imply a positive right: does the negative right to be free from crime imply a positive 
right to protection from crime?  If so, then this may apply to environmental cases.  The 
passive negative right to be free from the harmful effects of climate change may imply 
passive positive rights (i.e. rights to be provided with the conditions that one requires).  These 
could be held held either in rem against everyone else (suggesting that everyone should do 
something) or in personam against governments and other relevant individuals, that they take 
positive steps to reduce carbon emissions. 
4. Choice and Benefit Theories 
Another debate among rights theorists is between so-called choice (or will) theories and 
benefit (or interest) theories of rights.  These theories differ in the way that they relate rights 
and duties.  In a sense, this is taking the Hohfeldian analysis a step further, since his analysis 
merely says that if X has a claim right, then Y has a duty: it does not attempt a deeper 
explanation of this relationship or explain why it operates in this way. 
(4a) The Choice Theory 
The choice theory, first proposed by H.L.A Hart, states that a person has a right when some 
other person has a duty which they have a power over (Hart 1973, pp. 196-198).  They (and 
only they) can let the duty-bearer off the hook and discharge him of his duty.  In this sense, a 
right implies a Hohfeldian power of the right-holder, since he can alter the fact of whether his 
right must be exercised.  As Waldron observes, this is not a mere conjunction of Hohfeldian 
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concepts, since the duty and the Hohfeldian power share the same underlying justification: 
One way of looking at this, I suppose, is to say that Q has a duty and P has a 
Hohfeldian power in relation to that duty.  But it would be a mistake to say that Hart 
believes that rights are nothing but conjunctions of powers and claims.  Rather, the 
point of his analysis is that P can be said to have a right whenever the reasons for 
holding Q to be under a duty are also in themselves reasons for holding that P‘s say-so 
would be sufficient to release Q from the duty. (Waldron 1984, p. 9) 
 
Hart‘s theory is a theory of legal rights, and he holds that this account cannot work for all 
legal rights, let alone political and moral rights.  As Waldron points out, most of us would be 
very uncomfortable with the notion that we can in all cases relinquish our rights not to be 
killed or tortured whenever we choose.  It seems to go against the idea that certain rights are 
‗inalienable‘ (p. 9).  The interesting point about this theory for our purposes is that it is a 
prominent philosophical example of the notion that rights imply some kind of agency in the 
right-holder.  We hear this daily in political rhetoric when it is said that rights ‗come with 
responsibilities‘, and also in the idea that certain rights ‗must be earned‘: 
The will theory captures the powerful link between rights and normative control.  To 
have a right is to have the ability to determine what others may and may not do, and 
so to exercise authority over a certain domain of affairs.  The resonant connection 
between rights and freedom (of a certain sort) is for will theorists a matter of 
definition. (Wenar 2005, p. 9) 
 
This ties in of course with the concept of active rights - rights that are rights to do something, 
rather than rights to be treated in particular ways - since the possessor of an active right must 
be an agent.  However, if we are strict adherents to a choice theory of rights, or take literally 
some notion of rights implying responsibilities, all rights, be they active or passive, must be 
rights that are held by agents.  There are many different theories of what precisely agency 
consists in, and these cannot be the focus of discussion here, but it is plausible that such a 
theory of rights would exclude animals and infants (some may take this to be an advantage of 
such a theory, others a disadvantage).  It could also be argued that it would exclude groups 
(depending on our theories about agency and collective responsibility) and that it would 
exclude future people (because although the future person will be an agent, she cannot ‗let the 
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duty-bearer off‘ his duty if her lifetime does not overlap with the time at which he has the 
duty). 
(4b) Interest and Benefit Theories 
Benefit or interest theories of rights are based in the idea that a right exists in certain 
circumstances in which the execution of a duty will benefit, or be in the interests of, the right-
holder.  This may escape some of the difficulties of choice theories, in that we might be able 
to ascribe interests to animals and infants.  Proponents of these views can also maintain that 
there are rights, such as the right not to be tortured, which cannot be waived, even by the 
right-holder. 
 Of course, the theory requires more detail than simply stating that an individual has a 
right when they would benefit from another‘s duty.  If I carry out my duty to repay a loan to 
my friend, there are all sorts of people who may benefit from me carrying out my duty.  His 
friends and family might be showered with gifts, and local shopkeepers and publicans might 
be grateful for his new found liquidity, but none of these people have a right that I repay the 
loan, only the friend who I repay has that.  This problem may be soluble by tightening up our 
analysis.  One way that this can be done is by saying that the duty and benefit are so closely 
related that the duty will not have been carried out unless the benefit has been conferred 
(Waldron 1984, p. 10). 
However, another problem is that my right to liberty might result in my acting in a 
way that is not in my own best interests in some circumstances - we‘ve all done things that 
we know to be ill-judged or stupid.  The response might be that, despite these cases, there is a 
general benefit in having freedom.  A general benefit would by this theory suggest a general 
duty.  One question here is how general or specific we choose to be, and when we can include 
exceptions to narrow the scope of such rights for the sake of an overall benefit.  Can we say 
that all individuals have a right to freedom unless they are drunk, tired or depressed?  Where 
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do we draw the line between saying that we only have a right to do what is, on that occasion, 
in our interests (which would interfere with a lot of our rights) and saying that we have very 
broad general rights without exceptions (for example, the right to freedom permitting an 
insane person with a history of self-harm to have a knife)? 
5. How Basic are Rights in Moral Theory? 
Another way of categorising moral theories which are sympathetic to the notion of rights is 
by examining what level rights occupy in the structure and justification of such theories, 
whether rights occupy a central or foundational role in the theory, or whether they are a 
peripheral or derivative moral concept.  Dworkin makes a distinction between theories that 
are duty-based, theories that are goal-based, and theories that are right-based: 
Political theories will differ from one another, therefore, not simply in the particular 
goals, rights and duties each sets out, but also in the way each connects the goals, 
rights, and duties it employs.  In a well-formed theory some consistent set of these, 
internally ranked or weighted, will be taken as fundamental or ultimate within the 
theory.  It seems reasonable to suppose that any particular theory will give ultimate 
pride of place to just one of these concepts; it will take some overriding goal, or some 
set of fundamental rights, or some set of transcendent duties, as fundamental, and 
show other goals, rights, and duties as subordinate and derivative. (Dworkin 1977, p. 
171) 
 
(5a) Right-Based Moralities 
The distinction between theories that are duty-based, goal-based and right-based is embraced 
by J. L. Mackie (1984), who argues in favour of a right-based morality
1
 and by Joseph Raz 
(1984), who gives us some reasons to reject one.  For a theory to be based on rights, any other 
moral concepts which operate within the theory (goals and duties) are ultimately justified in 
terms of a number of fundamental rights which operate at the core of the theory.  So, for 
example, utilitarianism is goal-based.  Its ultimate aim and justification is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, or some refinement of that.  So a utilitarian like John Stuart 
                                                          
1
 What Mackie is arguing here is not that a right-based theory is true as such, but that we should invent one.  He 
denies that rights have what he terms ―objective existence‖ (1984, p. 170).  In his famous Ethics: Inventing 
Right and Wrong (1990) Mackie defends an ‗error theory‘ about moral judgements, suggesting that we are 
mistaken in believing that they have any genuine truth value. 
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Mill, who accepts a limited notion of rights based on utility, accepts a role for rights within a 
goal-based moral theory
1
.  Mackie rejects duty-based moral theories, because a duty stated 
simply for its own sake appears to be an empty command.  It seems difficult to justify duty 
simply for the sake of duty, especially if we reject the notion of a higher power that can lay 
down divine commands.
2
 
 Mackie takes considerably more trouble over his rejection of goal-based theories, 
arguing that the only acceptable and coherent moral theory must be right-based as opposed to 
goal-based.  This begins with an examination of utilitarianism, and the commonly observed 
issue that it can sometimes suggest that the welfare of an individual should be completely 
sacrificed for the sake of others‘ well-being.  Mackie identifies three main lines of response 
to this: firstly that we can tough it out and accept these unpalatable consequences; secondly 
that we can adopt an indirect utilitarianism which will sometimes go against the immediate 
utilitarian calculus for the sake of a greater overall long-term utility; and thirdly that we 
should criticise utilitarianism for its aggregative nature and that we should adopt a goal-based 
theory which places more importance on the notion of individual flourishing.  He suggests 
that the first of these responses is unsatisfactory because there is no strong prima facie reason 
to adopt simple utilitarianism, that the second response also falls prey to this problem to a 
great extent and also runs into theoretical difficulties when attempting to keep separate the 
first and second-order levels of moral thinking, and thus that the third response, a more 
eudaimonistic approach, is the only possible way forward.  Mackie then argues that 
flourishing involves making one‘s own choices and having autonomy and self-determination, 
thus what is central to any acceptable moral theory must be ―the right of persons 
                                                          
1
 See Mackie 1984, p. 169. 
2
 Kant is sometimes said to be a duty-based theorist, although duty does not appear to be the ultimate 
justification for his moral theory, even if it is supposed to be the ultimate motivation.  While we should be 
acting out of a sense of duty, this duty is based on notions about the fundamental respect due to rational agents 
which may arguably be construed as either goal-based or right-based (see the note on page 64). 
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progressively to choose how they shall live‖ (p. 176). 
 There are of course more criticisms that can be made of this view than I can fit into 
the chapter.  There may be sophisticated defences of a duty-based view which quickly 
overcome Mackie‘s swift dismissal, and of course there are plenty of refined and varied 
forms of utilitarianism that have been developed precisely for the purpose of avoiding the 
difficulties that Mackie identifies.  As for the claim that a eudaimonistic ethic is 
fundamentally based upon a right to liberty or self determination, can it not equally (or 
perhaps rather more convincingly) be said that a right to liberty or self-determination is a 
means to the achievement of the fundamental goal of human flourishing, and thus a 
derivative, non-fundamental concept? 
 However, it is easy to see in some ways why a right-based theory is so appealing.  
The fact that a right is based upon the fundamental interests or autonomy of the moral patient 
seems to lend right-based theories a particular appeal.  Surely at least one of the fundamental 
elements of our moral lives, if not the fundamental one, is how we respond to others.  If this 
is the case, then perhaps a theory which is centred around a ‗moral pull‘ from patients is 
preferable to one that is based upon a ‗moral-push‘ from duties.  It may also be the case that 
Mackie is correct in the sense that, when we examine the rationale behind our moral goals, 
they turn out to be based in the moral status that we place upon ourselves and others, and thus 
that they are ultimately also patient-centred moral theories.  This is not necessarily a reason to 
adopt a right-based theory.  It is quite plausible that there can be patient-centred theories 
which are not based on rights.  A goal-based theory may have the recognition or respect of 
moral status in moral patients as a goal without collapsing into a right-based theory, or at 
least not a right-based theory which conforms to our usual analyses of rights according to the 
complex categorisations that we have seen earlier in this chapter.  It may also be that there are 
other ways in which a theory can be patient-centred. 
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 Additionally, we have not yet seen a reasonable justification for the view that a moral 
theory must hold ―some overriding goal, or some set of fundamental rights, or some set of 
transcendent duties, as fundamental, and show other goals, rights, and duties as subordinate 
and derivative‖ (Dworkin 1977, p. 171).  Why can‘t it be the case that our moral theory is at 
heart a mixed one, with a number of different goals rights and duties occupying a 
fundamental place?  Certainly if we can have a ‗set‘ of rights as fundamental (and not just 
one foundational right) it seems just as plausible that the ‗set‘ of principles at the foundation 
of a moral theory might not all be of the same type. 
(5b) Raz’s Criticisms of the Right-Based View 
Joseph Raz supports this view, and puts forward several criticisms of right-based theories 
(Raz 1984).  Raz does not claim to offer a ‗proof‘ of pluralistic theories of the foundation of 
morality over right-based theories, but merely gives us some reasons to favour a pluralistic 
account.  One important thing to bear in mind before we take a closer look at Raz‘s 
arguments is that he endorses the ‗humanistic principle‘ (although in this article he claims 
that he is doing this merely for the sake of simplicity).  This is the principle that things are 
only good or bad in virtue of their effect on human life.  It can be claimed that all rights 
theories (whether part of a right-based morality or not) are essentially humanistic.  We have 
seen that this may be the case for example if we adopt the choice theory of rights.  I will 
argue later in this thesis that a rejection of the humanistic principle in fact strengthens the 
type of criticism that Raz makes of right-based theories if we conceptualise rights in certain 
ways. 
 Raz begins by giving three examples of cases that he feels are not adequately 
explained by a right-based account.  Firstly, he points to the (common, but not universal) 
view that there is a distinction to be made between ‗ought‘ and ‗duty‘.  This is not, he 
contends, simply a difference of strength, but rather a difference of moral character.  Raz 
79 
 
gives the examples of having promised to saw off a branch overhanging my neighbour‘s 
garden this week (which makes sawing it off this week a duty) and allowing my neighbour 
who is locked out of his house to use my phone (an ‗ought‘, but not a duty).  He maintains 
that I probably have more reason in these circumstances to act upon the ‗ought‘ than the duty.  
The ‗ought‘ is stronger.  Duties are of a distinctive character from ‗oughts‘, not just a greater 
strength.  He then argues that right-based theories, since they rely primarily on rights and the 
duties with which they correlate, cannot adequately explain this distinction. 
 The second case which Raz offers is supererogation.  Supererogation is, almost by 
definition, that which is ‗beyond the call of duty‘.  Those actions which it is good to carry 
out, but which we have no duty to carry out.  A right-based theory, consisting of rights and 
correlative duties, cannot adequately identify what it is that is distinctively ‗good‘ about the 
act of supererogation, just that I have no duty to perform it and no duty not to. 
 Finally, Raz contends that ―right-based moralities cannot allow intrinsic moral value 
to virtue and the pursuit of excellence‖ (p. 185).  Generally, virtue does not consist merely in 
discharging one‘s duties.  Even honesty, Raz maintains, cannot purely be explained with 
reference to rights and duties, since the person who has fully cultivated this virtue will go out 
of his way not to deceive or mislead, even when this goes beyond duty.  Raz is not suggesting 
that right-based theories can have no room at all for these cases, but rather that they cannot 
give them adequate importance or explain the richness of morality when dealing with cases 
such as these.  Raz contends that these examples show right-based theories to be 
impoverished.  He then backs this up with more detailed arguments claiming to demonstrate 
that ―the impoverishment involves real moral loss‖ (p. 186).  Raz claims that right-based 
moral theories are essentially individualistic, and cannot take sufficient account of what he 
terms as ‗collective goods‘: 
A moral theory will be said to be individualistic if it is a humanistic morality which 
does not recognize any intrinsic value in any collective good.  In other words, 
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individualistic moralities are humanistic moralities which hold that collective goods 
have instrumental value only (p.186) 
 
This bears some resemblance to Marx‘s criticism that rights are a product of and contributor 
to alienation, preventing people from having the true communal relationships to which they 
are better suited.  However, Raz‘s claim is about right-based moral theories, and is not a 
wholesale rejection of rights.  So Raz‘s claim is not as strong as Marx‘s.  Additionally, it does 
not rely on nearly so detailed and heavy a set of assumptions about social and economic 
structures. 
 The ‗collective goods‘ of which Raz feels that rights do not take adequate account are 
what he defines as ‗inherent public goods‘.  A good is a public good if and only if the 
distribution of its benefits in society is ―not subject to voluntary control by anyone other than 
each potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefits‖ (p. 187).  So these are benefits 
which are open to all in society, and the degree to which we benefit is only in the control of 
the beneficiary himself.  Raz then distinguishes between ‗contingent‘ and ‗inherent‘ public 
goods.  Contingent public goods could, at least theoretically, cease to be public goods and 
only benefit certain individuals, whereas inherent public goods are things which cannot, even 
in principle, cease to be public goods.  These are such things as benefiting from living in a 
civilized, educated society with a culture of tolerance and respect.  These are the ‗collective 
goods‘ which Raz thinks cannot be adequately understood by theories of rights. 
 Of course, one response to this may be simply to embrace an individualistic theory 
and say that such ‗collective goods‘ can ultimately be understood purely in terms of the good 
to individuals, but it is important to recognise that this line of thinking would be incompatible 
with some schools of environmental ethics.  ‗Deep green‘ theories emphasise the co-
dependence of life on the planet, and it is argued that a coherent approach to ethical 
consideration of the environment is impossible unless we can embrace a theory of 
collectivism that reaches beyond the purely humanistic considerations to the level of the 
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planet as a whole.  It may be that right-based theories are simply too individualistic to cope 
on their own with certain environmental problems.  However, whether this is necessarily the 
case will partly depend on how we formulate the notion of the individual ‗self‘.  I will argue 
in chapter eight that certain ways of understanding personal identity can make an emphasis 
on the individual entirely compatible with an equal emphasis on the co-dependence between 
the individual and his or her environment. 
6. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has been a very brief overview of an extremely complex and varied field.  The 
main aim has been to pull out the main strands that will be important for our purposes in the 
next few chapters.  We have also seen how, on a number of different levels, rights might face 
some problems when applied to environmental cases.  This is largely down to a number of 
hard cases of possible moral patients which are particularly prominent in environmental 
ethics.  Among the particularly strong candidates for consideration here will be animals, 
future people and groups.  Other possible moral patients might be non-sentient organisms and 
systems, such as plants or even Gaia.  Another difficulty that we will face will be the role of 
collective responsibility- how do we respond to a right when it is difficult to identify who has 
the correlative duty?  Certain theories of rights might make these problems particularly 
difficult, for example, the choice theory of rights, which requires that a right-holder is himself 
a moral agent.  This problem could be strengthened if we hold that rights are absolute or 
trump other moral considerations to give a moral theory that is weighted very much in favour 
of currently existing rational human individuals.  However, even if these considerations give 
us some reasons to doubt the extent to which right-theory can be applied in environmental 
ethics, this needn‘t lead us to doubt that rights have a purpose at all.  As I mentioned earlier, a 
theory that is not right-based can accommodate rights either in a derivative role or on an 
equal foundational level with other moral principles.  While some favour monolithic moral 
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theories, it may also be argued that the best moral theory is one that provides us with a 
multiplicity of moral tools for different purposes.  The judge‘s gavel working alone may not 
prove much use in the Amazonian rainforests, which of course does not rule out the 
possibility that it may be modified to do a better job.  
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Chapter 4- Environmental Rights of Current Human Individuals 
 
 
 
1. Environmental Rights 
 
Having examined the idea of a right as such, the following chapters will be concerned with 
the more specific question of environmental rights, rights to a particular environment or 
rights concerning aspects of one‘s environment.  This chapter will be concerned mainly with 
setting up the framework for how these rights are to be discussed.  For the sake of simplicity, 
here we will consider only the environmental rights that we can ascribe to presently existing 
human individuals.  In the next chapter, more challenging human cases will be considered, 
such as the rights of future people and of groups.  After that, the possibility of the application 
of this thought to non-human cases will be given some consideration. 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are a number of questions at stake 
when we ask whether someone has a right.  Consider the basic question ‗Are there rights 
concerning the environment?‘ What does this mean?  we need to consider who has these 
rights, what type of rights they are in terms of the theoretical analysis of a right, whom the 
rights are held against, and what are they rights to (i.e. what is meant by ‗the environment‘ in 
this context?)  Another question is whether this right would be absolute and inviolable, and 
whether it would be at the foundation of a moral theory.  These are difficult questions, and 
will not all be answered here, but the remainder of this thesis may begin to draw out some 
tentative conclusions about these questions. 
 For the time being, we will suppose that such a right is a universal one (or at least 
universal in as much as it is held by all presently existing human individuals) and that it is a 
right held equally by all of these people.  There obviously may be rights that specific 
individuals have concerning their environments, rights that they hold in virtue of their 
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inheritance, their culture, or specific agreements or contracts.  However, our main concern for 
now will be with environmental rights as rights of all.  Let us further suppose that it is a 
Hohfeldian claim right, or at least a bundle of Hohfeldian concepts of which claim rights 
form a strong component.  The question of whom the right is held against (who bears the duty 
that correlates with the right) has a number of possible answers.  It could be a right in 
personam (held against a particular person or group of people).  Environmental rights will 
take this form when they are rights against governments, local councils, landlords and even 
bin-men:  rights that impose a duty on a particular person to carry out their role with respect 
to our environment, whether this involves adhering to our carbon emission targets, or whether 
it means taking the rubbish from our back gates.  Environmental rights could also be rights 
that are held in rem, against everyone else.  Such rights would impose particular duties on 
other individuals with respect to their treatment of our environment.  Joel Feinberg‘s 
observation that ―Typically, in personam rights are positive, and in rem rights are negative‖ 
(1973, p. 59) may not have such a strong application here.  Perhaps environmental cases, 
especially those that relate to the human effect on climate change, prompt all people to act (or 
at least to change the way that they act presently).  If this requirement is a duty which 
correlates to a right to be protected from the damaging effects of climate change, we may be 
looking at the rare beast that could (rather cumbersomely) be named a passive positive in rem 
right, a right which prompts every person to take positive action in order to protect every 
other person.  If this is the case however, it would also be the case that there would be passive 
negative in rem rights (rights implying a duty on everyone not to harm the environment) and 
perhaps active negative in rem rights (rights implying a duty on everyone to allow people to 
do things with respect to the environment).  Whether or not this latter type of right is one with 
which we should be concerned comes down to what we consider the environment, and 
environmental rights, to be.  It is also arguable that while the distinction between acts and 
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omissions is usually a difficult one to discern
1
, in cases like pollution the distinction is 
particularly fraught with difficulties.  An obligation not to pollute the environment (an 
omission) may imply an obligation to take steps to alter my usual course of activity (an act)
2
.  
If this is the case, then any distinction between positive and negative rights faces the same 
difficulties.  For the time being, the distinction between positive and negative rights will not 
be treated as having special significance. 
(1a) Global Versus Local Environments 
 
When people refer to the environment, they often mean the earth and its ecosystems, 
particularly referring to living things, but also to geology, weather systems, and other natural 
systems existing on this planet.  The emphasis in talk about the environment is often placed 
on areas of wilderness where few humans live.  This is sometimes referred to as ‗the natural 
environment, which people contrast with the ‗built environment‘.  The natural environment is 
made of things like rainforests, oceans, deserts, and other expanses of ‗natural‘ space (often 
so vast that we have almost as little comprehension and connection with them as we have 
when we gaze at the Milky Way). 
 There is a (quite understandable) tendency in environmental movements and 
environmental philosophies to appeal to high poetics and wax lyrical about these vast and 
unfamiliar landscapes at the expense of what is in our own backyards. It may be that the 
attitude of reverence with which people regard distant wildernesses somewhat undermines 
the expressions of awe made by those who have a genuine relationship with those 
environments: 
I do not revere or hold sacred the Amazonian rain forest, not because I am irreverent 
                                                          
1
 For further discussions of this issue, see Quinn (1989).  Warren Quinn argues, against some thinkers (e.g. 
Philippa Foot), that we cannot say that positive rights can be treated as more stringent or demanding than 
negative rights. 
2
 Some (e.g. Foot 1978), make a distinction between positive and negative agency, according to which positive 
agency is initiating a harmful sequence of events, and negative agency is merely allowing one to continue.  
These distinctions may be useful in understanding the ethical implications of elements of our ordinary lifestyles 
that we can change if we so choose. 
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or profane, but because, never having been remotely engaged with that forest, such a 
vocabulary is inappropriate coming from my lips.  For me to speak that way devalues 
the same vocabulary when spoken by those whose home the forest is. (Cooper 1992, 
p. 166) 
 
In addition, it may also be the case that this attitude towards distant parts of our planet may 
be a distraction from what is right under our noses. 
(1b) Environment and Environments 
Another question that this prompts is whether we are talking about the environment or an 
environment.  The use of the definite article suggests that it is the earth or biosphere as a 
whole that is being discussed, whereas to say ‗an environment‘ is in a way less ambitious.  A 
creature‘s environment might be equated with its habitat - the surroundings which sustain its 
life and well being.  It may be that I have a right concerning my environment without having 
any rights concerning the environment as a whole, even if an improvement in the global 
environment is the way that this right can be granted to me.  Of course, we may wish to argue 
that such a right can be transitive - implying wider environmental rights - when there is only 
one way of bringing it about.  If I have a right concerning my environment, and changes in 
the environment are the only (or the best) way of granting my right, then perhaps I have a 
right concerning the environment. 
 It could be suggested that it is impossible to draw a line between the two.  The 
intrinsic links between the global and the local make them inseparable.  Perhaps, after all, 
there is no clear distinction between the environment and my environment, since the 
conditions of my immediate locality depend on there being a gulf stream, a jet stream, polar 
icecaps and large rainforests halfway around the world from me.  The hamster lives in a cage, 
but it also lives in a house with central heating and human inhabitants who feed it, and in a 
world that produces sufficient breathable oxygen and absorbs carbon dioxide.  Just as the 
hamster relies on these different layers of environment for its survival, there may be multiple 
levels of my environment, all of which constitute parts of my environment because they 
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sustain my need, even if I have never visited many parts of them.  Still, this does not mean 
that we cannot make sensible distinctions between these levels of the environment.  Even if 
the whole universe may in a sense constitute my environment, my immediate environment is 
the medium sized village in which I live, the small university town in which I work, and other 
areas with which I have a particular familiarity.  This is what David Cooper refers to as an 
‗older conception‘ of environment, and perhaps in some respects a more plausible candidate 
for a sense of ‗environment‘ that we have rights concerning. 
(1c) What Counts as an Environmental Right? 
So if we have particular rights concerning the aspects of the environment that in some way 
impinge on us or have particular significance to us, how do we articulate this?  What are 
these rights?  Presumably the violation of such a right, or the performance of its correlative 
duty or duties, must involve some act or omission which has a direct implication for the 
environment of the right-holder. 
One sense of environmental rights might be the usual suspects in a new guise: rights 
that we have to life, liberty, health, property, and so on, when the fulfillment of these rights is 
dependent upon human responses to particular environmental issues.  In this sense, we are 
talking about a broader environmental right, rather than something that is necessarily a right 
to a particular kind of environment.  In this case, the environmental rights are instrumental 
rights which serve the conventional rights.  To give an example, certain property rights would 
fall into this category.  A right concerning my property, particularly if the property in 
question is land or buildings that surround me on a regular basis, is in a sense an 
environmental right, one that might be violated by a trespasser.  In some cases, a right to 
liberty might also constitute an environmental right.  If I am taking my usual route to work, 
and suddenly discover that someone has built a twenty foot wall around the perimeter of the 
village in which I live, this could be construed as violating my right to liberty by means of a 
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physical imposition on my environment. 
 In some senses though, we might hesitate to class these cases as environmental rights.  
It is not an essential feature of a property right that it concerns my immediate environment.  I 
could, some would argue, own land on the moon.   I could certainly own territory that I 
never actually visit.  Likewise, my liberty can be assured or disrupted through other means 
than simply placing objects in my immediate environment, for example, we might say that 
the liberty of the Chinese people is being infringed by the restrictions that the Chinese 
government places on internet access.  Even if it could conceivably be argued that a violation 
of my liberty would ultimately impinge on my environment, it is not due to any relationship 
that I have with my environment that this is a right violation.  Rather, it is a right-violation 
precisely because it interferes with my liberty, and the interference with my environment is 
merely the means by which this interference takes place, in the sense that the right to a 
particular environment is only valued instrumentally for the purpose of bringing about some 
other good.  I will for now call environmental rights of this type ‗instrumentally‘ 
environmental rights.  We can probably accept that, if there are any rights at all, there are 
instrumentally environmental rights of this nature.  If I take a gun and shoot you, the bullet 
hurtles through your environment.  If I steal from your house, I am altering your environment 
against your will.  If I restrain you with ropes or chains, I am limiting the ways in which you 
can interact with your environment. 
 For something to be an environmental right in the strictest sense (lets call it an 
‗essentially‘ environmental right) it must be the case that not only is an interference in the 
environment of the right-holder the only way to violate the right, but that it is this 
interference which makes the act a right violation.  While a property right might be violated 
by a trespasser or a burglar, the distressing sense that one‘s home has been invaded by an 
intruder might constitute the violation of an essentially environmental right.  This may 
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constitute less of a property right, and more something like a territory right, or at least a 
much more nuanced and personal sense of property than can be summed up by the traditional 
bundles of Hohfeldian concepts that are often supposed to constitute property rights.  In the 
case of a right to liberty, a wall blocking my journey might constitute a violation of an 
instrumentally environmental right to liberty, if the right concerned is a general abstract right 
to liberty.  However, if what is at stake is a more nuanced relationship that one has with one‘s 
surrounding environment, we are talking about something else altogether, again something 
less coldly abstract and more rooted in an individual‘s experience than the traditional 
language of Lockean negative freedoms would suggest; a right to be free-range humans.  The 
wall that blocks my path violates my abstract freedom, but it also violates an engagement 
with my habitat which is essential to my sense of self.  I can no longer access parts of the 
world that have meaning, significance and familiarity to me.  This is distressing and wrong in 
a very different way from removing my freedom to roam in a foreign land.  Our environment 
is so entangled with our identity that a violation of an essentially environmental right is 
almost a violation of self.  What this might mean will be explored further in chapter eight, 
where I will suggest that essentially environmental rights might be bound up with 
conceptions of the self. 
2. Two Arguments for Environmental Rights 
Tim Hayward (2005) and Aaron Lercher (2007) both make cases for environmental rights.  
Both argue from the assumption that there are moral rights to the conclusion that there are 
environmental rights: 
This section makes and defends the claim that a right to an adequate environment 
genuinely is, if any rights are, a universal moral right- that is, a moral right that can 
and should be universally institutionalised. (Hayward 2005, p. 47) 
 
I shall argue conditionally that if there are any moral rights, then there is an 
environmental right against pollution.  This avoids some questions about where such 
rights come from, or what their ontological status is. (Lercher 2007, p. 356) 
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Perhaps it is something of a mistake to think that we can simply sweep questions about the 
ontological status or origins of rights under the carpet, since our answers to such questions 
may have a bearing on the types of rights that we adopt, and who the bearers of such rights 
might be. The problem with sitting on the fence is that one can easily fall off.  But for the 
time being I will put this problem to one side.  The right that Hayward defends is ―a universal 
moral right to an adequate environment‖ (p. 47).  By an ‗adequate environment‘, he means 
―an environment adequate for their [every human‘s] health and well-being‖ (p. 27).  
Lercher‘s focus is on ―a right against being subjected to pollution‖ derived from a right of 
any human being capable of choice ―that all other human beings refrain from negligently, 
recklessly or intentionally imposing risks on him or her, except to prevent such negligent, 
reckless or intentional risk impositions‖ (p. 356) 
(2a) Lercher’s Argument 
Lercher‘s approach is a development of Hart‘s ‗Are there any natural rights?‘ (1955) which 
argues that ―if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural 
right, the equal right of all men to be free‖ (p. 77), again an approach that is conditional on 
whether there are any moral rights.  Lercher claims that his initial proposal of a right against 
unnecessary risk impositions is a reasonable adaptation of Hart, in that ―such risk impositions 
have the same moral status as coercion and restraint in Hart‘s original formula‖ (p. 356).  He 
also makes the further claim that: 
Any human being capable of choice is at liberty to do (that is, is under no obligation 
to abstain from) any action that does not impose risks negligently, recklessly or 
intentionally on other persons. (p. 356) 
 
Lercher‘s two claims, adapted directly from Hart, replacing his references to ‗coercion, 
restraint and injury‘ with references to such risk impositions, are illustrated by reference to 
practical applications.  Lercher calls on the example of a neighbour who is spraying pesticide 
while Lercher‘s study windows are open.  The pesticide is of a type that imposes a risk to 
91 
 
Lercher‘s health and well-being, but no immediate danger or harm.  He also supposes that 
this risk imposed on him is outweighed by the benefits to his neighbour‘s garden. 
 Lercher then goes on to suppose that his neighbour had warned him in advance about 
his pesticide spraying, and that Lercher  had agreed that it was alright to go ahead with the 
spraying.  Lercher‘s claim is that it makes a moral difference that the neighbour had spoken 
to him about it in advance.  He is at liberty to agree to the spraying, and the fact that he does 
agree to the risk imposition makes it the case that his environmental risk against pollution has 
not been violated: 
The first of my formulas says that it is morally necessary that my concession be 
justified somehow, since otherwise my neighbour‘s spraying imposes risks on me and 
thus violates my environmental right against pollution.  In this case, my concession is 
justified by my agreement. (p. 357) 
 
This hinges on a choice theory of rights, where it is an essential feature of a right that the 
right-holder is able to waive their right and let the duty-holder off the duty that corresponds to 
the right.  A right against pollution following this theory of rights would make sense of 
Lercher‘s example.  It would explain why Lercher‘s agreement makes a moral difference to 
the situation even though it makes no difference to the level of risk imposed upon Lercher.  
The implication is that posing risks to someone without consulting them is coercive, in that 
they have no choice over whether or not the risk is imposed.  If they are consulted, and agree, 
then the coercive element is removed and the individual‘s right to freedom is not violated.  It 
is in this sense that Lercher believes that negligent, reckless or intentional risk imposition is 
morally equivalent to coercion in Hart‘s formula.  Lercher claims that this right is confirmed 
by the analysis of concrete environmental cases, taking as an example the case of Love Canal 
in New York, whose residents discovered in 1978 that they were living on top of a huge toxic 
waste dump.  Despite this, it has not been clearly demonstrated that any harm to any of the 
residents resulted.  Lercher contends that his right against ‗negligent, reckless or intentional 
risk imposition‘ makes sense of the intuitive claim that the residents were nonetheless 
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wronged by the dumping of toxic waste. 
 (2b) Hayward’s Argument 
Hayward defines a universal moral right as ―a moral right that can and should be universally 
institutionalized‖ (p. 47).  He claims to establish this right by appeal to Maurice Cranston‘s 
three tests of a genuine right: ―moral paramountcy, universality, and practicability‖ (Cranston 
1967) claiming that if the liberal rights traditionally espoused pass these tests, then so does a 
right to an adequate environment.  He does not give a detailed analysis of what is intended by 
an ‗adequate environment‘ (although he does indicate that work on this area has been done 
elsewhere). 
 These rights are, Hayward maintains, of paramount moral importance since the 
interests that they protect are vital to human flourishing, and the absence of an ‗adequate‘ 
environment leads to suffering, pain and death just as the torturing of an innocent human 
being might lead to these things.  In this sense, if a person‘s interest in not being tortured is of 
paramount moral importance, then so is the individual‘s interest in having an adequate 
environment for health and well-being.  It seems fairly uncontroversial to accept that, in as 
much as human activity can secure or destroy it, an adequate environment is an interest of 
fundamental moral importance, and thus a duty to provide it must be, at the very least, a 
reasonable topic for serious moral consideration.  Thus it seems plausible that a right to an 
adequate environment could pass the test of moral paramountcy. 
 Hayward points out that a right of this kind is universal in that the interest that it 
protects is one shared by all human beings.  We all depend absolutely upon an adequate 
environment for our health and well-being.  However, as Hayward acknowledges, this is not 
what Cranston means by universality.  Instead, according to Cranston‘s definition a right can 
be universal only if the duty to which it corresponds is a universal duty: 
On this view, each and everyone only has a right that is genuinely universal if each 
and everyone is also under the duty that correlates to it.  Inasmuch as the right of each 
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to an adequate environment can be understood to imply that each also has the duty to 
refrain from harming the environment of each other, it qualifies as a universal right in 
this sense.  The right to an adequate environment thus in fact fares better by this 
standard than human rights such as healthcare, education, and social rights generally, 
in that the correlative duty, being purely negative (i.e. a duty to refrain from certain 
actions), can be conceived as unproblematically universalizable. (p. 49) 
 
So it seems that what Cranston is here referring to as a ‗universal‘ right is something closely 
resembling what has traditionally been named a right ‗in rem‘, as well as a right held by ‗each 
and everyone‘.  Hayward correctly observes that rights to healthcare, education and so on do 
not pass this test, suggesting that environmental rights fare better on this front.  However, 
environmental rights may not be as unproblematic here as they first appear.  The difficulty 
here lies in our specification of who counts as ‗each and everyone‘ for these purposes.  A 
problem might arise if we hold the view that the community of right-holders may be wider 
than the community of duty-holders.  If this is the case then no right can be genuinely 
universal in this sense the ‗each and everyone‘ who has the right cannot also have the 
correlating duty because some of them cannot have duties at all. 
 The obvious candidates for right-holders who are not duty holders are animals.  These 
will be relevant in chapter 6, but can be disregarded for Hayward‘s purposes, since he is 
explicitly discussing human rights.  However, there are also cases of human individuals who 
may or may not count as moral agents in this case.  I will discuss the complicated cases of 
future people and group rights in the next chapter, but there are some presently existing 
human beings who might be considered to be moral patients without being moral agents, 
right-holders without being duty-holders.  These are infants and severely disabled people.  
Some theorists (for example, proponents of choice theories of rights such as Hart and 
Lercher) suggest that these would not be capable of having rights either (since having rights 
requires rational agency) but many would find this conclusion problematic.  It is certainly the 
case that many bills and conventions of human rights afford rights to young children and the 
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severely disabled.
1
 
 Perhaps Hayward would get around this problem fairly easily by reformulating his 
description of a universal right slightly.  Instead of saying that a right is universal only if it is 
held by each and everyone and correlates with a duty imposed upon each and everyone, he 
can say that a right is universal only if it is held by each and everyone who is capable of 
having rights, and correlates with a duty imposed upon each and everyone who is capable of 
having duties.  This still leaves open the enormous question of who is to fit into each of these 
categories, but the discussion of hard cases is something that is widely discussed elsewhere, 
and perhaps unnecessary for Hayward‘s core project. 
 However, as Hayward acknowledges, practicability is perhaps the hardest of the three 
tests for environmental rights to pass.  It is the practical question of how the universal duty is 
to be understood and applied that causes great difficulty, and this is why Hayward eventually 
argues that we must reject Cranston‘s strong conception of a universal right: 
If each and every individual is supposed to have a duty not to harm any other 
individual‘s environment, the critical question is how this duty is to be implemented 
and enforced; and how, indeed, it is even to be intelligible as an action-guiding 
principle. (p. 49) 
 
It is the complexity of the social interactions that lead to environmental problems which 
cause these difficulties, together with the fact that environmental problems sometimes require 
an active rather than a passive response.  These factors create great difficulty with identifying 
who is supposed to do what in response to an individual‘s environmental right.  So in 
response to this difficulty, Hayward (against Cranston) argues that a universal duty ―is not 
always - or even generally - either (a) necessary or (b) sufficient for the universality of any 
human right‖ (p. 50).  This weaker interpretation of a universal right seems plausible.  For 
example, if we suggest that there is a universal human right to healthcare, education or 
                                                          
1
 For example, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF 2008) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ENABLE 2009). 
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housing, this does not imply that there is a duty upon everyone to provide these things.  
Usually, this duty is held by governments or international agencies, rather than by specific 
individuals or people in general.  Each individual‘s right imposes a duty upon the state.  It is a 
right in personam held against a group or institution. 
 However, this is not the main ground on which Hayward rejects Cranston‘s 
correlativity thesis (that universal rights correlate with universal duties).  He attacks as overly 
simplistic the view that each right maps directly onto a particular duty: 
It is a mistake to say, as Cranston does, that to speak of a right is to speak of a duty as 
if these are simply two sides of the same coin… There is, to be sure, a category of 
rights for which it is the case that the right and its correlative duty constitute a single 
relation such that the right is nothing other than what the duty demands and vice 
versa.  This is the category of rights analysed by Wesley N. Hohfeld as ‗claim-rights‘, 
which arise in bilateral legal relations which are such that, by definition, the meaning 
of A‘s right is equivalent to B‘s duty.  This category does not, however, comprise 
what Hohfeld calls ‗privileges‘ (p. 51) 
 
What is meant by a privilege here is a ‗bare liberty‘ or simply the absence of a duty on the 
part of the possessor of the privilege, as we saw in the previous chapter.  Thus if I have a 
right of this form, a privilege to do X, it simply means that I have no duty not to do X.  
Nobody else has any duty to allow me to do X, it is just that I am not obliged not to. 
 As Hayward also notes, most rights are ‗clusters‘ of Hohfeldian rights, such that it 
would be overly simplistic to analyse them simply as a claim with a correlative duty.  A 
complex bundle of interrelated claims, duties and absences of duty might be implied by a 
single right.  He makes a further point that background considerations relating to the parties 
involved or the society that they inhabit may alter the duties involved with any particular 
right such that there can be no ‗closed list‘ of duties that correspond to any particular right. 
 This raises the question of whether it is ever possible to analyse a right and its related 
duties intelligibly.  However, as Hayward points out, this is a difficulty of practicality rather 
than one that makes rights incoherent in principle, and importantly for Hayward‘s argument, 
it presents as many problems for rights that are conventionally considered universal as it does 
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for environmental rights.  Thus in this sense, Hayward demonstrates that if any moral rights 
are coherent, then so is a right to an adequate environment. 
3. Analysis 
So how do these arguments for environmental rights fit in to the earlier analysis of what 
forms such rights could take?  Firstly, both rights can be seen as rights to a particular 
environment, not to some nebulous idea of the environment, they are rights concerning our 
habitat.  Lercher argues for a right against pollution, more precisely a right against exposure 
to pollution in the space that we inhabit.  Hayward argues for a right to an environment 
adequate for health and well-being.  Both are also environmental rights in the instrumental 
sense that I outlined, in that whether the right is fulfilled or violated will make some 
difference to the environment of the right-holder.  Are they also environmental rights in the 
strong sense?  By this I mean the sense in which something is an environmental right only if 
interference in the environment of the right-holder is the only way to violate the right, and it 
is this interference which makes the act a right violation.  Both a right against pollution and a 
right to an adequate environment can only be fulfilled or violated by affecting (or refraining 
from affecting) the right-holder‘s environment.  This differs from a right to liberty or 
property, which could perhaps be respected or violated in some other way, although in a 
moment this will be given more consideration.  However, it is not the role of environment 
that is important here, it is the role that the environmental rights serve in protecting further 
rights. 
 This raises the question of whether such rights are worthy of any special regard or 
analysis of their own.  They both seem to be specific instances of a broader (instrumentally 
environmental) right.  If we only have a right to a particular environment as an instrumental 
way of achieving other moral rights, is this worthy of any special attention that we would not 
give to any other practical applications of our wider theory of rights?  Is there anything 
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special about environmental rights in particular? 
 There are two main reasons why environmental rights might deserve special 
consideration.  Firstly, we might hold that there are rights which are essentially 
environmental: environmental rights which are not merely the instrumental means to 
achieving some other right, but which stand as rights on their own without a further right 
propping them up.  Secondly, we might say that while environmental rights are all merely 
instrumental, environmental issues are so pressing and important that we ought to consider 
whether the language of rights might be an effective way to examine and consider 
environmental issues.  Environmental rights are not a special category of rights, but there are 
many applications of them and they are very important. 
 The first of these approaches might be the most appealing to some kinds of 
environmental philosophers, in that it marks out environmental concerns as a unique and 
important for their own sake, although this advantage is limited if environmental rights are 
considered as rights of humans.  If a rights-based approach is to encapsulate uniquely 
environmental concerns, this may only be considered an advantage if it moves beyond the 
rights of humans, and perhaps even beyond the rights of discrete organic individuals.  These 
issues will be considered in the next few chapters.  A worry that many philosophers will have 
about the prospect of uniquely environmental rights is that this may open the door to an 
uncontrollable multiplication of categories of rights.  If we can have uniquely environmental 
rights, important for their own sake, then why not also have rights that are uniquely any 
number of other things?  This will be a particular worry for philosophers of rights who 
attempt to identify a single underlying basis for all rights, although less so for those who 
favour a pluralist account of rights or even of morality in general - if there can be a plurality 
of foundational moral concepts, then perhaps these can include a number of different types of 
right.  However, this approach would involve the difficult task of justifying the unique status 
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of environmental rights (and any other unique types of rights that it espouses)  I will attempt 
to indicate one way in which this might be done in chapter eight. 
 The second approach, claiming that environmental rights are not a special category, 
merely a very important and pressing one, is likely to garner more support from traditional 
rights theorists.  The project here would be the application of traditional theories of rights to a 
number of environmental issues in an attempt to throw new light upon them.  This is very 
much the approach adopted by Lercher.  The question of whether rights are an area of purely 
human concern will again arise.  If it is the case that rights cannot be held by animals, future 
people, species and so on, then we need to consider what to do about these cases.  We may 
have a moral theory where rights are only one among several important moral concepts.  If 
this is so, then it may be that rights are not the right tool for the job when considering the 
interests of these specific cases, but that rights are still important for considering the 
humanistic aspects of environmental ethics.  It may however be that we regard all of these 
interests as so entangled that when considering environmental questions the interests of 
human individuals cannot be easily separated from these other cases.  This may provide a 
prima facie reason to avoid the language of rights in environmental philosophy.  Of course, it 
may be that we can ascribe rights to animals, future people, groups, species and so on.  If this 
is so, then there are questions to answer about whether the pull or strength of these rights is 
commensurable between these cases.  It is crass to ask how many squirrels‘ rights to life, if 
any, are equal to my property rights concerning the produce in my garden, but we do need 
some answer to the question of how to deal with conflicts of rights between species.  Yet 
another approach might be to say that while rights can be ascribed to some or all of these 
cases, other environmental concerns are so weighty that rights-talk is rendered insignificant.  
This would be a very radical approach, but probably one that some ecologists would favour in 
the light of pressing environmental concerns. 
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4. Conflicts of Rights 
As we have seen, if we can defend environmental rights, a further question is how they are to 
fit in with each other, and with the other rights that we hold.  The issue of weighing the rights 
of animals and other moral patients against the rights of humans will be examined in later 
chapters, the concern here is simply with conflicting rights held by human individuals.  
Different people may have different rights concerning their environments, and sometimes 
there may appear to be conflicts between these rights.  The landowner‘s right to choose how 
he puts his land to use may conflict with the rights of other people living on that land 
(ignoring for the time being the possible rights of animals, groups and future landowners).  If 
I have a right not to suffer the effects of pollution, this may conflict with other people‘s rights 
to liberty.  We need to consider which rights (if any) are absolute, and whether any of these 
are environmental rights.  In a sense, this is a problem that has been dealt with before in other 
areas of rights theory.  Much has been written on the topic of how apparent conflicts of rights 
are to be understood and resolved, but in order to understand how environmental rights might 
be understood to function, this question deserves some consideration in terms of its relation 
to concrete environmental issues.  There are countless rights that might be thought to conflict 
with each other in an environmental context.  The following section on the right to liberty 
merely picks out one particular type of conflict to demonstrate how such conflicts might be 
addressed more generally. 
(4a) Environmental Rights and the Right to Liberty 
For many individuals, acting in a way that is thought to protect the environment is simply too 
inconvenient and difficult, and any measures to attempt to make them behave differently is 
seen as an imposition on their personal liberties, as it is making them act against their will.  
This has been raised as a concern with regard to compulsory recycling, ‗pay as you throw‘ 
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schemes and proposed systems of individual carbon emissions rationing.
1
  Instead it has been 
suggested that people should be persuaded to change their behaviour through education or 
incentives, as narrowing the scope of individual liberties is not regarded as justified in these 
cases. 
 However, the flip side of this is that many would suggest that we cannot simply allow 
people the freedom to destroy the environment.  After all, many scientists claim that the 
threat of global climate change is so severe that carbon emissions need to be reduced 
dramatically in a very short timescale in order to avoid drastic environmental damage.  There 
is a real issue of whether people will respond to this threat if left to make their own choices 
about how ‗green‘ they wish to be.  If people will not respond to persuasion (and some would 
argue that there is not enough time to see whether they will) then we are left with the question 
of whether it is ever permissible to interfere with someone‘s personal liberties for the sake of 
preventing harm to the environment.  This appears to be a direct conflict of rights.  On one 
hand, people have a right to individual liberty, while on the other, they have rights concerning 
the state of their environment, rights not to be subjected to serious risks, or to have their 
health or well-being damaged.  The question here is how far the right to liberty extends, and 
what limits, if any, can be placed on it.  There is a sense in which it is impossible for 
everyone to be granted an absolute right to total liberty.  Total liberty, the liberty to perform 
any action which one is capable of performing, would imply the liberty to restrict the liberty 
of others, and thus total liberty is not universalizable.  We therefore need some rule or 
principle for how liberties ought to be distributed.  Where does one person‘s liberty begin and 
another‘s end? 
 Two popular justifications for the restriction of the right to liberty are the harm 
principle as articulated by John Stuart Mill (that the only reason to interfere with the liberty 
                                                          
1
 See for example Guardian Unlimited, 2006 and McCright (2000). 
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of an individual is to prevent harm to others) and John Rawls‘ liberty principle (that everyone 
should be allowed maximum liberty compatible with a like liberty for all) (Mill 1999 and 
Rawls 1999).  Serious environmental harm could conceivably count as a reason for the 
restriction of liberty under either of these principles.  The potential human cost of climate 
change could be disastrous.  The effect of events such as hurricanes and tsunamis have been 
seen in recent years, and the chance of these events becoming increasingly dramatic is 
thought to be increased by human driven climate change.
1
  There is also a serious issue 
concerning more general climate trends aside from these isolated dramatic events.  Hotter 
summers and rising sea levels would make more areas of the world uninhabitable, making the 
simple business of sustaining one‘s life very difficult for many people in the developing 
world and leading to large scale migration of populations to find space in an ever more 
crowded world.
2
 These effects are reminiscent of war on an unprecedented scale, killing 
people and driving them from their homes.  The enemy is not an external alien force, in fact 
many of the people who will suffer are themselves partially responsible for their predicament. 
 It may be argued that such a threat gives sufficient reason to interfere in a person‘s 
liberty.  After all, whether we use Mill‘s condition (harm) or Rawls‘ condition (infringement 
of liberty) it would seem that, certainly by some people‘s predictions, the results of climate 
change are fit to be considered good reasons to restrict liberty where such restrictions are 
necessary to prevent those effects.  A rights theorist would couch this in right-based terms, 
maintaining either that the right to liberty does not cover these circumstances, or that the 
individual‘s prima facie right to liberty is in this case overridden by a more pressing right, 
either another right to liberty, or a right not to suffer harm (the latter is close to Hayward and 
Lercher‘s interpretations of an environmental right). 
 Whether we accept such interventions will depend upon how we interpret principles 
                                                          
1
 See the US Climate Change Science Program‘s report on this issue (U.S. Climate Change Science Program 
and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research 2008). 
2
 See, for example O'Neill (2001). 
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that determine the limits to our liberty.  Let us take as an example Mill‘s ‗harm condition‘.  
The basic principle is that the only reason for which a state can rightly interfere with the 
liberties of an individual is to prevent harm to others.  This excludes self-harm, as only 
actions which harm people other than the agent are regarded as causing grounds for 
interference.  One of the ways in which Mill seeks to elucidate the notion of harm is with 
reference to rights and right violations: 
Every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the 
fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe 
a certain line of conduct towards the rest.  This conduct consists, first, in not injuring 
the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal 
provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights. (Mill 1999, p. 
122) 
 
So which interests is Mill referring to when he describes those that ought to be considered as 
rights?  He claims that he is not talking about rights in the natural rights tradition, as he 
means simply interests which ought to be held as rights in legal or social arrangements, and 
he forgoes ―any advantage which could be derived to [his] argument from the idea of abstract 
right, as a thing independent of utility‖ (Mill 1999, p. 53).  So what we are discussing are 
interests which ought to be considered as rights for reasons of utility: 
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend 
me in the possession of.  If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought?  I can give him 
no other reason than general utility. (Mill 1962, p. 309) 
 
So if there is a Millian right to a clean or undamaged environment, that would mean that the 
best decision in utilitarian terms would be to protect the individual‘s enjoyment of a clean or 
undamaged environment.  This might be couched in more general terms as less specific 
rights, such as a right to health or well-being, or the right against risk impositions.  This 
would mean that the state should protect people‘s health and well-being, or should not subject 
them to unnecessary risks.  In some cases the only way to achieve this might be through 
protecting their environment.  The state would only be justified in interfering with an 
individual‘s liberty in the case of a right violation, perhaps in this case that could be causing 
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excessive pollution, or not recycling waste.  It is important that the criteria remain fairly 
stringent, as for Mill, the right to liberty is usually stronger than most other rights in 
utilitarian terms, as he argues in great detail in On Liberty.  Despite this, if we assume for the 
sake of argument that the intended interference in a person‘s liberty will serve to prevent 
harm to others in the form of violating their rights, and that it is the only way to prevent this 
harm, it initially seems that under Mill‘s terms, such interference would be justified.   
 However, a complication occurs at this point which draws on several strands that we 
have mentioned.  Recall that those who are the victims of environmental damage are also 
very often the perpetrators.  In fact, there is probably hardly anyone on this planet who does 
not contribute to climate change in at least some small respect.  We should also recall that 
Mill thinks that the only reason for interfering in someone‘s liberty is to prevent harm to 
others.  Here it becomes clear what the problem is.  If we are complicit in the damage to the 
environment, then can the state still be justified in interfering in our liberties for the sake of 
preventing harm to us?  Is complicity in harm the equivalent of self-harm and thus unaffected 
by Mill‘s harm condition?  If it is, then our right not to be harmed is forfeited because we 
ourselves have acted in a way that would violate it. 
 There are a few possible answers to this.  Firstly, people may not be aware of the 
threat that is posed to them by their own activities.  If this is the case we may be justified in 
restricting their actions.  Some people certainly do not seem to believe that climate change is 
a great threat, or at least that if it is it is caused by human activity.  If people are not aware of 
the danger of their actions, then perhaps they can be restrained.  Mill uses an example of a 
man crossing a bridge that is in a poor state of repair.  If he does not know that the bridge is 
dangerous, and there is no time to warn him of the danger, he can be restrained from crossing 
it ―for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall in the river‖ 
(Mill 1999, p. 146).  Thus we can act to prevent someone from doing something that will 
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harm them when they do not know about the harm that their action would result in.  So we 
might maintain that people who do not realise the dangers of climate change and their 
contribution to it can be forced to act in a certain way because they do not want to suffer the 
ultimate consequence of what they are doing. 
 But the bridge example is simpler than the climate change one.  With climate change 
some argue that the science is still a matter of dispute.  While most people involved in that 
area of scientific enquiry agree that climate change is a danger to mankind and is caused by 
human activity, this view is not unanimous.
1
  The man can be prevented from crossing the 
bridge when it is known to be dangerous, but should he be prevented from crossing it when a 
group of engineers are in the middle of a heated disagreement about its safety?  While many 
would probably urge the precautionary principle just to be on the safe side, this does not 
necessarily chime very well with Mill‘s liberal thought. 
 His emphasis on freedom of thought and individuality would suggest that the man 
should be allowed to choose whether to cross the bridge once he had heard what all the 
engineers had to say.  Similarly with climate change, this might suggest that according to 
Mill‘s principles, an individual‘s behaviour should not be restricted once he had heard and 
considered the arguments on both sides.  Here is not the place to discuss the role of doubt in 
ethical decision making, but is a complex issue that would need to be addressed.  Perhaps it 
                                                          
1
  It is, however, sensible to take many of the claims that dispute the scientific evidence for climate change with 
a sizeable pinch of salt.  There is a great deal more disagreement about climate change and man‘s responsibility 
for it in the media and among politicians than there is in the scientific community.  Thus there appears to be less 
scientific consensus than there actually is.  Of course, there is a separate question that can be asked about how 
non-scientists can know what scientific findings to trust and accept.  As non-specialists, we must take the words 
of specialists on trust to a certain extent, just as we generally trust doctors, financial advisors, plumbers and 
electricians in their respective fields.  But which experts should we listen to in cases of disagreement, and how 
can we make up our minds where there is uncertainty?  Can we take what we have heard from experts to be 
knowledge, and if not, how can we use it as the basis of behaviour, political policy making and so on?  Do we 
have good reason to side with the majority of experts, when lone voices have sometimes turned out to be 
correct? These kinds of questions have attracted an increasing amount of attention over the past few years (see 
for example Collins 2007 and Lahsen 2005) but cannot be discussed in detail in this thesis.  Many thanks to Ian 
Kidd for suggesting these sources. 
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also highlights one respect in which Mill‘s emphasis on individual flourishing does not 
connect very well with environmental issues.  If the situation we face is the one that the 
majority of scientists predict, do we have time for the luxury of avoiding the tyranny of the 
majority?  Perhaps Lercher‘s argument, suggesting that there is not only a right not to be 
harmed, but also a right against the imposition of risk might help to some extent. 
 The view that we are examining is that climate change cannot be a reason for 
interfering with people‘s liberty because those people are complicit in their own harm.  We 
have briefly addressed the point that perhaps we could interfere if the people were unaware of 
the harm that they were causing to themselves, but of course this is not the case for most 
people.  It is generally accepted within and without the scientific community that human 
activity contributes to climate change, but while most people contribute to this harm, not 
everyone does.  Of those who do, not all of them can be held responsible.  Some animals, 
children and people who do not yet exist will all suffer as a result of climate change, but 
cannot be said to be responsible for it.    Animals and children, but not future people, are both 
interest groups which fall outside of Mill‘s view of who should be allowed liberty bound only 
by the harm condition, as they are not capable of making rational choices for their own good.  
They are not however groups that would necessarily be excluded from counting as sufferers 
of harm who can count as a reason to restrict another‘s liberty, as they are both capable of 
experiencing pleasure and pain. 
 These cases will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis, but they are not the 
only ones to be considered in this instance.  There are many people in the world for whom we 
can say that, while they do contribute to climate change through some of their activities, their 
overall impact will be very small.  These may be some poor people living in developing 
countries, people who make deliberate efforts to reduce their environmental impact, or people 
who have a small impact for other reasons (an example might be certain Amish communities 
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who reject the use of the automobile and electricity). 
Other people who may be regarded as not responsible for climate change may be 
people who contribute to it significantly but do not do so freely.  These are people who have 
very little choice, such as poor factory workers, or the many people in Britain who cannot 
afford to purchase locally sourced products, which are often more expensive than goods that 
are shipped from parts of the world where labour is cheaper.  The issue in these cases would 
not be so much whether we should constrain people‘s liberty, but how we can facilitate their 
behaving in a way that does not contribute to climate change.  This is perhaps a question of 
positive liberty, and even of positive rights to be able to do good. 
 So in reality, we may be allowed to appeal to Mill‘s harm principle to intervene to 
lessen the effects of climate change, since for many people and animals it is not a case of 
freely chosen self-harming activity.  We can perhaps interfere with the liberty of those who 
make significant contributions to climate change for the sake of preventing harm to those 
who do not, or who are not responsible for any contributions that they make.  However, it 
does seem rather odd to say that measures that are taken to curb climate change are taken for 
the sake of these people or animals and nobody else.  While climate change might be 
particularly damaging for certain vulnerable groups, many would hold that we should try to 
tackle it for the sake of everyone.  This would seem to suggest that Mill‘s thought faces 
difficulty in dealing with situations which have complex webs of interactions and suffering, 
and where the conventional moral agent/ moral patient distinction is not straightforward. 
 If we are to use the traditional liberalism of Mill to justify coercive measures to 
protect the environment because they are being done for the sake of those people who are 
complicit in their own harm, we must explain why Mill‘s sphere of self-regarding actions is 
not applicable to this case.  If we should be forced to protect the environment for our own 
sakes then this seems difficult.  Perhaps a better way of looking at it would be to argue that 
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everyone should be made to preserve an environment that is conducive to the health and lives 
of everyone else.  When it is worded like this, we can see how we are not talking about a self-
regarding action; rather we are talking about an other-regarding action which regards 
everyone else in the world.  Thus, the fact that other people are contributing to the pollution 
does not mean that they are excluded from being worthy of others‘ consideration, they are 
still liable to be harmed by it.  Each of us only contributes a little to the pollution and 
deforestation that is responsible for global warming, so if we suffer harm as a result of it, 
only a tiny proportion of that harm is self-harm.  The greater part is caused by others, and it is 
because of that part that we should restrict people‘s actions. 
 A difficulty that faces this is that the same argument could be applied to other 
activities that result in mutual harm, such as sadomasochism or smoking in a household 
where everyone is a smoker.  These cases would traditionally be regarded as examples where 
people are complicit in their own harm and because of this the behaviour should not be 
restrained.  It is not always so clear why this is thought to be the case, but one answer might 
be that by participating in the activity one gives one‘s tacit consent to be harmed which 
means that no outside force is justified in intervening to prevent the harm.  It may be that we 
can distinguish the climate change case from these more traditional cases because true 
consent requires the ability not to consent.  Living in a house of smokers or participating in 
sadomasochistic activity is a choice, but living on a planet that is under threat from climate 
change is not, so simply by existing on this planet, of course we have not given our consent to 
what is happening to it. 
 Another difficulty lies in the question of whether we should see damage to the 
environment as shared responsibility, where responsibility for the harm can be measured out 
between its different contributors, or whether it is collective responsibility which is held by 
groups rather than by individuals.  The argument that people can be coerced into non-
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pollution because the harm that they suffer is mostly not caused by them fits best with a 
notion of shared causal responsibility, where the individual‘s contribution to their own harm 
can be singled out and discarded.  It would be harder to account for how this would be 
possible if it is collective causal responsibility that is most relevant here.  Should we then 
regard global warming as something caused by individuals or by countries, governments, 
societies, corporations, cultures and so on? 
 Mill, as a firm advocate of liberal individualism, would be likely to be rather sceptical 
about the notion of collective responsibility itself, but perhaps this betrays an inherent 
weakness in theories such as Mill‘s for dealing with situations such as environmental damage 
on a global scale, as there are several reasons that suggest we should view the problem as one 
of collective responsibility, rather than just the aggregated responsibilities of many. 
 The literature on collective responsibility is rather too extensive and detailed to argue 
this point conclusively here, but collective responsibility seems to be suggested by the fact 
that no one individual polluting alone makes a significant contribution to the harm that would 
be suffered as a result of climate change.  One person acting individually would not cause a 
small amount of climate change proportional per head to the current levels predicted.  Rather, 
no climate change would occur at all.  Harm caused by climate change is by nature something 
that is caused by many people acting and, in the sense that it can only be caused this way, is 
not an aggregate of the individual actions which contribute to it.  It is also the case that the 
identities and behaviours of the individuals who are acting is less important than the identities 
and behaviours of the groups that have a causal impact, and this is not just down to a question 
of scale.  In the type of society, corporation or species that causes pollution, people can be 
substituted and the activity continues, whereas if the structure or aims of the group that acts 
alters, the behaviour changes far more significantly.  The activity is shaped by the type of 
group that is operating more than it is by the identities of the individuals who act within it, 
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since individuals always operate largely within the norms of the culture which they inhabit. 
 So the suggestion that we can interfere to preserve the environment due to Mill‘s 
harm condition faces a problem when we consider that most people on the planet are 
complicit in the harm that is being caused to them.  However, if such measures would be 
necessary to avoid the drastic effects of climate change, it seems equally difficult to defend 
the view that interference is not the best option in utilitarian terms.  Even Mill‘s ―largest 
sense‖ of utility ―grounded on ―the permanent interests of man as a progressive being‖ (Mill 
1999, p. 53) do not seem to justify taking no action when the threat to human happiness and 
progress is so grave.  Part of this seeming contradiction stems, as we have seen, from Mill‘s 
failure to account for collective responsibility and the inevitable entanglement of moral agent 
and moral patient that arises with global cases such as this.  This does not seem to be unique 
to Mill.  This is partly a product of the individualism that has dominated political thought for 
centuries, but it is not just down to this.  The thought of Marx, with his strong alienation 
between the worker and the bourgeoisie, might also struggle to deal with the extent to which 
different groups and their activities occupy multiple roles, both as attacker and as victim.  
These complexities make environmental problems very difficult to conceptualise in 
conventional political terms, something that becomes particularly apparent in the literature on 
rights, which as we have seen makes a stark division between agent and patient.  We will also 
see how it is not just human individuals and groups who are entangled in this way.  Issues 
such as the importance of animals and species and the interaction between them, humanity, 
and the non-sentient world will further highlight the inadequacy of conventional agent/patient 
and rights based approaches to the issues facing our planet. 
5. Chapter Conclusion 
We have seen what forms environmental rights might take, and how they fit in with wider 
theories of rights.  It appears to be at the very least plausible, if rights theories are plausible at 
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all, that there can be environmental rights.  In a sense, the conventional rights of classical 
natural rights theories can be considered environmental rights, at least in some instances.  It is 
also plausible that, derived from these, there are more specifically and essentially 
environmental rights, where harm or interference in the environment lies at the heart of the 
formulation of the right, and the right does not exist merely as a derivative of another more 
foundational right. 
We have also looked at the issue of how the right to liberty might come into conflict 
with environmental rights.  This has thrown up a great deal more questions, suggesting that 
perhaps traditional rights theory may be simplistically individualistic when applied to large-
scale environmental problems.  The level of complex dependencies and global interactions 
affecting the world were not fully recognized in Mill‘s times, and the problems with applying 
his moral thought to contemporary issues is perhaps further evidence that moral and political 
ideas must be understood in terms of the social and intellectual backgrounds against which 
they develop. This chapter has also forced us to consider the role in theories of rights of those 
who are not (presently, at least) moral agents.  Many of these cases will be discussed in the 
next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5- Rights of Future People and Groups
1
 
 
 
 
Should we fail to rise to this challenge I don't believe we will be able to explain 
ourselves to future generations that we have let down. 
-Tony Blair on Climate Change
2
 
 
The content of a fruitful ideal necessarily lies beyond the momentarily actual.  And 
because it reaches beyond the limits of an individual life, it naturally reduces the 
individual to a link in the chain of life, which connects the past with the future.  Man 
sees himself caught up into a larger providence, which looks beyond him and yet is 
his own. (Hartman 1981, p. 307) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In chapter four we looked at environmental applications of theories of moral rights, and 
considered what forms these rights might plausibly take.  The focus of the chapter was on the 
environmental rights of currently existing human beings, although it suggested that theories 
of environmental rights might be harder to apply to some other cases.  This chapter will be 
concerned with some of the difficulties of applying rights theory (and particularly theories of 
environmental rights) to some human cases.  The main questions will concern whether we 
can attribute rights to future people, and whether we can attribute them to groups of people.  
Work has already been done surrounding these issues (especially relating to the rights of 
future people) although less has been said about the implications of these difficulties for 
rights-based theories and how environmental ethicists ought to respond to the notion of rights 
given these issues. 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to Jonathan Lowe and to Jonathan Tallant for their advice on some of the more metaphysical 
elements of this chapter, as well as on the most appropriate terminology to apply, and to Geoffrey Scarre for 
past conversations about moral obligations to the dead which have direct implications for some of the substance 
of this chapter. 
2
 Tony Blair in a speech launching the Stern review of the likely impacts of climate change. See The Daily Mail 
Online (2006). 
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 Questions about future people are often raised in relation to environmental ethics.  In 
the case of people who will be born after the time that we have died, the main way that we 
can affect their quality of life is through the legacy that we leave in the environment.  Things 
that we do now will have sometimes irreversible effects on the environments that future 
people will experience, whether it is in the form of an altered climate, reserves of natural 
resources, preserved ancient woodland or levels of population growth.  However, it is 
probably worth mentioning that environmental matters (particularly climate change) are 
thought of less in terms of future generations than they used to be.  The growing literature on 
the medium rather than long term effects of climate change, coupled with the recognition that 
we are living longer has brought more focus on things that will happen within some of our 
lifetimes.  However, the consideration that we give to future people is still very important in 
shaping the way that we respond to environmental questions.  For example, if we consider 
only the interests of currently existing people, we may choose to use up a natural resource 
which we would otherwise preserve for future generations, or to make different decisions 
about the storage of hazardous waste. 
 I aim firstly to consider the moral status of future people, and then to demonstrate 
how this issue is closely tied to the moral status of groups of people.  I will argue that one 
way that we might ascribe moral rights to future people is to ascribe moral rights to groups. 
2. Future People 
 
As always, it is important here to make some sense of the terminology that we are using.  
Various different things have been meant by ‗future people‘, and there are different subsets 
into which the set ‗future people‘ can be divided.  In the broadest sense, future people can 
include distant future people, but also ourselves in the future, the children that we have or 
may have in the future, and those who currently exist only as zygotes, embryos or foetuses 
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(which we may or may not also regard as current people).
1
  In a narrower sense, future people 
might be only those people in the relatively distant future, whose lives will never overlap 
with our own: 
What is distinctive about the notion of obligations to future generations is… that it 
refers to generations with which the possessors of the obligations cannot expect in a 
literal sense to share a common life. (Golding 1972, p. 225) 
 
Different things can be said about these different cases.  It is perhaps significant for example 
whether the genetic identities of the people concerned have been determined at this point in 
time.  If having a particular current genetic identity is a condition of having rights, then we 
may be able to ascribe rights to presently existing foetuses which we cannot ascribe to non-
presently existing future people (and if current genetic identity is not a criterion, but rational 
agency is, the reverse might be true).
2
 
 These questions are further complicated by some of the same questions that we might 
have about the ascription of rights in general: do future people from dramatically different 
cultures, who have dramatically different ideas about morality or concepts of the good, or 
who are not the inheritors of our culture have any rights against us? Or perhaps all future 
people have rights against me because I have the power to determine, in part, their way of 
life: 
The cross-temporal moral community in which one finds oneself is not restricted to 
those who share one‘s own way of life, but extends to all those with whom one stands, 
directly or indirectly, in dependency or interdependency relations... Interdependency 
is transitive, and so relates me to all those with whom either earlier or later 
participants in my particular way of life have stood in interdependent relationships. 
(Baier 1981, p. 179) 
 
The answers to these questions may or may not make a great difference with respect to which 
environmental policies should be enacted.  It may be that these people have prima facie 
                                                          
1
 Embryos and other things that exist which are not people but will become so are sometimes distinguished from 
contingent future people (people in the future whose identity and existence depends upon what we do now) by 
the use of the label ‗Potential people‘ See for example Warren (1978). 
2
 This depends to an extent on our theory of time and our views on tenseless logic, as we shall see later. 
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rights, but that they are so heavily outweighed by the demands of current people that they 
don‘t count for very much.1 On the other hand, the fact that these are rights may give them a 
strength and demandingness that other moral claims do not. 
The issue may be one of enormous moral and practical significance, for a duty to 
respect another‘s rights generally carries greater weight and thus overrules a 
competing ―uncorrelated‖ duty, such as a duty to be charitable.  Thus, for example, 
we assume that we can write a check to the March of Dimes only if we have cash on 
balance after paying our bills and instalment debts.  Our creditors have a right to our 
money, but the charitable agencies do not. (Partridge 1981, p. 135) 
 
This is heavily dependent upon what we think about rights in general.  Alternatively, it may 
be that future people do not have rights, but that they still have moral status of some sort that 
should prompt us to behave sustainably,
2
 or that even if future people have no moral status, 
we should behave sustainably for the sakes of current people who have strong views about 
what should happen to future people
3
.  These issues may have implications for the value of 
rights theories and their applications to future people and to environmental ethics more 
generally.  I will mostly be concerned with those future people with whom we shall never 
share a common life. 
3. The Moral Status of Future People 
 
As I mentioned, it is possible (at least by some theories) to assert that future people have 
some kind of moral status without attributing moral rights to them.  However, it is not 
possible so far as I can see to do the opposite, that is to attribute moral rights to an individual 
whilst denying that they have moral status.  At least part of what it means to say that someone 
has rights is to say that they feature in our moral landscape, that they are worthy of moral 
consideration.  This means that those wishing to assert that future people can have moral 
rights have to answer questions about moral status, but even once this has been done, it does 
not necessarily imply that future people can have rights. 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of this, see Williams (1978), Kavka (1978) and Barry (1978) 
2
 See Macklin (1981) 
3
 For example, Clayton Hubin (1976) and Schwartz (1978, pp. 12-13) 
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In this section we will consider the question of whether future people can have moral 
status, moving on to the more specific question about rights later in the chapter.  The most 
notable problem for the moral status of future people is Derek Parfit‘s ‗non-identity problem‘ 
(1984), although issues relating to the non-existence of future people also provide the 
grounds for some other criticisms of the view that they have moral status. 
(3a) The Non-Identity Problem 
 
Derek Parfit‘s non-identity problem is probably the most famous problem associated with 
obligations to future people.  The problem hinges on the idea that the identities of future 
people have not yet been determined.  An individual‘s identity is determined, at least in part, 
by which sperm fertilised which ovum.  Due to the minimal likelihood of any particular 
sperm fertilising an ovum, tiny changes in circumstances can completely alter which people 
will come into being.  Any decision that we make which will have an impact on the well-
being of whichever people exist in the future will also affect who those people will be.  Thus 
a decision which will give future people a poor standard of living can‘t be said to cause harm 
to anyone, since had a different decision been made, the people experiencing the low level of 
well-being might not have existed at all.  Instead, different, happier people might exist, who 
similarly cannot be said to have been benefited by the decision.  This means that moral 
theories relying on weighing up harms and benefits to specific people cannot account for 
obligations to future generations. 
 Whether or not the non-identity problem is a serious concern will depend to a certain 
extent upon which moral theory one adopts.  Parfit himself answered the problem by appeal 
to an impersonal moral outlook, comparing the relative welfares of different people.  He 
suggested that we should bring about the possible state of affairs in which people‘s lives are 
best.  Critics of this position say that this does not achieve what it is supposed to.  Who or 
what exactly is better off under the ‗better‘ choice? Certainly no individuals are better off, so 
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should we say simply that this is a better world?  The world itself does not care whether it is 
better off than it otherwise would be.  One way to approach this would be to consider the 
welfare of society or of a group as a whole, rather than considering the welfare of individuals.  
This view is rejected by Thomas Schwartz, although he doesn‘t clearly explain the reasons 
for his view: 
Let us concede that one and the same future society would exist under both the 
restrictive and the laissez-faire [population] policies, although it had none of the same 
members under the two policies.  Still, this ―society‖ would not be better off under the 
restrictive policy in any morally relevant sense.  The fact that one policy would in 
some sense be better than another for something called a society, although in no sense 
better for any person, constitutes no moral ground for prescribing the former policy. 
(Schwartz 1978, p. 7) 
 
Of course it is the case that, if we take an individualistic approach, we cannot have 
obligations to a society.  Equally, if we do not take such an approach, it may well be the case 
that we can.  Schwartz does not (in this article) provide any rationale for embracing the 
individualistic approach.  Whether a non-individualistic approach is compatible with a rights-
based theory is a further question, and one that will be considered later in this chapter.  
However, before we address that, we should consider a further question about whether we 
can have moral obligations at all to people who do not currently exist. 
(3b) The Existence Condition 
 
Epicureans regarded death as something which could not be a harm to them.  This is because 
‗harm‘ cannot be attributed to something that does not exist: ―so long as we exist, death is not 
with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist‖ (1926, p. 85).  Once someone dies, he 
ceases to be, so his death cannot be a misfortune for him.  As with people who have died, 
people who have not yet been born do not exist at present, so in a similar way, we might say 
that we cannot attribute ‗harm‘ to those who do not yet exist.  If this is the case, then we 
cannot correctly say that an action that we perform now is harmful to future people. 
 This idea of harming those who do not exist is part of a wider question in philosophy 
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of language about what is going on when we apply any predicate, reference or description to 
a non-existent object.  Think of Russell‘s famous puzzle which suggests that (due to the law 
of the excluded middle) ―the present King of France is bald‖ must either be true or false 
(Russell 1905).  It quite obviously is not true, since there is no present King of France to be 
bald, but the sentence‘s negation seems to imply that the present King Of France is not bald, 
which does not seem to be true either.  The difficulty of course is that Russell is grappling 
with a non-existent object, and things that don‘t exist are very difficult to keep hold of.  We 
cannot truthfully attribute any property to a non-existent object (this perhaps relies on the 
assumption that non-existence is not a predicate).
1
 
 The idea that future people cannot be harmed because they do not exist (are not 
actual) can be argued as follows (I use ‗exists‘ to refer to existence at a particular time, and 
‗is actual‘ in a broader, tenseless sense): 
1) Future people do not exist at present. 
 
2) Objects that do not exist at present are non-actual objects 
  
3) No properties can be attributed to non-actual objects, therefore, 
 
4) No properties can currently be attributed to future people. 
  
5) ‗Being wronged‘, ‗being harmed‘, ‗having moral status‘, ‗having rights‘ etc. are 
properties (or at least supervene on properties), so, 
 
6) Future people cannot currently be harmed, have moral status, have rights etc. 
 
This issue has been discussed in the context of harming or wronging the dead at least as much 
as it has been with reference to future people.  David-Hillel Ruben noticed this with respect 
                                                          
1
 One exception to this might be how we deal with fictitious entities.  It is quite normal for us to attribute a 
property to a fictional character or object (‗Sherlock Holmes is/was an opium user‘).  There are a number of 
ways of dealing with this, one of which is simply to say that it is true that in Conan Doyle‘s stories Sherlock 
Holmes was an opium user.  Another response is that Sherlock Holmes is a genuine object with the property of 
non-existence.  If this is the case then it is not true that Holmes exists, but it is true that he is an opium user.  Yet 
another response is to say that what we are doing when we ascribe properties to non-existent objects is playing a 
game of make-believe.  We are not making genuine references but merely pretending to. See Thomasson (1999) 
for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
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to predicating any property of an object which has ceased to exist: 
A suitable slogan might be: No properties can be had or acquired by things at times at 
which the thing in question is not there to have or acquire the property.  That is, 
(4) If, at t, x has the property P, then x exists at t. (Ruben 1988, p. 213) 
 
Similarly, when considering the Epicurean question about the evil of death, Fred Feldman 
uses the term ‗the existence condition‘, which states that ―nothing bad can happen to a person 
at a time unless he exists at that time‖ (1991, p. 205).  Premise (2) deserves further attention 
before we can make sense of the argument, and this requires that we analyse it in terms of 
different theories of time. 
(3c) Eternalism 
 
The view that presently non-existing people are non-actual depends on holding particular 
views about time, whereby what has been in the past, and what will be in the future, is not 
actual in the present.  If this were not the case, then (2) and therefore (4) would be false.  The 
future person, while he does not exist in the present, is actual, and can therefore have 
properties.  Views such as this can be characterised as ‗eternalism‘ or ‗block universe theory‘, 
the notion that all time and all space is one continuous whole, and that the apparent 
differences between past, present and future depend merely on the subjective viewpoint of the 
observer.
1
  If the present has no particular privilege which makes propositions about it any 
more real than the past and the future, this allows us to apply tenseless logic to it.  We can 
truly say that (tenselessly) the future person x exists and has the property P.  In other words 
the future person (and the property that he has) are actual. 
 This might then allow us to apply morally significant predicates to people who do not 
yet exist.  The proposition ‗Some future person, x, is (tenselessly) in pain‘ would then be very 
different from the proposition ‗The present King of France (the King of France, who is actual 
                                                          
1
 See, for example Grunbaum (1950-1) and Horwich (1987) 
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in August 2008) is bald‘.1  So according to eternalism, a person who exists at t can 
meaningfully and truthfully say that there is a time t+1, at which x exists and has the property 
of being wronged, harmed, possessed of rights etc, and therefore that x, and the wrong, harm, 
right, etc., is actual.  Because the present has no special privilege, this becomes equivalent to 
saying that there is a place, different from the place in which we live, in which x exists and is 
wronged, harmed, possessed of rights etc.  Premise (1) is true, but not important, and premise 
(2) is false. 
 This is not to say that temporal ‗distance‘ would have no moral implications for the 
eternalist. There is debate about the extent of our moral obligations to those who live far 
away from us, but few people would deny that some such obligations are at least possible, 
even if not instantiated.  It might be argued that there are exceptions in the form of theories 
like the ethic of care
2
, which suggest that a moral tie between y and x depend on a 
relationship of care between y and x.  In the case of the ethic of care, this is because a direct 
relationship of care exists between them.  This may arguably also be true of some theories of 
rights, as we shall see shortly.  However, the question of whether we have a relationship with 
someone is not the same as whether we occupy the same points in space.  It may often be the 
case that a moral community, or a pair or group of people sharing bonds of care, occupy the 
same geographical area, but this is far from being a logical necessity or even a universal 
experience.  Thus if we adopt eternalism, the problem with future generations would not be 
concerned with whether or not y and x exist at the same time (and whether or not they can 
instantiate properties) but with whether the fact that they do not exist at the same time 
precludes the possibility of any moral relationship.  This question will be considered later in 
this chapter. 
                                                          
1
 The view that propositions referring to states of affairs in the future already have truth value arguably implies 
determinism, which would have major implications for moral philosophy too complicated to deal with here.  To 
preserve moral responsibility alongside determinism, we must adopt some form of compatibilist approach.  For 
example, Hume (1978), Strawson (1962) and Dennett (1984) 
2
 See, for example Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) 
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(3d) ‘No Future’ Theories 
 
‗No Future‘ theories is the term that I will adopt for theories that reject eternalism and give 
ontological privilege to the present over the future.  I use the term ‗no future theory‘ 
(henceforth NF) to apply both to ‗presentist‘ theories (which hold that only the present has 
ontological reality - see, for example Bourne 2006) and to ‗growing past‘ theories (which 
hold that the present and past have ontological reality, but not the future), since they are both 
opposed to the eternalist idea that the future is ‗actual‘, even though they disagree about the 
ontological status of the past. 
If we do not accept eternalism, and think that there is no ontologically extant future, is 
Ruben‘s statement ‗If, at t, x has the property P, then x exists at t.‘ irreconcilable with the 
view that future people have moral status?  One might initially find this view more 
problematic for the idea of future people having moral status, since moral status is generally 
thought either to be a property, or to supervene on a property.  If we hold (as the NF theorist 
does) that there are no ontological entities in the future, then we must also hold that no 
properties can presently correctly be applied to future objects.  There are, however, various 
approaches which might duck this problem. 
 One such approach might be to claim that there is a sense in which x does exist at t, 
even though his genetic identity and other facts about him have not yet been determined.  In 
work that I have previously done on moral obligations to the dead I have suggested that it 
may conceivably be possible to have certain obligations to a person who does not exist 
anymore because important elements of his identity last beyond his physical or conscious 
existence (McKinnell 2007).
1
  A person‘s identity is constituted, at least in part, by his 
projects, goals, relationships, and so on.  If we take a strong version of the view that these 
elements are constituents of a person‘s identity, then perhaps it is possible to ascribe 
                                                          
1
 In my 2007 paper I also suggest that this is supported to a certain extent by the language that we use in 
everyday life.  We talk, for example, of someone being ‗immortalised‘ through his work, or ‗living on‘ in our 
hearts. 
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properties to what remains of someone after his or her physical death.  This view would have 
to overcome a number of difficulties, the most pressing of which would, to my mind, be the 
counterintuitive implication that human personal identity becomes subject to vagueness.  We 
could answer the question ‗does Bertrand Russell exist?‘ with the reply ‗mostly‘ or ‗a bit‘.  
We are used to thinking of groups of people in this way (consider the question ‗Is there a 
punk scene in Durham?‘) but we generally regard individual humans as indivisible wholes.  
However, this might depend to some extent upon what type of theory of identity we are 
looking at.  Numerical identity is usually understood in a binary way, either x equals y or it 
doesn‘t.  However, other ways of looking at personal identity might have less clear cut 
implications than this.  A narrative theory of identity, for example, does not necessarily see 
an individual as divisible, but it does make the boundaries of the self rather more fuzzy in a 
number of respects.  I will return to this theme in chapter eight. 
 How might this argument apply to future people?  Remember that what is being 
denied here is premise (2) in our original non-existence argument, that currently non-existing 
objects are non-actual objects.  The NF theorist would have difficulties employing a tenseless 
logic in the way that an eternalist might, since propositions about contingent facts in the 
future cannot be true or false, they can only be possibly true or false.  This would mean that 
objects in the future cannot truthfully be ascribed any properties.  Depending on whether the 
proposition about the future will be a contingent or a necessary truth, it can only be the case 
that these propositions are ‗possibly going to be true‘ or ‗going to be true‘, not currently true.  
What follows from this is that premise (2) cannot be sidestepped for the NF theorist in the 
way that it can for the eternalist.  That future people do not currently exist and are non-actual 
are premises of (so far as we can see) a valid argument, and must be either confirmed or 
denied to establish whether the argument is also sound. 
 Now let us turn to the notion that elements of our identity might extend beyond the 
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temporal boundaries of our biological lives.  The tentative theory of identity suggested at the 
start of this section claims that a person is constituted of a complex web of elements.  Among 
these might be genetic and biological identity, but they also include projects, goals, 
relationships etc.  For this person to have any of this identity left after he has died, at least 
some of these elements must remain after his physical death.  A future person‘s identity will 
come to consist of all of the elements that we have discussed, some of which exist before his 
physical body comes into existence.  Before I was born, people wrote philosophy, dug their 
gardens, were members of my family etc.  In 1982, I came into existence and incorporated 
these things into my identity.  Thus there were elements of my identity that existed prior to 
my birth, and (at least to a small extent) properties could be ascribed to me even then. 
 This faces obvious difficulties.  Assuming a NF view, before I came to exist there was 
no fact of the matter about whether I would come to exist or not, and there was also no fact of 
the matter about whether someone with my genetic or biological identity would come to 
instantiate or absorb those other elements of personal identity.  This means that it could not 
be the case that elements of my identity existed prior to my own existence, since there was no 
fact of the matter at that time about whether there would be a ‗my identity‘ for those things to 
be elements of.
1
  This could be argued by reference to a ‗potential identity‘ that might come 
to exist, but if we consider the vast number of potential genetic identities, when this is 
coupled with all possible combinations of projects, goals and relationships, considering them 
all as individuals who are worthy of the moral concern that we ascribe to extant individuals 
would start to look rather absurd. 
 Another possible view is that future people do not currently exist to have moral status, 
but that in the future they will do, and the fact that there will be such people with moral status 
                                                          
1
 Whether or not this is a problem for obligations to the dead depends on whether or not we believe that there 
are facts about what happened in the past.  A presentist would be able to maintain this objection in the case of 
past people, but a ‗growing past‘ theorist probably wouldn‘t. 
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confers present obligations on us.
1
  According to NF views, the proposition ‗there will be 
future people‘ is not determinately true in the present moment, because we don‘t think that 
there is presently any fact of the matter about what exists or doesn‘t in the future.  However 
even the NF theorist (depending of course on his views about ethics) can accept the minimal 
proposition that ‗if there turn out to be future people, they will (then) have moral status‘.  NF 
theorists are of course generally of the opinion that things will happen in the future, and that 
we can make some good guesses about what those things will be.  Despite the fact that the 
NF theorist thinks there is currently no fact of the matter about whether there will be future 
people, he can still predict that there will be such people.  Given that he has a good idea that 
there will be some future people, he also has a good idea that there will be future people with 
moral status.  In other words, he cannot say ‗there are future people who have moral status‘, 
but he can say that he can make a pretty good prediction that the proposition ‗there are people 
who have moral status‘ will be true in the future as it is now.  This might be said to confer 
obligations on adherents of NF theories to behave in such a way that people‘s future moral 
status is respected.  If we take this line then, the epistemological question of how well we can 
predict whether there will be future people becomes more significant than the metaphysical 
question about the ontological status of those future people. 
 The difficulty with this is the problem of how future (non-actual) moral status can 
confer present (actual) obligations.  If it is some projected future property of the future person 
that allows her to be ascribed projected moral status, then how can these affect the NF 
adherent‘s present obligations?  We might get around this to some extent by suggesting that it 
is our obligations that confer moral status and not the other way around.  If we focus on what 
we should do, rather than on what future people want, need, require or demand, then the 
relation does not seem to be a backward one.  This arguably however undermines the notion 
                                                          
1
 Thanks to Jonathan Tallant for helping me to think about this argument more clearly. 
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of moral status to some extent, and certainly would undermine the notion of rights, as we 
shall see later in this chapter. 
Perhaps then it might be less controversial for the NF theorist to take a more 
impersonal approach, focused on what we might share with future generations or what we 
might owe to people as a whole.  The fact that an obligation is owed to a particular person 
becomes irrelevant, instead we are considering what we owe to a particular community of 
which we may or may not be a part, but which has a currently existing component. 
(3e) Moral Communities and Reciprocity 
 
Earlier I suggested that the major question for the proponent of the eternalist view, so far as 
obligations to future generations are concerned, is whether it is possible to share a moral 
community or moral relationship with a member of another generation.  This also appears 
(for different reasons) that it may be the case for someone holding a NF view, since the NF 
view may have to solve the problem of non-existence by holding that we have obligations to 
a community in order to have obligations toward people in the future.  The answer to the 
question of whether we can participate in such an intergenerational moral community would 
depend very heavily on the way that we characterise a moral relationship.  For example, if the 
relationship had to depend on reciprocity, we immediately encounter difficulties.  The notion 
of reciprocity is particularly prominent in the language of justice, so even if we hold that 
there can be obligation without reciprocity, whether there can be rights without reciprocity is 
quite a different question, and one that we shall come to shortly.  There is considerable 
difficulty in considering intergenerational ethics and justice in terms of reciprocity.  We are 
able to have a significant effect on the lives of people who exist in the future, but what can 
those people do for us?  Some would deny that they can do anything, since they can‘t affect 
our conscious experiences of life: others would say that they can have some effect upon our 
reputation, desires or projects (something that will be discussed later).  Either way, there 
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appears to be a considerable asymmetry between what we can do for people in the future and 
what they can do for us: 
This relationship [between current and future people whose lives do not overlap] 
could not result from a relationship of mutual benefit (reciprocity) nor from explicit or 
implicit agreement.  It is difficult to see how future generations could come to have a 
claim against us in any of the ordinary ways in which one comes to have a claim 
against another. (Clayton Hubin 1976, p. 71) 
 
However, perhaps there is no reason why a morally significant relationship needs to be 
reciprocal, or at any rate symmetrical.  It is often said that parents invest far more time, 
emotion and money in their children‘s welfare than they can ever expect to get back.1  
Whether this is the case or not, this fact would not seem to undermine the sense of a genuine 
relationship between parent and child.  This idea is particularly well articulated in a novel in 
the ‗Space Opera‘ genre2 by Lois McMaster Bujold: 
You don't pay back your parents. You can't. The debt you owe them gets collected by 
your children, who hand it down in turn. It's a sort of entailment. Or if you don't have 
children of the body, it's left as a debt to your common humanity. (McMaster Bujold, 
1999, section 10) 
 
Notice that there are two different types of repaying the ‗debt‘ alluded to here, the second 
being to one‘s ‗common humanity‘.  As we have seen, the latter of these may be more 
promising for a NF theorist than a theory that gives moral status to future individuals.  Since 
groups can span generations and still maintain their identity, obligations to a group (from my 
own family to a ‗common humanity‘) may hold more promise than obligations to individual 
identities which do not exist at the same time.  So we have two separate questions to 
consider: firstly whether it is conceivable that we have a moral relationship with those with 
whom we share no common life, and secondly, whether we can have moral obligations to a 
group as a whole, rather than to its individual members.  The question of group obligations 
                                                          
1
 Although with people living longer and requiring more care from younger generations, this relationship, while 
far from equal, is more reciprocal than it once was.  There are also of course always going to be isolated cases 
where the roles are reversed. 
2
 A style of science fiction, characterised by epic themes, romance and high melodrama. 
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and group rights is the subject of the second part of this chapter, but first we will consider the 
idea that we can have relationships with those individuals with whom we do not share a 
common life despite the lack of reciprocity. 
(3f) Relationships of Obligation 
 
First, let us consider the question of some kind of intergenerational relationship that might 
link us to individuals who do not yet exist.  This might take various forms.  There might be a 
common community which we share with those future people such that we owe obligations to 
all members of that community; we may have some kind of relationship of care with future 
people, despite never having met them; or we might have obligations to future individuals 
through some kind of ‗chain‘ of owing that links us, through people with whom our lives 
overlap, to people with whom we do not share a common life. 
 The concept of belonging to an intergenerational community has a great intuitive 
appeal.  We regard ourselves as comprised of our history and as shaping our future.  This 
relates to my point in chapter one (concerning the role of history in informing philosophy) 
that our experience and our culture is formed by its history and motivated by its future.  This 
supports the view that human society is temporally as well as spatially extended. We, at least 
to some extent, occupy the same society as our great grandparents and our great 
grandchildren.  Thus, if we owe obligations as part of a shared society, then (at least to some 
extent) we owe obligations to our great grandchildren.  We can extend this further (both in 
time and in numbers of people) if we argue that we owe obligations to people simply because 
they are members of the human race. 
 This might also superficially seem a tenable view for the NF theorist, since it does not 
depend on an identity being assigned to a specific future person.  However, assuming we 
cannot get around the existence condition, it fails because it still relies on future predication.  
We still talk about a non-specific person having the property of group membership.  The 
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difficulty here is that according to NF theories, this cannot currently be true or false.  So we 
cannot say that we currently owe an obligation to that person because they are a member of 
that group, because they do not exist to have group membership assigned to them. 
 It might be objected that if this is the case, then my argument that the NF theorist may 
be able to have obligations to groups as a whole cannot stand either.  It is certainly true that 
the group, of which I am currently a part, may not exist in the future (its future component is 
contingent) and no predicate can currently truthfully be assigned to its future component.  
Any proposition relating to the group in the future cannot be true of that group at present.  
However, the group does exist now.  This means that things can currently be predicated of the 
group.  Thus I can say that I owe it to my group now to ensure that (if it exists in the future) it 
continues to flourish.  It is commonplace to have obligations toward currently existing people 
that will (or even that might) affect them in the future.  A mother might lose her child at the 
age of five, but before that was known to her she still had an obligation to have concern for 
its future beyond that age. 
 Since eternalism gives no privilege to the present, the idea of having obligations to 
future members of our group (be it our family, our nation, the human race, or the biological 
community) is no more controversial than having obligations to currently existing people in 
virtue of their membership of a group.  This would suggest that, if group membership is 
satisfactory, we need not deal with the notion of chains of obligations to ground obligations 
to future people as some theorists have, since the chain is a device for connecting those who 
have no direct link
1
.  If we have a direct connection with anyone who is a member of our 
group, this is unnecessary, and if (as the conclusion of a NF theory would seem to be) we 
cannot ascribe moral status to those who do not currently exist, the chain cannot connect us 
beyond the generations with whom we will share the earth. 
                                                          
1
 Edward A. Page provides a detailed discussion of what he calls the ‗chain of concern model of 
intergenerational reciprocity‘ (Page 2006, pp. 115-119). 
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 The chain model is often invoked in cases such as these where one-to-one direct 
reciprocal relationships cannot exist.  By the chain model, what I ‗owe‘ to person B is paid to 
a substitute, person C, who then passes it on to D, and so on.  This can be described as 
‗indirect reciprocity‘.1  My suggestion here is that, for the eternalist, one-to-one direct 
reciprocity can exist (rendering the chain model unnecessary) and that for the NF theorist, 
even indirect reciprocity such as the chain model is impossible on an intergenerational basis. 
 But perhaps the chain can be of some use when we look at the problem from another 
angle.  Consider, for example, the view that we have a special relationship of care with 
certain individuals which gives us obligations to them over and above the obligations that we 
owe to members of our society or human beings in general.  In these situations we could 
imagine a bond connecting, for example, parent to child.  The parent is bound by the 
relationship of care to provide their child with as good a life as possible.  They have this as an 
obligation, but it is also in their interests.  We could say that human flourishing involves the 
flourishing of any offspring that one has.  This would mean that part of the parent‘s 
obligation to their child might be to look out for their grandchild, great grandchild and so on.  
In this sense, we might say that a relationship of care gives us moral obligations concerning 
those who do not yet exist.  However, whilst this is an obligation concerning future people, it 
is not an obligation to them (assuming that the NF view is true).  In this example, the parent 
has an obligation to give consideration to the welfare of future generations for the sake of 
their child and their child‘s welfare.  The claim that we can have obligations concerning 
future people is less contentious than the claim that we have obligations to future people (i.e. 
that they have moral status).  If enough people in our current society who are alive today have 
deep concern for the people of the future, then we might owe it to those living people to have 
concern for future people, regardless of whether the future people themselves have moral 
                                                          
1
 See Page (2006, p. 103) and Arneson (1997) 
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status.  Whether or not we can have a right concerning someone else‘s welfare is a further 
question, and not an important one here.  If anything it would have had its place in the 
previous chapter among the many different varieties of environmental rights that can be 
ascribed to presently existing human individuals.  However, we might note that if we hold 
that other-regarding preferences are of central importance (with or without rights) this may 
lead us away from individualistic moral theories.  Whether theories of rights can withstand 
this change is yet to be seen.  This view would not allow us to talk in terms of the rights of 
future people. 
4. Future People and Rights 
 
I have already indicated how, depending on one‘s metaphysics, an ethic based on groups 
might suggest a more promising approach to the moral status of future people than an ethic 
based on the obligations that we have to future individuals.  We will come to the rights of 
groups shortly. First I will consider whether (if we can ascribe moral status to them) future 
individuals can have rights.  There are some features which make a right-based approach 
appealing in these cases: some rights are frequently considered universal and inalienable.  
They belong to a person purely in virtue of his being a person, and do not rely on him having 
‗earned‘ something.  The fulfilment of his rights is not expected because he is Fred, Joe or 
Bill, or because he belongs to a particular culture; it is expected because he is human and he 
exists.  This might help to a certain extent with the non-identity problem, since it is arguably 
an impersonal approach- personal identity is not relevant. 
 However, there are also potential problems with theories of rights in this context.  If 
we ground them in the idea of a social contract, we would seem to face problems with the 
notion of reciprocity that was mentioned earlier.  Another issue is that the problem of non-
existence seems to loom particularly large when rights are brought into the picture, since 
rights often rely explicitly on positing some feature or property of the right-holder.  We might 
130 
 
be able to escape the problem in a non-rights-based way by taking an agent centred approach.  
If our obligations to future people are based in our virtues, or in what sort of consequences we 
will bring about, rather than in the idea of what is owed to future people, then we can perhaps 
sidestep the problems of ascribing the mysterious property of ‗moral status‘ to future people.  
However, a right-based theory is unavoidably patient centred, couched as it is in the language 
of what is due to a particular person.  Rights can be understood either as properties or 
predicates of the moral patient, or as things that supervene on such properties.
1
  If we were to 
create a system of ethics which avoided the notion of moral status, this theory could not have 
any room for moral rights. 
(4a) The Non-Identity Problem 
 
Doran Smolkin (1999) argues that a rights-based approach can provide a solution to the non-
identity problem.  He makes this claim on the grounds that rights can capture how someone 
can be wronged even if the situation that is brought about is no worse for them than any 
alternative situation.  The idea is that if bringing the situation about violates that person‘s 
rights, it is still wrong whether or not that person would have existed had another (non-right 
violating) situation been brought about.  This claim relies on a number of different things.  
Firstly, to accept the claim we would also need to accept that something which is not 
predictably worse for a person can still wrong them.  Secondly, we would need to hold that 
we violate someone‘s rights by bringing them into existence in such a way that their rights 
cannot be fulfilled.  Thirdly (and most importantly) we would need to answer critics who 
                                                          
1
 A distinction can be made between predicates and properties, whereby properties are instantiated by objects 
and predicates are (in normal usage) used to apply those properties to objects linguistically.  See, for example, 
Heil (2003).  Some theorists hold ‗sparse‘ theories of properties, maintaining that there are few properties in the 
world, but still hold that there can be many well-formed predicates.  According to this view not all predicates 
express real properties (Armstrong 1989).  One suggestion here might be that we could potentially apply 
predicates to future people even though they do not exist to instantiate properties.  This point is worthy of 
further exploration that goes beyond what I can do here.  However, my initial thought is that even if this were 
possible, this would be potentially problematic as a way of generating rights or moral status.  My reason for this 
view (although not fully formed) is that if we could make these claims about non-existent future people, we 
could presumably make them about fictional characters.  This might result in a moral framework that creates 
stringent obligations to Othello, Bugs Bunny and Eleanor Rigby. 
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claim that future people are not the sort of things that can have rights.  Smolkin also defends 
himself against the argument that, once we grant rights to future people, this opens the door 
to all kinds of absurd and spurious rights claims.
1
  I will not dwell on this last point, as it 
seems that all applications of rights theory are open to this type of abuse, and it is neither an 
insurmountable problem nor a particular problem to future people.  As Smolkin observes, a 
decent exposition of the correct attribution of rights ought to escape these claims.  I will 
argue that Smolkin‘s view encounters difficulties on the second and third counts. 
 Smolkin addresses the first point, the argument that we cannot be wronged by 
something that is not predictably worse for us, by outlining and then criticising an analogy 
that several philosophers have drawn between the case of bringing into being a person who 
will suffer, and rescuing a person by performing a life-saving but bodily damaging act.  
Smolkin quotes a passage from Feinberg: 
Did the mother wrong the child by causing him to come into existence in a harmful 
(handicapped) condition?  I do not think that the child can establish a grievance 
against her so long as he concedes that his handicapped existence is far preferable to 
no existence at all… To hold her liable anyway, would be (at least with respect to the 
harm element) something like holding a rescuer liable for injuries he caused an 
endangered person that was necessary to saving that person‘s life.  He may have 
caused the imperiled party‘s arm to be broken in the rescue effort, but the alternative, 
let us suppose, was to let him die.  So the broken-armed plaintiff suffered a harmful 
condition with respect to his arm, but the rescuer-defendant did not cause a condition 
that was harmful on balance, offset as it was by the overriding benefit of the rescue, 
and he cannot be said, therefore, to have harmed the plaintiff… at all. 1 (Feinberg 
1992, p. 27) 
 
Smolkin (correctly I believe) disputes the value of this analogy.  He points out that in the case 
of the rescuer, a worse fate would befall the plaintiff (death).  However, in the case of the 
handicapped child, if his mother had decided not to have a child (or to have a child at a 
different time) then there would be no alternative worse fate for the child, as the child would 
not exist to undergo such a fate.  This, Smolkin maintains, leads to a kind of ‗moral necessity‘ 
in the first case which does not apply in the second, since in the first there is a person 
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 The criticism has been made by David Heyd (1992) and is discussed by Joel Feinberg (1992). 
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desperately in need of help, while in the second there is no such person: 
Unlike the rescuer who is in the straightforward position of being able to promote or 
fail to promote another‘s best interests, the earlier person in a non-identity problem 
case is in a position of determining whether or not a particular person will ever come 
into being.  And we may reasonably think that this special power, coupled with the 
fact that the earlier person is not confronted by someone desperately in need of help, 
grounds a special responsibility that the person who does come into being is able to 
live well.  That is, we can maintain that a future person may legitimately complain 
that an act necessary for her to come into being wronged her even though her life is 
on balance worth living, if it resulted in her being in a seriously handicapped 
condition. (Smolkin 1999, p. 201) 
 
It certainly is true that the analogy is flawed as it compares a case where identity is 
determined with a case where it is not.  It is furthermore quite possibly also the case that 
Feinberg‘s analysis that the rescuer does not harm the plaintiff is flawed: a harm is not 
necessarily a wrong, especially when it is the least harm that we have the option of inflicting.  
It seems quite implausible to say that, even in the most extreme circumstances, breaking 
someone‘s arm does them no harm.  Perhaps then the rescuer harmed the plaintiff without 
doing her any wrong.  So can we carry this over to the case of the future person who will be 
handicapped if his mother chooses to have him?  Is he harmed by the choice that his mother 
makes, and whether or not he is harmed, does she thereby wrong him? 
 For us to be able to say that the mother harms her child, we have to equate inflicting 
harm on someone with bringing into existence someone who will suffer harm.  After all, the 
mother may know that if she has a child he will be disabled, but in most cases it is not any 
direct action of hers that makes this the case.  Thus it seems that while the mother brings 
someone into existence who will suffer harm, she does not herself directly harm him, she 
merely chooses to bring about a situation where he will exist to suffer harm.  If we were to 
equate this with a harm, then we could all accuse our parents of harming us if we have ever 
experienced any kind of harm, since they brought us into existence and it was reasonably 
foreseeable that we would experience harms. 
 But nonetheless, is bringing someone into existence who will experience significant 
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harm a wrong?  This is most easy to argue in cases where the person‘s life is not worth living, 
but these are not the cases with which Smolkin is concerned.  It seems far easier to argue that 
it is a wrong per se, than it is to argue that it is a wrong to the person who is brought into 
existence.  We can, with Parfit, adopt an impersonal approach and say that when we make 
these decisions we should attempt to bring about a future in which the greatest possible level 
of welfare is experienced.  However, to say that we wrong someone by creating them (and 
thus their handicap) seems to be the same as saying that the right thing to do, for them, would 
have been to ensure that they never had existed.  Even if we think that this does not reduce to 
absurdity, it implies that their life is not worth living.  Thus while we can talk in these terms 
about the right choices that we can make concerning future people, it seems rather more 
difficult to suggest that the wrong choices wrong those people in cases where they still have 
lives that are worthwhile.  However, Smolkin argues that a right-based theory can account for 
wrongs which do not make someone worse off than they would otherwise be, following 
Annette Baier‘s claims that our rights can in some circumstances be violated in ways that do 
not make us unhappier or thwart our achievement of our goals: 
The violation of a right is, of course, a special sort of effect on a person and on his or 
her good.  It cannot be equated with making that person unhappier, or less able to get 
what she in fact wants.  If I don‘t want to vote, then the violation of my right to vote 
by the removal of my name from electoral rolls will not hurt me - it may not even be 
noticed by me.  Nevertheless someone else on my behalf might correctly protest the 
violation of my right, and correctly say that my position is worsened… I might even 
myself protest, and insist on my rights, then never exercise them. (Baier 1984, p. 218) 
 
Whether or not we agree on this point will depend to some extent upon what theory of rights 
we hold.  However, Smolkin seems to misinterpret Baier to some extent in his statement that 
―Thus, there seems to be nothing particularly unusual about claiming that a person‘s rights 
can be violated by some act, even when that act does not, on balance, make things worse for 
the person affected‖ (p. 202).  In fact, this directly contradicts Baier‘s statement in the above 
passage that, in spite of the lack of harm caused to me by my disenfranchisement, one might 
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‗correctly protest the violation of my right, and correctly say that my position is worsened’.  
Baier‘s claim appears to be that someone‘s situation can be worsened even in situations 
where we cannot say that they have been harmed, and that worsening someone‘s situation 
may in some circumstances account for how their rights are violated.  This is not akin to, and 
perhaps even in direct opposition to, the claim that the notion of a right violation does not 
depend upon the right-holder being made worse off in some way.  Smolkin has more work to 
do if he wishes to overcome the non-identity problem with a right-based approach, and given 
the route that he is taking, this will probably rely upon rejecting benefit theories of rights.  I 
will discuss this issue a little later on in this chapter. 
(4b) The Existence Condition 
 
As we have seen, the notion of ascribing moral status generally relies on the ascription of 
properties to the people in question.  ‗Moral status‘ might be used more loosely, simply to 
describe the focus of our obligations rather than relying on some inherent property of the 
person whose moral status it is.  If we use the term in this way, then we may be able to speak 
about future people having moral status.  This seems to be more complicated when we talk 
about rights however.  Rights have some of the appeal that they do because they are patient-
centred, they look to some feature of the right-holder as the source of duties or obligations.  
For example, choice theories of rights demand that the right-holder is rational and 
autonomous, while interest or benefit theories claim that they must be capable of having their 
interests served or being benefited in some way.  The NF theorist would deny that future 
people currently have any of these properties because they do not exist.  So can we 
simultaneously hold a NF position and argue that the rights of future people are in some sense 
binding on us? 
 Perhaps, just as we might maintain that future people will have moral status, they will 
also have rights, and that provided we can make a reasonable prediction that there will be 
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future people, the fact that those people will have rights is enough to ground our duties.  But 
this would have the peculiar implication that future rights would appear to generate present 
duties.  This depends to an extent, as with moral status, upon our view on the relationship 
between obligations and rights.  If we think that obligation is the ‗main‘ or ‗prime‘ concept 
here, then perhaps this is not so problematic.  The future people will have rights because we 
have present obligations concerning their future wellbeing.  However, this way of thinking 
robs theories of rights of some of their intuitive appeal.  Rights are partly popular as a moral 
concept because they have their basis in some feature of the right-holder.  There is some 
inherent integrity or inviolability that grounds the obligations that come with rights.  Rights, 
in other words, are commonly viewed as having their basis in the right-holder: they are a 
patient-centred notion.  The reason that this then presents a problem is that it would appear 
that future rights somehow have to generate present obligations.  This bears at least a 
superficial resemblance to backward causation, something that the NF theorist in particular 
might be keen to avoid.  However, notice that it may also cause some discomfort to some 
eternalists if they hold that time has a direction or ‗arrow‘.  The fact that future people 
(tenselessly) exist and hold rights might still create difficulties in explaining our obligations 
to them if we think that the relation between rights and obligations can only take one 
temporal direction in the way that it is often thought that causation does. 
However, the relation between a right and an obligation should not be regarded as a 
causal one.  A right does not cause an obligation as such: it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that it signifies one.  It is not so clear that signification always has to be a relation that places 
what is signified later in time than what signifies.  The idea of ‗backward signification‘ has 
been used to some effect to attempt to explain how we can wrong the dead, even though we 
can never affect their conscious experiences.  Geoffrey Scarre writes that ―while a person 
cannot be pleased or pained by what he never knows, occurrences after his death can cast a 
136 
 
backward light or shadow over his life‖ (Scarre 2001, p. 210).  The idea is that while a past 
event cannot be caused by a future one, future events can alter the meaning or significance of 
what has gone before.  Consider the following example from George Pitcher: 
If the world should be blasted into smithereens during the next presidency after 
Ronald Reagan‘s, this would make it true (be responsible for the fact) that even now, 
during Reagan‘s term, he is the penultimate president of the United States.  Only if 
one bears this straightforward sense of ―make true‖ and ―responsible‖ in mind can one 
properly understand the thesis that ―An ante-mortem person can be harmed by events 
that happen after his death. (Pitcher 1984, p. 188) 
 
Aristotle conveys some similar thoughts when he considers whether the flourishing of 
someone‘s life can be affected by things that happen after he dies.  He suggests that it would 
be strange to think that someone who is already dead can change between ‗happiness‘ and 
‗unhappiness‘ on the basis of events that postdate his death, and yet that there is a sense in 
which his fortunes do seem to be invested in the fortunes of his descendents, and we can talk 
about his life having been more or less successful on the basis of what happens to them after 
his death (Aristotle 2000, pp. 16-19). 
So it might be argued that, just as things that we do now can give new significance or 
meaning to things that have happened in the past, rights that people will have in the future 
can confer certain meanings or signify certain things relating to presently existing people.  Of 
course, this has not happened yet, but we can perhaps predict that it will, on the basis that 
there probably will be future people who will have rights.  Our moral lives are thus shaped 
and coloured by what we can reasonably predict will happen in the future.  This type of view, 
being extremely light on ontology, depends on holding a certain kind of outlook on what our 
moral lives are like.  To accept it we must hold that, at least to some extent, what matters 
about human life is networks of meaning and signification, rather than what properties are 
instantiated by things that actually exist.  This type of view may not be to everyone‘s taste, 
although I will provide some reasons for supporting it in chapter eight.  An alternative to this 
approach may be to ascribe rights to currently existing groups that ensure the wellbeing of 
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their future members.  Again, this view will be revisited in the final chapter, and we shall see 
that it appears to be very compatible with a similar view about what matters about human 
life. 
(4c) Social Contracts 
 
Rights are sometimes associated with a social contract model, and thus we might think that 
the ability to take part in a social structure, or to agree explicitly or implicitly to certain 
conditions of that structure, are a prerequisite for having rights.  I will not say a great deal 
about this here, since we have already discussed the problems with talking about reciprocal 
moral relationships involving future people, and since it is plausible to think that there may 
be such things as rights without social contracts.  Natural rights theories for example claim 
that there are moral rights that are prior to any social contract.  I shall say a little more about 
this point in the next two chapters. 
However it is also important to say that the project of applying a Rawlsian 
hypothetical contract model has been attempted in the area of the rights of future people.
1
  
These attempts will not receive a great amount of attention here because they typically do not 
address problems relating to the ascription of rights to presently non-existent entities.  In 
some cases this omission is deliberate: 
I shall begin by assuming that we do not owe obligations to future generations and 
that when we do, we are speaking either metaphorically or elliptically… It is possible, 
I think, to account for much of our duty to provide for future generations in terms of a 
duty of justice with regard to future generations (but not owed to them).  But since 
questions of justice seem to arise most naturally with respect to competing claims of 
contemporaneous agents, we must ask how it is that duties of justice can extend to 
include actions the intended beneficiaries of which do not yet exist. (Clayton Hubin 
1976, p. 71) 
 
The Rawlsian model is an intriguing one, but it faces a great deal of problems when dealing 
with future generations.  If, for example, we wish to allow the hypothetical contractors to be 
                                                          
1
 In fact, Rawls himself discusses the idea in a small section of his famous Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999, pp. 
251-258) 
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unaware of the generation in human history in which they live, how can we account for 
Parfitian non-identity problems?  The decisions that the contractors make will affect the 
circumstances of life that determine who comes to exist, and how many future generations 
there will be.  Do we then allow there to be some hypothetical contractors who may, if a 
certain decision is taken, never come into existence?  It seems that we must, but if this is the 
case it is hard to imagine what decisions this might lead the contractors to make.  Perhaps, for 
example, they would choose population maximizing strategies because they judge that it 
would be better to come into existence (even with a poor quality of life) than never to be born 
at all.  A hypothetical contract model would not necessarily run into the same problems as, 
say, a tacit consent model, which relies to some extent upon reciprocal relationships, but it 
brings a whole host of problems of its own.  For now I will simply take it that Rawls‘ contract 
is merely a way of discovering or refining our relationships of right and obligation, and not a 
device which gives those rights or obligations any independent weight.  Bearing this in mind, 
we can take it that (at least for the case of future generations) the hypothetical contract is not 
the best method to use, and that we should employ other ways of establishing what rights and 
obligations we take to be binding. 
(4d) Choice Theories of Rights 
 
I have observed that part of the problem in viewing rights of future people in terms of a social 
contract is the problem of reciprocity.  We cannot enter into reciprocal relationships with 
people in the future to the extent that they cannot actively do anything that affects our 
conscious experience of life (even though, as I have suggested earlier, they may be able to do 
things that affect the value or meaning of our lives).  We face a similar problem with the so-
called ‗choice‘ theories of rights, which maintain that part of what it is to have a right is to be 
able to exercise our autonomy to ‗waive‘ the right and to cancel or override the 
corresponding obligation. 
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 Part of the problem here is that, depending on our theory of time, we may not wish to 
regard future people as autonomous agents.  Certainly, the NF theorist who thinks that no 
properties can presently be instantiated by future people might hold this view.  A proposed 
solution to this problem was to say that the rights which future people will have are sufficient 
to ground our obligations, perhaps by a process of backward signification.  This is further 
complicated by the choice theory however.  To ascribe rights to future people under a choice 
theory would appear to imply the possibility not only of backward signification, but also 
backward causation.  If, in order to have a right against you, I need to be in a position to let 
you off the hook with regard to your obligation, it seems that we must be contemporaries.  In 
fact, I must exist, be autonomous and have the right before the time that your obligation 
would need to be discharged, otherwise I would not have an option of waiving the right.  It 
would not appear to be possible for me to let you off your obligation in any meaningful way 
after the time that you have either honoured it or failed to do so.  This is not a problem just 
for NF theorists, but also for eternalists. 
 It has been argued that problems of this kind can be remedied by appointing a 
representative (or representatives) for future people who can claim, and in some 
circumstances waive, their rights on their behalf (Feinberg 1981, pp. 147-148).  This would 
be someone chosen to represent the interests of the future people in moral or political 
decision making, who can exercise their own autonomy to act in what they judge to be the 
best interests of the future people in question.  One problem here is that we may have great 
difficulty in predicting what the interests of future people will be, especially the interests of 
people who live in the distant future, in physical, political and cultural conditions that may be 
extremely different from our own.  What is regarded as valuable in life might be radically 
different, and the things that are necessary to sustain life may also be different from what 
they are now in any number of different and unpredictable ways. 
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 However, this need not concern us too much.  It may be difficult to predict what 
people‘s interests might be in the distant future, but that does not stop us looking out for the 
generations that we can make some reasonable predictions about.  At a bare minimum, we 
can reasonably assume that there will be many generations of future people who require food, 
water and an atmosphere to breathe, that they will have some kind of interest in pursuing 
personal relationships and pursuing personal goals, whatever forms such goals might take.  
We can predict that people will have some notion of what is a good life, and that this notion 
will require certain natural resources in order to be made concrete.  This may mean that the 
representatives of future generations are making difficult choices based on limited 
information, but the fact that their decisions will not always be perfect or detailed does not 
mean that they should abandon any prospect of making such decisions. 
 The problem with the representative view lies on a deeper level than this.  It is not 
simply that there is a practical question concerning how future generations are to be 
represented.  Choice theories of rights are couched in the kinds of terms that they are because 
they give fundamental weight to the notion of autonomy and moral agency.  According to 
such theories, a fundamental part of what it is to be a holder of rights is to be a free and 
rational agent.  This is partly a problem for future people because, depending on our 
metaphysics, we may think that they do not exist to instantiate these properties.  They are not 
(although we might reasonably predict that they will be) the types of things that are rational.  
This could, as we have already seen, be a problem that we can solve.  If we think that 
people‘s future rationality can signify things about our present lives that confer obligations on 
us, then the fact that there probably will be rational autonomous agents in the future might 
help.  But this may not be enough.  Choice theories typically place autonomy and rationality 
at the heart of rights because these things are fundamental parts of our identities.  They are 
based in a particular kind of liberal tradition that values individual autonomy as one of the 
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things that makes us uniquely human.  If this is the case, it would seem odd to say that (in the 
absence of an autonomous decision to do so, such as a living will) we can simply transfer our 
autonomous decision making to another person and still retain our rights.  It would be as 
incongruous as instructing someone else to eat my dinner or do my exercise for me. 
 The representative solution mistakes the nature of the problem.  Future people cannot 
claim or waive their rights against present people, because they exist (or will exist) after those 
present people have died.  This cannot be solved by simply appointing someone to do it on 
their behalf, since the exercise (non-exercise) of our rights is, according to such theories, a 
fundamental element of the rights themselves. 
 If backward signification conferred by rights that people will have doesn‘t work as a 
way for the choice theorist to ascribe rights to future generations, will the group-based 
solution fare any better?  It certainly wouldn‘t chime well with theories of this nature to 
ascribe rights to groups.  The background from which these theories emerge tend to treat the 
individual as sovereign.  Whether the notion of group rights is entirely incompatible with a 
choice theory is something to which we will return later in the chapter, but it will depend 
heavily on whether we regard groups as entities that can have agency of their own, above and 
beyond the agency of their individual members. 
(4e) Interest/Benefit Theories of Rights 
 
So will interest or benefit theories of rights fare better in the project of explaining rights of 
future people?  To an extent the answer must be yes.  Although it seems that there is a 
genuine problem (if we hold a NF view) of ascribing properties such as interests to future 
people, this may be dealt with by taking the route of ascribing duties on the basis of rights 
that people will (probably) have.  Alternatively (or in addition) we might maintain that 
groups can have interests that include an interest in their future.  Either view does not seem to 
rely, as choice theories do, on backward causation, representatives, or any other potentially 
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problematic philosophical positions.  We can say with some degree of certainty that there will 
be future people, and that they will have some interests that we can protect (even if there is a 
certain amount of difficulty in predicting in detail what all of those interests will be. 
 Benefit theories are even less problematic in this regard because the notion of doing 
something now which will, in the future, benefit someone who does not yet exist is not 
mysterious.  However, benefit theories may be prone to the non-identity problem.  We face 
the difficulty of how something can be regarded as benefiting someone or (even more 
problematically) harming them when the alternative is non-existence.  We might suggest that 
even a very damaging environmental policy will benefit the future people whom it affects, if 
being born is a benefit.  Or, if we reject the notion that we can be benefited by being born, we 
might say that to speak of benefiting a particular person through a given policy is incoherent.  
If another policy had been chosen, he would not exist to be harmed by it.  Thus what has been 
conferred on him is not a benefit, merely his existence. 
 This is why Parfit chooses to take a more impersonal approach, but it may be doubtful 
to what extent this is compatible with rights.  Can we really talk about someone‘s rights being 
violated if the alternative to the violation is non-existence?  This would suggest that no 
policy, no matter how harmful, could be taken to be a violation of someone‘s rights.  This 
would appear to be the implication for benefit theories in particular, since the concept of 
being benefited relies on the idea of being made ‗better off‘ than one would be in an 
alternative situation.  It is harder to see to what extent this might apply to interest theories.  
We can talk about someone‘s interests being served even if there is no possibility that that 
person‘s interests could be done a disservice.  An interest theory would not be incoherent in 
this sense.  So we can talk about how interest theories of rights might be able to 
accommodate the rights of future people when those rights are being fulfilled.  The problem 
comes when we try to articulate what would count as a right violation in these circumstances.  
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A future person will not necessarily be able to turn around and claim that their interests were 
not served by a decision made by an earlier generation, since had another decision been 
made, they would not even exist to have interests.  It would seem very strange to claim that 
we can hold a theory of rights that accommodates right fulfillments but not right violations, 
so the non-identity problem looms large for interest theories as well. 
 But notice that this may not be the case for group rights.  The precise forms that 
groups might take can be altered by decisions that we make now, but the groups themselves 
already exist.  It is the group that is there now that can be benefitted or harmed, or perhaps 
have interests that can be served.  I will move on to this issue later in the chapter.  However, 
it does seem that ‗personal‘ approaches, based on the rights of specific individuals, are 
problematic in this regard. 
5. Future People and the Separateness of Persons 
 
So far, we have seen that for the NF theorist, it is very difficult to ascribe moral status to 
future people.  This problem does not arise with eternalism, although for either theory of time 
the non-identity problem appears to have the same effect (although perhaps for the eternalist 
‗non-identity‘ is a misleading term).  In either case, decisions that we make now will affect 
which individuals come to exist, suggesting that an impersonal rather than a personal 
approach might be in order.  What exactly is meant by an impersonal approach in this sense?  
Parfit argues for an approach to ethics (and metaphysics) which is impersonal on a number of 
different levels.  The non-identity problem is one of his most famous arguments here, but a 
number of different arguments combine to give the full story.  Parfit‘s main point is that we 
generally place too much emphasis on the notion of the individual, and that we instead need 
to hold a view that does not regard personal identity as an absolute and irreducible fact, and 
which is impartial with respect to which people are being affected by our actions. 
 Even accepting this, if we choose a NF theory, then the existence condition still 
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proves a serious obstacle.  Even if our focus should be less on personal identity and more on 
predicted states of affairs, these states of affairs still rely on people instantiating properties.  
Something needs to exist to instantiate the property.  Furthermore, there seems to be 
something very odd and artificial in splitting our regard for the interest or experience off from 
our regard for the individual who is having it. 
Parallels might be drawn with the classic criticism of utilitarianism that it fails to 
respect the separateness of persons.
1
  The idea that we cannot simply aggregate happiness or 
well-being to make a utilitarian calculation is based in the claim that a person‘s experiences 
are irreducibly theirs and cannot be stripped away from them as though they were mere 
commodities: 
In the perspective of classical maximising utilitarianism separate individuals are of no 
intrinsic importance but only important as the points at which fragments of what is 
important, i.e. the total aggregate of pleasure or happiness, are located.  Individual 
persons for it are therefore merely the channels or locations where what is of value is 
to be found. (Hart 1979, p. 829) 
 
I do not intend here to argue for the validity of this claim, but merely to say that it is an 
influential problem which deserves attention. 
Of course, utilitarianism is not the only doctrine that rejects a strong conception of the 
separateness of persons (it might for example be said that both the Buddha and 
Schopenhauer, who appear to deny a strong notion of a separate self, are virtue ethicists
2
).  
However, from a certain perspective, any theory that cannot accommodate a separate 
selfhood is problematic.  This arguably includes any moral theories which support the moral 
status of future individuals, since their individuality cannot be recognized, so any theory 
supporting the moral status of future generations must look at the experiences that our actions 
                                                          
1
 Most of us would associate this claim most strongly with Bernard Williams (1973), although similar arguments 
have also been made by John Rawls (Rawls, 1999, pp. 150-153) and many others.  This view has probably 
contributed greatly to the significant erosion of confidence in some forms of utilitarianism which has occurred 
over the past few decades. 
2
 Thanks to David Cooper for this point. 
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will cause future generations, taken separately from the identities of the people who will have 
those experiences.  This is not quite the same as the criticism of utilitarianism, since it is not 
necessarily the aggregation of happiness that is the main problem.  However, at the heart of 
each problem is the fact that the experiences of one person are regarded as completely 
replaceable with those of another, which seems to miss something very profound about what 
it is to be a person and to have experiences. 
 To suggest the attribution of moral status to groups as a solution to this problem might 
seem paradoxical.  How can attributing moral status to an aggregation of persons escape the 
problem of failing to respect the separateness of persons?  This is only a problem if we think 
that groups must in all cases replace individuals as the proper objects of moral concern, that 
groups are to be assigned some special moral and ontological credibility that individuals do 
not possess.  There is no reason why, in general, we need to do this.  We can hold that there 
are obligations to groups without rejecting our obligations to those people within the groups.  
They remain very much separate persons, perhaps more so than they would be if we could 
not explain people‘s identities in terms of the relationships and roles that they have within the 
groups in which they exist.  It strikes me as a fundamental mistake to claim that there is one 
favoured level on which life can operate.  Individuality and community are mutually 
supportive, not mutually exclusive.  Therefore there should be no problem (according to 
‗separateness of persons‘ type objections) with having obligations to aggregations of persons, 
so long as we are not regarding individuals as mere ‗vessels‘ for the group welfare. 
 So how would obligations to groups operate in terms of future people?  Groups of 
people, whether we are talking on as small a level as a family, or as large a level as the 
human race in general, are extended over time: just as individual lives are, only more so.  We 
can have obligations to individuals who currently exist (for example, to our children) even if 
those obligations concern what will happen to those people after we have died.  In the same 
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way, perhaps we can have obligations to a currently existing group even when we will be 
long gone by the time that the group comes to gain the benefit of our actions.  This depends 
on holding the view that the group will essentially be the same group even when all of its 
members have changed, and when the identities of its members will be altered by the choices 
that we make.  However, I think that at least for some groups (e.g. our family and our 
species) this is not an overly problematic view assuming that we reject extreme nominalism. 
6. Future People and Group Rights 
 
There is often a reluctance to ascribe rights to anything other than the individual.  This has its 
origins in the ways in which rights theories were brought under the banner of enlightenment 
liberalism: 
It is then time for a confession about my lack of faith or at least a deeply felt worry I 
have about the grounding individualistic values of liberalism.  What the liberal takes 
as basic and unquestionable is the idea that the individual is the measure of 
everything; hence the liberal believes that the correct normative principles treat the 
individual as the fundamental unit of value and the ultimate focus of rights.  
Individuals are regarded as valuable because they are choosers and have interests.  
But so also do communities make choices and have values.  Why not then treat 
communities of fundamental units of value as well? (Macdonald 1991, p. 237) 
 
The association between rights and individualism is evident both among advocates of theories 
of rights and their opponents.  As we have seen, Marx criticised rights as drawing divisions 
between individual people, forcing them to regard each other in terms of what they owe to 
each other and viewing each other as a prima facie threat to their rights and freedoms.  
 Rights in general are often associated with a rationalist enlightenment tradition which 
has often been criticised for creating a whole set of dualities and divisions.  The dominant 
duality here is sometimes said to be Cartesian mind-body dualism
1
, which through separating 
                                                          
1
 Several references are made throughout this thesis to 'Cartesian Dualism'.  When I use this term, I am referring 
to the view that the body and the mind are radically ontologically distinct (albeit interacting) substances.  This 
can be distinguished from property and predicate dualisms, although these positions owe a great deal to their 
Cartesian ancestors.  While substance dualism as I have outlined it above is a view standardly attributed to 
Descartes, it has been suggested that his views are in reality rather more complex than this brief outline would 
suggest (see Cottingham 1985).  Therefore, when I use the term 'Cartesian Dualism', I am referring to a view 
that would be associated with Cartesian thinkers, and making no particular claims about the proper 
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ourselves from our bodies creates a separation between us and the physical universe that we 
inhabit, including other people, animals and nature in general: 
As many people have pointed out, the central trouble is the dualism of mind and body.  
The notion of ourselves - our minds - as detached observers or colonists, separate 
from the physical world and therefore from each other. (Midgley 2005a, p. 357) 
 
This is also frequently associated with a whole set of other divisions, relating to gender, race, 
class and so on.  For example, it is associated with a division between men and women, since 
women have traditionally been associated with the natural and the irrational. 
 While some of these divisions are being remedied, we have inherited enough of them 
to suggest that we are still relying on this mode of thought.  The response to this is not so 
much to reject the dualities.  Some of them may be false distinctions, but this is not 
necessarily the case (of course man is different from woman, the individual is different from 
his neighbour etc.).  Rather, the problem comes when we view a duality as contrary to or 
destructive of unity.  The individual, as I have already argued, is explained by the group, and 
the group is explained by the individual.  The individual is part of a continuous whole, but 
still identifiable as the individual.  It is the suggestion that one level of existence is given 
evaluative and ontological primacy that causes dualities to become divisions.  Thus if the 
focus is placed too strongly on the individual, then ‗the other‘ becomes a problem or a threat; 
if the focus is too strongly upon the nation or culture, then xenophobia is the result; too much 
of a lens on the notion of men or women as a whole leads us to view the opposite sex as an 
enemy to be feared or resented, rather than as sharing a common humanity.  This is not to 
deny that any of these levels are important: they all are; I am simply suggesting that an 
unbalanced and simplistic viewpoint that gives primacy to a duality on any one of these 
levels is liable to lead to a negative sense of division rather than a neutral recognition of 
duality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
interpretation of Descartes' thought.  Many thanks to Claire Graham for making me think about a term which I 
had previously used without much consideration. 
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 A knee-jerk reaction to this would be to say that if rights are irreconcilably 
individualistic, then they must be abandoned.  This is not necessarily so even if they cannot 
escape their individualism.  If they operate as part of a pluralist theory of ethics which can 
take account of life on all its levels, then rights might still be a very useful way to talk about 
our moral lives in terms of our interactions as individuals.  However, for a right-based theory 
(a theory which asserts that all moral concerns can be described in terms of rights) to survive 
in this multi-layered picture, rights must be able to take account of groups on all of the scales 
on which they have moral significance.  We might also want to make rights do more work 
than serving individuals if we hold that rights are trumping considerations, and yet that 
individual concerns should not always win out over the concerns of groups or communities. 
(6a) Choice Theories 
 
Again, it is significant to this project to consider which form of right theory we are looking 
at.  Choice theories are problematic for ascribing rights to future people, because future 
people are unable to waive the rights that they might have against presently existing people.  I 
have argued that the ‗representative‘ solution is not going to be effective because the very 
notion of having rights under a choice theory is bound up in the autonomy that the right-
holder exercises over his or her rights.  Given these problems, it appears rather difficult to 
account for choice-based rights of groups.  Even if groups are capable of acting 
autonomously (or in other words, if people within the group are capable of acting as one fully 
unified whole) surely they will always rely on a representative of some kind, a person who 
will act as their mouthpiece to vocalize or in some other way express the interests of the 
group.  This is only superficially problematic.  A representative of a group does not 
necessarily make decisions or act on the part of the group.  When I speak, my mouth, vocal 
cords and lungs combine to allow me to express decisions that I have made.  These and other 
organs allow me to act upon decisions.  This does not mean that my mouth, arms, legs or 
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whatever else is making decisions on my behalf, they are the means through which I engage 
with the world.  The spokesman of a group need not be making decisions on the group‘s 
behalf, she may merely be the means through which the collective will is expressed. 
 But does it make sense to talk in this way about collective will, autonomy, action and 
so on?  If it does not, then choice theories of rights cannot account for the rights of groups.  
One way to think about this would be through the literature on collective responsibility.  
According to Hart‘s choice theory, the community of right-holders is probably going to be 
identical with the community of moral agents.  Both groups require autonomy, rationality, 
agency and the ability to understand moral concepts. 
 The notion of collective responsibility faces a great deal of criticism from those who 
claim that we simply cannot sensibly attribute notions such as agency or responsibility to 
anything other than an individual person.  But it would appear on the face of it that this is 
something that we do all the time, and in a number of different ways.  Sometimes I might 
attribute responsibility to a large set of disparate people for consequences that they cause, 
although the consequences would not have occurred if only one of them had acted as they did 
and would still have occurred had one of them chosen not to act in this way.  These cases are 
distinct from instances in which people act collectively in a joint activity that contributes to a 
harm, such as participating in a harmful project or endeavour.  They are also distinguishable 
from cases where there is a common cultural norm or attitude within a given group that 
people buy into and which causes harm.
1
  I suspect that in the first instance, we will not be 
able to talk about any kind of collective rationality or agency in a group, only the agency of 
many individual people participating in individual activities that contribute to the same 
consequence.  However, the other two cases need to appeal to something beyond the 
individual, a project or a norm, in which the individual participates.  But can these projects or 
                                                          
1
 These different types of cases were originally distinguished in this way and explored by Joel Feinberg (1968). 
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norms simply be reduced to the sums of their parts?  If so, does this imply that the 
responsibility that we attribute to the ‗groups‘ is ultimately just reducible to the language of 
individual responsibility? 
 Perhaps one objection to the idea of a group having any kind of agency in any morally 
relevant way might be that it makes no sense to attribute any properties to a group that are not 
reducible in some way to the properties of the group‘s individual members.  If this is the case, 
then to speak of the ‗agency‘ of a group, and of any rights or responsibilities that this implies 
is likely simply to be a statement about the agency, and hence the rights or responsibilities of 
its members.  If this were true, then we would not be able to ascribe any properties to groups 
(a similar problem to one facing future generations, but for different reasons) but this seems 
highly implausible.  It appears that we can say things about groups that are not simply 
equivalent in meaning to statements about individuals.  One good reason for thinking this is 
that the identity of a group is not determined by the specific identities of its members: 
The local tennis club is the same club as it was last year, despite the fact that new 
members may have joined, and old ones departed.  The expression ‗the local tennis 
club‘ does not, except in rare circumstances, refer to a determinate set of individuals.  
So it is absurd to equate the meaning of a statement about a collective with the 
meaning of a statement about a number of individuals.  This would have the bizarre 
consequence that, had one of the individuals belonging to the collective not been a 
member, the meaning of the statement about the collective would have been different. 
(Cooper 1968, p. 260) 
 
So in general, it does seem that we can apply properties to groups which are not merely 
reducible to any properties of the group‘s individual members.  But is responsibility or 
agency the kind of thing that can be talked about in this way?  Cooper argues that we can 
assign responsibility to groups in the sense that characteristics of a group not reducible to the 
characteristics of its individual members might be causally responsible for a bad outcome.  In 
addition, certain attitudes of shame, disapproval or indignance toward the group (rather than 
its members) would be appropriate as a response.  Cooper‘s understanding of the question 
does not depend upon assigning any group agency or groups rationality, so an approach like 
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this would not be useful to us in any attempt to explain the rights of groups in terms of group 
intentions or agency.  However, it does help us to explain how groups can instantiate 
properties. 
 There are several accounts which claim that it is possible to attribute agency or 
intentions to groups.  The problem for our purposes is that these accounts generally rely on 
the notion of contemporaneous individuals acting together to perform groups actions or agree 
shared commitments.
1
  This does not render it entirely impossible that groups can have some 
members (i.e. future people) who are not currently individual agents, but it does raise a whole 
set of questions that would have to be answered concerning the status of the non-agents in the 
group.  To what extent do they have full group membership if they do not participate in the 
actions or intentions made by some of the group‘s members?  And would this give us reasons 
to think that they should be excluded from group membership so far as rights are concerned?  
I cannot discuss these questions further here, but it does seem to present some difficulties for 
a choice theory of rights to account for groups that extend across non-contemporaneous 
generations. 
(6b) Interest/ Benefit Theories 
 
It might therefore seem more promising to look to something like an interest or benefit theory 
of rights to account for the rights of groups (or at least the rights of groups as they are 
extended over time).  It does not seem mysterious to talk about something being to the benefit 
of a group, or even for something to be in a group‘s interests.  Groups can be weaker or 
stronger, more or less cohesive and companionable, and they can also face an extinction or 
demise.  Neither do we face non-identity problems in these cases, because as Cooper 
observed, the individual membership of a group can be variable and the identity of the group 
does not depend upon the identities of its members.  Thus, provided we can make a 
                                                          
1
 See for example, Gilbert (1997), May (1987) and Tuomela (1989). 
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reasonable assumption that the group will continue to exist in the future, it is not an important 
consideration that I cannot predict who its members will be.  This would seem to suggest that 
an interest or benefit type approach, or some other approach based on what is good for or 
needed by the right-holder, would seem to be the best way to ground group rights. 
More will be said about how precisely we might encapsulate these notions in the final 
chapter, but of course, how we define what it is to have interests, needs or to be benefited will 
have an effect upon what sorts of groups we can talk about as being the proper subjects of 
rights.  This must fit in very closely with our theories about what constitutes identity, and 
what is morally important about identity.  In the final chapter, I will suggest that we may be 
able to talk about groups of human beings as having a type of narrative identity or integrity 
that allows us to talk about their interests in terms of rights. 
(6c) An Objection to Group Rights 
 
Many of the objections that are made to the notion of group rights or the moral status of 
groups question the notion that we can coherently ascribe certain qualities (autonomy, 
interests, rationality etc.) to groups.  We have examined these views, albeit briefly, earlier in 
this chapter.  However, another species of criticism is more ideological in character.  There is 
a concern that any theory ascribing moral importance to groups that is not reducible to the 
moral importance of its individual members is fundamentally illiberal or even totalitarian.  
There is a concern that the interests or rights ascribed to the group will in some way eclipse 
or trample the interests or rights of the individual.  His will would, according to such 
objections, be regarded as completely assimilated into some notion of the common good, and 
he would have no room to exercise his autonomy and individuality.  If this concern is well-
founded, we certainly have a great deal to worry about here.  If ascribing rights to groups will 
inevitably lead to the breaching of individual rights, we would not be looking so much at an 
expansion of the concept of rights to encompass groups (and possibly through this, future 
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generations).  We would rather be narrowing the scope of rights such that none of us could 
even be certain that (as individuals) that we have any.  In their crudest forms, these arguments 
sometimes appear to take the form of ‗reductio ad Hitlerum‘, but this is not to say that we 
should ignore the history of the ideas that we hold.  They can, as I have argued in chapter 
one, have a bearing on what those ideas mean today.  As Michael McDonald points out, 
criticisms of this kind are often associated with a certain way of interpreting historical events: 
In part liberal hostility to collective rights is based on a certain reading of history that 
identifies collective rights with a totalitarian approach in which the individual is run 
over by the collective steamroller.  Collective rights are seen as having a fascist 
ancestry, an association with the doctrine of the master race.  The liberal‘s concern is 
often for the members of minority groups who will suffer at the hands of a majority 
invoking its alleged collective rights at the minority‘s expense. 
 But here it seems to me the liberal simply misunderstands the main reason for 
advocating collective rights, namely, the protection of minority communities from 
majorities. (Macdonald 1991, p. 227) 
 
McDonald is right in some senses.  The terrible acts carried out by the Nazi regime should 
not properly be understood as a result of the ‗group rights‘ of the majority trumping 
individual rights.  Instead it seems more plausible to claim that, as well as breaching many 
individual rights, the Nazis breached the group rights of Jews, and of various other minority 
communities that existed in Europe at the time.  Part of what was so terrible about the 
holocaust was that, in addition to causing great suffering, pain and death to many individuals, 
it was motivated by a desire to eliminate an entire group, including its genetic inheritance, 
social cohesion and ways of life.  In fact, some might argue that we need a concept of group 
rights as well as a concept of individual rights in order fully to capture the nature of such 
atrocities. 
 One key point here is that, just as individual rights do not allow the individual to act 
in any possible way that is to his advantage, group rights are not a right to all things.  This 
may appear somewhat trivial, but it seems to be overlooked by some who claim that group 
rights are inherently damaging to individual rights.  An individual‘s right to liberty, for 
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example, does not include the liberty to violate another individual‘s rights.  It would seem 
odd to suppose that this is any different at the level of group rights.  A little more will be said 
on this point in the final chapter, where I briefly look at the question of whether certain 
groups have an automatic right to exist. 
7. What Environmental Rights Can We Ascribe to Future People and Groups? 
 
It would be a good idea at this point to return to the notion of explicitly environmental rights, 
and briefly look at what the work of this chapter may have contributed to the notion of rights 
concerning the right-holder‘s environment.  The two arguments that we examined in chapter 
four, those put forward by Aaron Lercher and Tim Hayward, were primarily concerned with 
the environmental rights of currently existing human individuals, but it may be worth 
considering how well they might stand up if we wished to extend such rights to future people 
and to groups.  As we have seen, there are a great many problems affecting choice-based 
theories of rights.  This suggests that Lercher‘s development of Hart will not be useful here, 
and we need to turn to a theory that appeals more to interests or benefits to right-holders.  
This would make Hayward‘s approach, based ultimately on our interest in having an adequate 
environment, a more plausible candidate for the extension of rights to future people and to 
groups (although, as we have seen, there will be a certain amount of guesswork involved in 
determining what an ‗adequate‘ environment might be for distant future generations).  
Another advantage of Hayward‘s account is that it rejects the thesis that holders of universal 
rights must be holders of universal duties.  This makes an easier case for future generations to 
be right-holders.  We can have duties to them that do not imply an equal corresponding duty 
to us. 
 I also mentioned in chapter four that while some rights might be only ‗instrumentally‘ 
environmental, in that they are based on or instrumental to the more familiar rights in the 
western liberal tradition, there may be rights that are environmental in an ‗essential‘ sense, in 
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that the right cannot be protected or violated without the duty bearer interfering or refraining 
from interfering with the environment of the right-holder, and also in that it is this 
interference or non-interference that makes the act a right violation.  I will argue later in the 
thesis that this distinction may be elucidated by a thorough examination of the right-holder 
and the various ways in which he might relate to his environment.  I will explain this in terms 
of environment forming an essential part of the right-holder‘s identity, in a similar way that 
liberty is sometimes thought to lie at the heart of personal identity.  The relevance to this 
chapter is that we may thus be able to think about future generations, but more interestingly, 
groups, in these terms.  This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter eight, but we can 
reasonably assume that environment plays at least as great a role in the identities of groups 
and communities as it does in the identities of individuals. 
 Consider for example some of the claims made on behalf of indigenous peoples.  
Certain ways of life are inherent to the identities of any culture, and these ways of life have 
often developed in such a way that they are heavily dependent on a particular type of natural 
environment.  Examples include the relationship between Native American tribes of the Great 
Plains, and the buffalo, or American bison
1
.  Not only is there a strong history of interaction 
between the native people and the buffalo, but through use of controlled fires, the Sioux and 
other tribes played a role in providing the ideal grazing conditions for the buffalo and in 
regulating the buffalo population.  These interactions were important to the Sioux people in 
themselves, but also fed into other cultural phenomena such as naming and mythology.  In a 
sense then, it could be said that it is (or at least was) essential to the identity of the Sioux 
people that they lived somewhere with buffalo and with conditions in which they could live.  
In other cases, it is not just a particular type of environment that is essential to the identity of 
a group of people, but one particular environment that is in a sense irreplaceable.  In many 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to Thom Brooks for this example 
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cultures, the mythology that people create, and through which they understand themselves, is 
closely tied in with particular features of the landscape that they inhabit.  This is very much 
the case, for example, in Australian aboriginal ‗dreamtime‘ mythology.1  If we think that the 
environmental identity of a group or community can in some cases generate rights, the 
content of the corresponding duties may well vary depending on whether it is a specific 
irreplaceable environment, or merely a type of environment, that is crucial to the collective 
identity.  Will it simply be enough to ensure that the people in question are able to live in an 
environment with the types of trees, animals, landscape and so on in which their culture has 
developed, or must they be allowed to remain in that very place?  This is likely to depend 
upon their particular types of stories, religious activities and so on.  The ways in which these 
identities might be understood will be examined further in chapter eight. 
8. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined two of the more difficult human cases that we might encounter in 
the attempt to assign environmental moral rights.  I have argued that the two issues in some 
respects go hand in hand.  There are a number of difficulties that afflict the prospect of 
attributing rights to future people (difficulties which vary in degree according to which theory 
of time one adopts).  However, I have argued that there are two possible solutions to these 
problems.  We can hold one or both of the following views: 
1. We can attribute moral rights to groups that exist in the present, and which will have 
members who are yet unborn. 
2. We can attribute future rights to future people, which, provided we can reasonably 
predict that those people will exist, will influence our obligations through backward 
signification (although for NF theorists this may be made problematic by the non-
identity problem). 
 
In an important respect, these two views go hand in hand.  If we allow backward signification 
to determine moral obligations, the implication of this is that at least one important part of 
                                                          
1
 For an exploration of the ways in which specific places have cultural significance to Aboriginal Australian 
cultural life, see Myers (2002). 
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what matters about human life is the networks of meaning and significance that we build.  In 
fact, if we are to be able to attribute rights to future people, these networks must be at least as 
important as autonomy or agency (or at least autonomy and agency with respect to the duty 
bearer)  in how we think about what might confer rights.  If we hold that these constructs are 
part of what allows us to attribute moral rights to future people, this may also be an approach 
that we can take to groups or communities, a view that I will attempt to defend later in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 6- Rights of Non-Human Animals 
 
 
Anthologies and introductions to environmental ethics often include, along with a section on 
our obligations to future people, a section on animal rights.  While the connection seems 
obvious (perhaps because of the traditional division of the world into the human and the non-
human ‗other‘, or perhaps just because of a rather more lazy lumping together of the two 
issues under the category of ‗hippie stuff‘) it must be pointed out that the concerns of some 
animal rights advocates are not always in line with the concerns of some environmentalists.  
For example, in parts of Africa, there is an ongoing debate about whether elephants should be 
systematically culled, not just because of their devastating effects on the livelihoods of poor 
farmers, but also because of the threat that they present to rare species such as the antelope 
and the black rhino through the destruction of their habitats.
1
  Here the ecological concern for 
the survival of a threatened species and a fragile ecosystem conflicts with the concern for the 
rights of individual animals.  Similarly, closer to home, there is dispute over whether the grey 
squirrel population should be controlled because of their effects on local ecosystems.  The 
grey squirrel, introduced to this country from America, can kill beech and sycamore trees by 
stripping their bark for food.
2
  This removes an essential part of woodland ecosystems and 
can permanently alter landscapes.  It is better known that the grey squirrel also presents a 
threat to the native red squirrel by out competing it for the available food and spreading the 
squirrelpox virus, which is harmless to the grey squirrel, but deadly to the red squirrel.  For 
these reasons, culls of grey squirrels have been carried out.  Rob Atkinson, the head of 
                                                          
1
See The Independent, 2005a. 
2
See The Independent, 2005b.  Of course, if it is the integrity of the native environment that we are concerned 
with, we should bear in mind that the sycamore, like the grey squirrel, is a non-native introduction with its 
origins in central and southern Europe, unlike the native beech. (See the entries on the sycamore and beech on 
the Royal Forestry Society website for more detail. 
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science at the RSPCA has said that it is ―ethically dubious killing one species for the sake of 
another‖ while a representative from the Countryside Alliance has criticised the RSPCA ―for 
valuing animal rights over wildlife and habitat management‖ claiming that culls are a vital 
part of conservation work.
1
  What the Countryside Alliance are missing is that the RSPCA 
would not regard this as a criticism.  The RSPCA are not ignorant of the plight of the red 
squirrel or of conservation methods, in this case they simply value the rights of individual 
animals over the plights of species and environments. 
 So in both of these examples, there is a direct conflict between the demands of the 
animal rights lobby and the demands of conservationists.  This is not to say that animal rights 
and conservation are at odds with each other - they are usually very much in harmony - but 
merely that these odd cases of disputes show that they are two distinct issues to be considered 
separately.  Why then should a thesis on environmental rights contain a chapter on animal 
rights?  Firstly, animals are among those with whom we share our environment, or whose 
environments overlap with our own.  If they have rights concerning their environments, then 
those rights must be considered alongside our own environmental rights.  In addition, non-
human animals, like humans, constitute a part of the environment, and unlike humans, they 
often constitute part of what we regard as the natural environment.  While their interests are 
not always considered to be in line with what might be thought to ‗benefit‘ an environment, 
they are dependent on the habitat that they occupy, and dependent on each other for the subtle 
ways in which they shape that environment to each other‗s mutual benefit.  If animals do 
have rights concerning their environments, then the nature of ecosystems dictates that those 
rights are entangled with our own environmental rights in a deeply complex fashion.  To treat 
animal rights as a separate issue from environmental ethics would be to oversimplify both 
issues.  The extent to which human and animal identities are bound up in their environments 
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 See Country Life, 2008. 
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will be explored further in chapter eight. 
 Another point that is worthy of mention is that when many people (especially animal 
rights activists and other non-philosophers) talk about animal rights, they are often not too 
interested in what is meant by the concept of rights.  They are concerned with the animals, 
rather than the moral theory.  When they say that animals have rights, what they really mean 
is that animals don‘t have ‗no rights‘ in the colloquial sense, since to suggest that someone 
has no rights implies that we can do whatever we want to them, without implying any kind of 
deeper moral theory or framework: 
To say that ‗animals do not have rights‘ does not sound like a remark about the 
meaning of the word rights but one about animals - namely, the remark that one need 
not really consider them. (Midgley 1983, p. 63) 
 
If there is a sense of rights intended here, it is a very vague and minimal notion that animals 
ought to be treated appropriately for their own sake, rather than for the sake of human 
happiness or well being.  It is rather like Kant‘s idea that nobody should be treated as a mere 
means to an end, except that unlike Kant‗s view (which applies only to humans) it cannot not 
hinge on a strict and rigid idea of rationality.
1
  PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals) clearly have this notion of rights: 
People often ask if animals should have rights, and quite simply, the answer is ―Yes!‖ 
Animals surely deserve to live their lives free from suffering and exploitation. (PETA, 
2009) 
 
PETA make it very obvious that they are not referring to rights in any technical philosophical 
sense when they mistakenly attribute an animal rights view to Jeremy Bentham, who as we 
have seen is fervently opposed to the notion of moral rights: 
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, 
stated that when deciding on a being‘s rights, ―The question is not ‗Can they reason?‘ 
nor ‗Can they talk?‘ but ‗Can they suffer?‘‖ In that passage, Bentham points to the 
capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal 
consideration. (PETA, 2009) 
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 See, for example, Kant 1994. 
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In fact, it is easy to imagine that Jeremy Bentham would turn in his wooden cabinet at this 
interpretation.  He would reject the notion that animals can have moral rights because he 
would reject the suggestion that anyone can have moral rights, but for Bentham, as for many 
contemporary moral philosophers, a rejection of animal rights does not amount to a rejection 
of animals‘ moral status or entitlement to decent treatment, or to the view that in colloquial 
terms they have ‗no rights‘.  The use of the language of rights probably earns its popularity in 
these movements from its rhetorical and polemic power.  The language of rights has pervaded 
a great many political struggles, occupying a central role in gaining justice for women, 
ending the slave trade and so on.  ‗Animal rights‘ campaigners wish to identify themselves 
with these causes, since the language of rights and justice has such motivational force.  For 
some of the more extreme groups of animal rights activists, the language of rights might 
prove to be a slightly more substantial justificatory device, since the prevention of a right 
violation is often thought to be grounds for behaviour that would otherwise be unacceptable.
1
  
Consider for example this extract from the anonymous article ‗Why Animal Rights?‘ on the 
Animal Liberation Front‘s (ALF‘s) website: 
A common argument is that the ALF has no right to destroy another's property. 
History tells us the contrary. The holocaust carried out against the Jewish people by 
the Nazis during World War II was only ended through war. What right did we have 
to interfere in that situation? Another darker part of history occurred in our own 
country - slavery. At that point black men, women, and children were seen as 
property, just as animals today are. Yet, there were those who chose to follow their 
hearts and take part in the Underground Railroad, despite what the law told them was 
right, and helped slaves find their way to freedom. In retrospect we can see that the 
laws of the day, or an abusers right to carry on their oppression unimpeded, mean 
nothing when compared to the lives that are on the line. (Animal Liberation Front) 
 
                                                          
1
 In fact, the Animal Liberation Front, an organisation which although it advocates non-violence is often 
associated with extreme acts, devotes relatively thorough attention to the philosophy of rights.  See for example 
(Animal Liberation Front).  The name does not refer to an organised group with a list of members, but is united 
by an ideology which advocates non-violent civil disobedience.  Activists who are not happy to comply with the 
ALF‘s policy of non-violence often adopt the initials ARM (Animal Rights Militia) although critics suggest that 
this is simply a more militant wing of the ALF.  The idea that rights justify behaviour that would otherwise be 
unacceptable is strongly related to Dworkin‘s view of ‗rights as trumps‘ which we will discuss later in this 
chapter. 
162 
 
For John Locke and many other natural rights theorists, the violation of natural rights 
provided the only grounds for rebellion against the government (Locke, 1960).  In the same 
way, for many activists, the violation of the rights of animals can provide justification for 
civil disobedience, just as the violation of the rights of women did for the suffragettes. 
 However, the idea that moral status and rights may be separate considerations and the 
question of whether the language of rights is appropriate in these cases are rarely discussed 
outside of academic philosophy. 
1. Moral Status and Rights of Animals 
Whether moral status and rights are separate issues will depend very strongly on the theory of 
rights that one chooses to adopt, and to some extent on what one takes to ground moral status.  
In the last chapter I made the uncontroversial assumption that while it may be possible to 
have moral status without moral rights, it certainly is not possible to have moral rights 
without moral status.  I will carry this assumption through to this chapter, to imply that if 
animals have no moral status, then they can have no rights, and if they have rights, then they 
must have moral status.  By moral status, I will mean that if x has moral status, then x is the 
kind of being to whom it is possible to have direct duties or obligations (duties or obligations 
that exist for x‘s sake).  You will notice that what is raised here is the question of whether all 
duties correlate to rights and vice versa.  If we hold the position that a right is simply the flip 
side of a duty, and that all duties entail rights, then not only must we hold that if animals have 
rights they must have moral status, but also the reverse, that if animals have moral status, 
then they must have rights.
1
  If we think that there are duties which do not correlate with 
rights, then we need not hold this view.  This leaves us with a number of different possible 
positions on the question of duties to animals and animal rights, some of which I will outline 
below, although I‘m quite certain that other positions are possible.  Three of these operate 
                                                          
1
 Assuming, that is, that we do not make a significant distinction between a moral duty and a moral obligation.  
As we saw in chapter three, Joseph Raz distinguishes between a ‗duty‘ and an ‗ought‘, arguing that right-based 
moralities cannot sufficiently account for this distinction (Raz, 1984). 
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within the rights and duties framework, while the others would reject the use of the 
terminology of rights, or even of rights and duties: 
1. Unlike humans, non-human animals are not the type of thing toward which we can have 
moral duties, and hence they also have no moral rights. 
This is the view supported by Aquinas
1
 and (assuming, as some do, that he is a rights 
theorist) Kant.  It would also be the view that would be accepted by more recent writers on 
the topic such as Peter Carruthers (Carruthers 1989 and 1992). 
2. Unlike humans, non-human animals are not the type of thing that can have rights, but we 
can have moral duties toward them. 
This is the view that is held by Roger Scruton, who argues that although there are kind and 
cruel ways to treat animals, and that these are kind or cruel because of the experiences of the 
animal itself, the language of rights can only be applied to human beings (Scruton 1998).  
This allows human beings to be given priority in cases where the fulfilment of their rights 
would involve harm to animals. 
3. Like humans, non-human animals can have moral rights, and thus we can have moral 
duties toward them. 
This is the view that is held by thinkers such as Tom Regan and Joel Feinberg, who think that 
rights are an appropriate way to describe our moral relationship with animals (Regan 1983 
and 2004, Feinberg 1981). 
4. Nobody, human or otherwise, has rights, but we have duties toward both human beings 
and animals. 
This is the conclusion that we can draw from two of Bentham‘s most famous claims: that 
animals have moral status because they can suffer, and that moral rights are ‗nonsense upon 
stilts‘.  Mary Midgley also suggests that the language of rights is problematic, not simply in 
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 See Aquinas 1976.  See Singer (2003, pp. 56-8) for a discussion of this view.  Whether Aquinas‘ view 
accounts for anyone having rights depends of course on our interpretation of his idea of ius naturale that was 
discussed in the first chapter. 
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the case of animals, but more generally (Midgley 1983). 
5. Moral duties that we hold are not directed toward any particular being, and so it makes no 
sense to speak of rights, human or otherwise. (e.g. an extreme emphasis on ‘moral push’) 
We have moral duties, but these are based in a concept of virtue, rather than in the effects that 
the carrying out or neglect of those duties might have on another.  Thus the usual language of 
moral agency and patiency is misleading.  Perhaps this might be a useful approach if we take 
the problem of animal minds to be a serious obstacle.  If the duty not to torture animals 
derives from something like a virtue of human empathy, rather than from animal pain, the 
fact that the animals display the same kind of behaviour as we do when we are in pain might 
mean that torturing them betrays or cultivates a vice which is bad in itself.  It is not clear 
however that anyone actually holds a view that is this extreme in its rejection of the idea of 
moral status. 
6. We have no moral duties toward any other being, human or otherwise, and thus nobody 
has any rights. (an extreme egoist view) 
Clearly, if nobody has any duties, then nor can anyone have any rights (except perhaps for a 
very minimalist sense of right such as a Hohfeldian ‗bare liberty‘ or Hobbes‘ right of nature). 
7. We have no moral duties toward animals, but to be kind to them is good in a 
supererogatory sense. 
I have included this merely as a reminder that rights, duties and obligations are not the only 
kinds of moral concepts that we have to deal with.  Perhaps it is the case that our treatment of 
animals lies completely outside the realm of what is owed or required, and to be kind to 
animals is good ‗beyond the call of duty‘.  This of course would mean that animals have no 
rights, because to have a right against someone that they perform an act automatically implies 
that the act in question is obligatory, not supererogatory. 
Within each of these views there is a multiplicity of different positions that can be 
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taken.  For example, the first view does not necessarily advocate animal cruelty.  For 
example, the view held by Aquinas and Kant is that we should not be cruel to animals only 
because this will lead us to develop cruel character traits which might later be taken out on 
humans.  These are often referred to as ‗indirect theories‘1. The second, third, fourth and fifth 
views might vary in the extent of the rights of and obligations toward animals.  We could 
hold position three, which on first appearances might seem the most animal-oriented, and 
only hold that animals have the weakest and most minimal of rights, or we might claim that 
they have equal rights with humans.
2
  If we take a view such as number two that distinguishes 
right-holders from those to whom duties can be owed (e.g. Roger Scruton) we need to figure 
out what it is that separates having a right from having a duty or obligation owed to one.  
Does a right give the right-holder priority over someone to whom mere obligations are owed, 
as Roger Scruton argues?  If there is no such practical difference, why not either dispense 
with the language of rights altogether or extend it to animals?  I will initially be concerned 
with the first three of these positions, but this will lead to a consideration of the value of 
rights discourse per se. 
 Most work on animal rights has centred around issues like vegetarianism, vivisection, 
farming and blood sports.  The main concerns with these issues have been to do with an 
animal‘s rights to life and freedom from pain.  I will be looking at this in the context of 
environmental rights, so the main concern will be whether the animal in question has 
particular rights concerning its environment.  Naturally, this question will spill over into some 
of these more widely discussed issues.  I will follow most other writers on this topic and use 
the word ‗animals‘ to refer to non-human animals.  This is certainly not intended to imply 
anything so absurd as the notion that homo sapiens does not describe a type of animal, it is 
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 See, for example Wilson (2002). 
2
 If we embrace a theory that bases all rights in a fundamental right to equality, as discussed in chapter three, 
this may be our only option. 
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simply a useful shorthand.
1
 
 Finally, it must be pointed out that this chapter is necessarily limited in what it can do.  
All animals are not the same, and to say that some animals have rights is not the same as 
saying that they all have them.  A dog, a parrot and a fly cannot necessarily all be considered 
in the same light.  All that I can do here is give broad consideration to what confers rights on 
someone or something, and to whether this means that rights can be conferred on some 
animals.  Detailed separate examinations in terms of species or some other categorisation will 
not be possible here. 
2. The Moral Status of Animals 
(2a) The Historical Background of Our Patterns of Thought 
Most (but not all) moral philosophers today hold the view that animals are morally significant 
entities, and should not be made to suffer unnecessarily on the grounds that this causes 
suffering to the animals themselves.  However, this view has not been predominant in the 
past.  As we have seen, Kant and Aquinas both thought that our moral obligations concerning 
animals could only be indirect ones.  This view is rooted in a tradition which has frequently 
viewed animals as mere objects which could be used in whatever way best suited human 
beings, and which have been created for that purpose.  Part of this tradition is rooted in the 
Bible, although as we shall see, this cannot explain some of its extremes.  The following 
quotation from Genesis is often used to demonstrate a biblical view of a God-like man with 
total command over all other living creatures: 
So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and 
female created he them.  And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, 
and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish 
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon 
the earth. (Genesis 1, verses 27-28) 
 
Certain thinkers have taken the notion that man (and therefore, they assume, not beast) is 
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 This will be relevant to the discussion of biological theories of identity in chapter eight. 
167 
 
created in God‘s own image, with ‗dominion‘ over other animals to mean that humans have 
no duties at all towards animals and can make use of them as they please: 
Have we duties of charity to the lower animals?  Charity is an extension of the love of 
ourselves to beings like ourselves, in view of our common nature and our common 
destiny to happiness in God.  It is not for the present treatise to prove, but to assume, 
that our nature is not common to brute beasts, but immeasurably above theirs, higher 
indeed above them than we are below the angels… We therefore have no duties of 
charity, nor duties of any kind, to the lower animals, as neither to sticks and stones. 
(Rickaby 1976, p. 179) 
 
However, this aspect of the bible is not so black and white as it is currently fashionable to 
believe.  The notion of dominion would be unpalatable to many animal rights activists (some 
Christians think that a better translation would be ‗stewardship‘1) but dominion over an 
animal is certainly not the same as mere ownership of an object.  The passage goes on to 
describe how God gives plant life to the animals to use: 
And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that 
creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat: 
and it was so. (Genesis 1, verse 30) 
 
It makes little sense to speak of giving something to a mere object, and it also may be taken 
as significant that God gives man dominion over the animals, but gives the animals (and 
humans) the plants themselves.  This is undoubtedly an anthropocentric view, but not 
necessarily one which regards animals as mere objects like ‗sticks and stones‘.  Consider also 
the implications of the (slightly bizarre) tale of Balaam‘s ass, who God caused to speak after 
Balaam had beaten her three times: 
And the LORD opened the mouth of the ass, and she said unto Ba'laam, What have I 
done unto thee, that thou hast smitten me these three times?  And Ba'laam said unto 
the ass, because thou hast mocked me: I would there were a sword in mine hand, for 
now would I kill thee.  And the ass said unto Ba'laam, Am not I thine ass, upon which 
thou hast ridden ever since I was thine unto this day? was I ever wont to do so unto 
thee? And he said, Nay. (Numbers 22, verses 28-30) 
 
This seems to portray the ass (whether in God‘s words or her own) as an innocent creature 
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 For a discussion of the debate surrounding dominion and stewardship, and Christian attitudes to the 
relationship between humanity and nature more generally, see Hand (1984). 
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who should not be caused to suffer, especially after her long and faithful service to her 
master.  This suggests that the crudely objectifying attitude to animals exhibited by some 
philosophers cannot simply have its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition.  As with most 
dominant theses in any era, this attitude was probably the result of a complicated web of 
factors, including not only the biblical tradition, but also the anthropocentric position of many 
ancient Greek philosophers, and later the influences of the mechanistic philosophy of the 
enlightenment.  All of these contribute in part to a world view which sets us above and apart 
from other animals and the natural world in general, and which at its most extreme leads to 
the view that human beings are the only proper object of moral concern.
1
 
 Various justifications have traditionally been given for this standpoint.  Some, most 
famously Descartes, have claimed that animals are mere ‗machines‘, incapable of having any 
conscious experiences, including pleasure and pain
2
.  Others have claimed that it is a lack of 
the ability to reason that makes animals unworthy of moral consideration
3
.  Reasons such as 
lack of language, non-membership of a moral community, and non-membership of the human 
species have also been employed. 
(2b) More Recent Perspectives 
Today, most thinkers agree that animals are worthy of some moral consideration, although 
there are notable exceptions.  This shift has occurred in line with scientific discoveries that 
have highlighted certain features of our social and behavioural lives that we share with non-
human animals, and especially by drawing comparisons between animal lives and the lives of 
what are perhaps inadvisably referred to in much of the relevant literature as ‗marginal 
humans‘, such as very young infants and the severely mentally disabled.  Those who deny 
                                                          
1
 For detailed discussion of these ideas, see Pojman (ed. 1994), and for a selection of historical readings, 
including extracts from The Bible, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and Bentham, see Regan and Singer (eds. 
1976). 
2
 For example Descartes, 1976. 
3
 This view goes back as far as Aristotle, and is repeated in different versions through Aquinas and Kant right up 
to Peter Carruthers. 
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that animals have moral status typically do this by challenging the usefulness or validity of 
drawing conclusions about conscious experience from analogies between humans and other 
animals
1
, or by suggesting that consciousness depends on cognitive abilities that scientific 
experiments have failed to demonstrate the presence of in non-human animals.  All this 
assumes of course that it is the capability for conscious experience that makes something 
worthy of moral consideration for its own sake.  Certain environmental ethicists would 
disagree, often claiming that it is possible for things without the ability to feel pain or other 
conscious experiences to be worthy of moral consideration.
2
 
 I do not have the time or space to dwell on the criticisms made by those who deny 
animal consciousness or animal minds, but as my concern is more with the proper application 
of the language of rights, I shall assume that at least some animals can feel pain and 
experience this as something bad, although I will not assume that consciousness or the ability 
to feel pain is the only - or indeed the main - criterion for moral considerability. 
3. Animals and Rights 
If we make the assumption that animals have moral status, we face a further question 
concerning whether they can have moral rights.  Of course if we believe that rights are 
simply the flip side of moral obligations or embrace a right-based ethic of the type that I 
mentioned in chapter three, then anything which has moral status has rights, and if we are 
sceptical about the language of rights altogether, then we must reject animals‘ rights along 
with everyone else‘s.  So the question of whether animals with moral status also have rights 
is only a meaningful one for those theorists of rights who occupy the middle ground: those 
who believe that rights exist, but do not underpin all cases of moral obligation.  Of course, if 
we hold that moral status implies rights, and animals cannot have rights under the theory of 
                                                          
1
 For example Harrison (1991). 
2
 This is evident in works which attribute moral status to all natural objects or all living things, for example, 
Stone (1994) argues that trees and other non-conscious natural objects are worthy of legal consideration for their 
own (moral) sakes.  See also Rolston (1988), Varner, (1998), Attfield (1987) and Taylor (1986). 
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rights we choose to accept, then this may give us grounds either to revise our moral theory or 
to reject the idea that animals have moral status after all.  As we have seen, there are various 
different theories of rights, and our conclusions about animal rights may differ significantly 
according to which theory of rights we adopt, but a common view is that while moral status 
can be attributed to all those who are capable of feeling pain or emotional distress, rights can 
only be attributed to rational moral agents who have active membership of our moral 
community.  At least one question that must be answered therefore is whether the notion of 
rights can be separated from concepts of rationality and agency. 
 We often hear it said (particularly by parents and politicians) that ‗with rights come 
responsibilities‘.  The implication is that because we are granted some right, we ought to 
behave in a suitable way and not take undue advantage of the rights that we are given.  This is 
often a very sensible position, but it is not the same as saying that moral rights cannot exist 
without moral responsibilities.  For a start, the rights that are usually spoken about are legal 
ones, and the claim is that with legal freedoms that we are granted comes a responsibility to 
honour the spirit and intention of the law.  This is a world away from the claim that we 
cannot have moral rights unless we can also be demonstrated to have moral duties.  
Nonetheless, some thinkers do hold the latter view, and claim that the kind of being who has 
no moral responsibilities also has no moral rights.  Roger Scruton is a notable example: 
A creature with rights is duty-bound to respect the rights of others.  The fox would be 
duty-bound to respect the right to life of the chicken and whole species would be 
condemned out of hand as criminal by nature… By ascribing rights to animals, and so 
promoting them to full membership of the moral community, we tie them in 
obligations that they can neither fulfil nor comprehend… Se Shonagon, in The Pillow 
Book, tells of a dog breaching some rule of court etiquette, and being horribly beaten, 
as the law requires.  The scene is most disturbing to the modern reader.  Yet surely, if 
dogs have rights, punishment is what they must expect when they disregard their 
duties. (Scruton 1998, pp. 80-81) 
 
But why should we agree that a right-holder is necessarily a being with duties to respect 
others‘ rights?  The answer is often given by reference to a moral community bound by some 
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form of social contract and tied up with the idea that members of this community must be 
capable of giving consent, both to their initial membership, and also to certain things that 
might happen to them within that moral community.  Animals, since they lack rationality and 
language (or at least usually lack a language readily understood by us) cannot participate in 
this moral community and thus have no rights. 
 It must be pointed out that this is not an understanding of the relation of social 
contract and rights which was common to the classical social contract tradition.  Many of its 
early advocates held that we had natural rights which were pre-social, and which society 
existed to uphold.  According to such a theory, non-participation in a social contract would 
not automatically make one the sort of being who cannot have rights.  This is precisely what 
is meant by natural rights.  Certain rights assumed under a government, such as the right to 
choose one‘s leader, the right to political rebellion, or the right to certain government granted 
welfare provision such as benefit money or education, would not apply to animals
1
.  Whether 
we wish to make the further claim that animals can have no moral rights will depend upon 
which theory of rights we favour. 
3a) Choice Theories of Rights 
According to a choice theory of rights, part of what it is to have a right involves the right-
holder‘s entitlement to waive his rights.  Having a right involves not only having some 
special entitlement, but also having a power over that entitlement.  It is obvious that this 
poses difficulties for ascribing rights to animals, just as it might also pose similar problems 
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The examples I give are mostly of rights that would be of no use to animals, in fact the Great Ape Project 
campaigns for the non-human great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, orang-utans ad bonobos) to be given rights 
under international law, including rights to life and liberty and rights against torture (See the demands on the 
Great Ape Project website, listed in the bibliography).  We should not assume, simply because some legal rights 
are useless to animals, that they should have none at all.  This mistake was made in Thomas Taylor‘s A 
Vindication of the Rights of Brutes, a 1792 parody of Mary Wollstonecraft‘s A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (Wollstonecraft 1992) : ―I do not see why an elephant may not become the king's principal surgeon, and 
a bear his physician in ordinary, as soon as the language of beasts is universally known, or at lest understood, by 
the principal person at court.‖ (Taylor 2003).  However, to argue that animals should have legal rights at all 
would involve arguing that having legal rights should not depend on having entered into a social contract. 
172 
 
for the rights of babies and the severely mentally disabled.  The inability, through a lack of 
understanding of the notions of rights and duties, to waive one‘s rights, might be taken to 
mean that such rights cannot be conferred on these creatures.  This is similar in some ways to 
the view that having a right involves the ability to claim one‘s right, and that therefore one 
needs a basic understanding of moral concepts in order to be granted rights.  Both views 
hinge on the notion that in order to have a right, one must be an agent, capable of making 
moral choices and acting upon them.
1
  Simply to be worthy of moral consideration is not 
enough.  Thus if we view rights as trumping considerations, reasons for acting in one way 
even though other normal considerations are telling us to act differently, we give ultimate 
moral preference to moral agents.  Non-agents can still be candidates for moral consideration, 
but if an agent‘s right conflicts with the non-agent‘s interests, then those interests will 
automatically be put aside in order to honour the right.  As we saw in chapter three, the 
notion of ‗rights as trumps‘ is developed by Ronald Dworkin.  Roger Scruton combines this 
understanding of rights with a view of right-holders as agents to conclude that animals cannot 
have rights, and that therefore the rights of human beings can trump considerations of animal 
welfare
2
: 
Rights cannot be arbitrarily overridden or weighed against the profit of ignoring 
them… I must respect your right, regardless of conflicting interests, since you alone 
can renounce or cancel it.  That is the point of the concept - to provide an absolute 
barrier against invasion.  A right is an interest that is given special protection; it 
cannot be overridden or cancelled without the consent of the person who possesses it.  
By describing an interest as a right we lift it from the account of cost and benefit and 
                                                          
1
 Although the view that rights have to be claimable is potentially compatible with a view that those incapable of 
claiming them can have representatives (Feinberg 1981) while a choice-based theory, as I have argued in the 
case of future people and will reiterate in the case of animals, is not. 
2
 Scruton seems to adopt a rather extreme version of Dworkin‘s position.  We saw in chapter three that Dworkin 
maintains that rights are there to protect deeper underlying concerns that stand out against the ―background 
justification for political decisions‖, and that even though in normal circumstances they can trump utilitarian 
claims of the greater good, they can be overcome in extreme situations where overwhelming considerations of 
utility come into play (Dworkin 1977).  Scruton, however, maintains that ―I must respect your right, regardless 
of conflicting interests, since you alone can renounce or cancel it.  That is the point of the concept – to provide 
an absolute barrier against invasion.  A right is an interest that is given special protection; it cannot be 
overridden or cancelled without the consent of the person who possesses it.‖ (Scruton 1998, p. 31).  Scruton 
cites Dworkin for this view, but it strikes me that Scruton‘s own interpretation of a right says something rather 
stronger than what Dworkin intends. 
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place it in the sacred precinct of the self. (Scruton 1998, pp. 30-31) 
 
This combination of rights as trumps, rights requiring agency and animals as non-agents has 
dramatic consequences.  It means that the interests of any number of animals can potentially 
be ‗trumped‘ by the rights of one person.  If one person‘s life or health could be saved by 
scientific advances which involve causing painful deaths to a million apes, then that is what 
must be done.  Additionally, it raises questions about our treatment of other possible ‗non-
agents‘ such as the severely mentally disabled and infants. 
 As we saw in chapter five, some argue that the exclusion of animal rights is not a 
necessary consequence of an approach to rights that maintains that rights must be able to be 
claimed or exercised in some way.  They suggest that a way around this is to say that those 
who are not able to waive or claim their rights can have a representative or proxy who can 
waive or claim rights on their behalf where appropriate.  This has been suggested not just in 
the case of animals, but also in ‗marginal human‘ cases and cases applying to future people 
and groups.
1
 
 However, as I argued in chapter five, this is not applicable to choice-based theories.  
The claim is not simply that it happens to be the case that those who have rights can waive 
them, but also that this freedom, autonomy and choice (and therefore agency) is at the heart 
of what it is to be a moral right-holder.  Moral rights, according to such theories, are essential 
features of rational moral agents.  As we saw in chapter three, for Hart, a right is not just a 
simple conjunction of someone‘s duty and someone else‘s powers concerning that duty.  The 
power and the duty are intimately connected in that they share the same underlying 
justification, and only the person to whom the duty is owed is in a position to have the power 
to alter that duty (Hart 1955).  The right-holder‘s power over the right is an essential part of 
what makes it a right in the first place.  Thus it seems that theories advocating representatives 
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 See for example Feinberg (1981) and Baier (1981). 
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are missing the point.  The problem with ascribing rights to non-agents does not lie in 
problems of practical application, but in deeper theoretical difficulties. 
 This may not be the case with legal rights, where right-holders can have 
representatives who speak and uphold their legally granted rights on their behalf, but legal 
rights do not necessarily imply moral rights.  A company or a ship may be a legal right-
holder, but this does not automatically mean that it is in possession of moral rights
1
, and we 
may be able to say the same about animals, future people, and ‗marginal humans‘.  There 
could conceivably be legal right-holders who are not agents.  Under a choice-based theory of 
moral rights, a moral right-holder is essentially a moral agent.  This excludes cases such as 
babies and the severely mentally disabled, as well as animals, from being right-holders.  
Some see this as a deficiency of these theories, but it is an implication which some choice 
theorists seem willing to accept. 
 Theories of this type are open to the criticism that they provide extra protection for 
those who are already strong and able, and neglect those who are weak, vulnerable or 
disabled.  By allowing rights (and, under a trump theory of rights, priority) only to those who 
are able to exercise power over their rights, they neglect those whose interests are most under 
threat.  As we saw in the previous chapter, it is this type of theory of rights which has led 
some thinkers to prefer a needs-centred approach to a rights-centred one.  In addition, it can 
be argued that such a strong focus on moral agency relies on an overestimation of our human 
freedom and independence, and an underplaying of the constraint and interdependence which 
characterises much of our common life.
2
  Perhaps a more balanced view of human life free 
from fantasies of omnipotence and total independence might lead us to acknowledge a 
closeness to the rest of animal life that a strongly agential conception of humankind would 
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 See Stone (1994). 
2
 These arguments (levelled against agent-centred ethical theories in general, not specifically against  choice-
based theories of rights) are made very clearly by Soran Reader (2007).  Many thanks to Dr. Reader for 
discussing these ideas with me. 
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not allow.  The degree to which even our conceptions of self are strongly dependent on the 
environments that we inhabit will be explored further in chapter eight.  Perhaps we are not so 
close to the angels after all. 
(3b) Benefit/Interest Theories of Rights 
Benefit or interest theories do not depend on agency in the same way.  According to these 
theories, the capacity to have interests or potential benefits which can ground duties is what 
secures rights.  Thus if we can have duties to animals on the basis of their interests, or duties 
to benefit them, then animals can have rights.  Clearly, this is a less demanding criterion than 
agent-centred theories of rights such as choice theories, and it can escape the criticism of 
favouring the strong over those who need greater moral and political protection.  By some 
versions of this view, a right-holder is merely someone to whom duties can be owed because 
of their moral status.  If this is true, then the question of rights is at least to some extent 
reduced to the question of moral status, since all those who have moral status (to whom 
duties can be owed for their own sake) can have rights.  We may still want to say that rights 
should be the type of things that can be claimed, but in this instance there is no reason why a 
proxy or representative cannot do this on a non-agent‘s behalf.  The main question that this 
raises is what extra work the language of rights is doing over and above the language of 
moral status. 
 As we saw in chapter one, one answer is more in terms of a slightly different nuance 
or subject area, rather than an entirely different category.  Rights are part of the language of 
justice, and this has a number of different implications.  Firstly, questions of justice are often 
regarded as legal or political questions.  Secondly, matters of justice are sometimes afforded a 
particular urgency or moral pull which other moral questions lack.  When something is a 
matter of justice, it often seems to dictate what must be done, not simply what should.  By 
this interpretation, a right need not be of a completely different category from other moral 
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concepts, it simply comes with slightly different baggage.  We are dealing not so much with 
personal morality, but moral questions that have political implications, and the moral claim in 
question has a special urgency - a right cannot be ignored, it will continue insistently to 
proclaim itself until notice is taken of it.  Perhaps a right can in ordinary circumstances trump 
all other moral considerations, as Dworkin maintains, or perhaps the question is more one of 
degree and nuance. 
 So what is it to be a right-holder?  If the central factor which separates rights from 
other moral concepts is a matter of degree or nuance, this is basically the same as the question 
of what it is to have moral status.  If the distinguishing factor is that rights are trumps, then 
perhaps we might say something more.  Roger Scruton accepts that animals have moral 
status, but denies them rights: the rights of humans can thus always trump questions of 
animal welfare.  However, if what we are faced with is an interest or benefit based theory of 
rights, it is hard to see how humans can have priority in this way, except to the extent that 
most humans may have interests that are not possessed by most animals, generating a greater 
number of right-claims (something that I will touch on in the final chapter of this thesis) or 
that animals‘ interests are of the kind that cannot ground rights at all1.  To be a right-holder is 
to be in possession of the types of interests or potential benefits which can generate duties on 
someone else‘s part.  To deny right-holder status to animals would therefore involve denying 
either: 
a) that animals have interests or can be benefited (or harmed), or 
b) that the type of interests or potential benefits that animals can have can generate 
human obligations. 
 
The first claim here is a claim about animals, the second is more complex as it hinges on 
what we see as the connection between interests or benefits and duties.  From a classical 
utilitarian perspective, it might be that all potential benefits (and perhaps all interests) 
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 This is for example Mill‘s view in On Liberty. 
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generate prima facie duties or reasons for action.  If I can foresee that an action that I can 
carry out will benefit you, that provides you with a claim against me that I perform that 
action, even if this claim can be defeated by a stronger claim generated by a greater benefit to 
someone else or a benefit to more people.  Many people would however doubt this.  Why 
would I have even a prima facie duty to act in a way that makes people who are already 
happy and well off happier and more well off?  If I could give five pounds to Bill Gates or 
flush it down the toilet, the fact that Bill Gates stands to benefit from the donation does not 
seem to generate a decisive reason to give him any money.  Perhaps this would be the better 
thing to do on balance, but duty doesn‘t seem to come into it.  It seems fair to conclude that 
not all interests and potential benefits can generate duties.  This means that for animals to 
have rights under an interest or benefit theory, they must not only have interests or be capable 
of being benefited, but the interests or benefits that they can have must be of a kind that can 
confer rights. 
 I will consider what types of interests might confer rights in the next two chapters.  
However, for the remainder of this chapter I will concentrate on how the notions of interests 
and benefits might apply to animals. 
4. Do Animals Have Interests? 
What do we mean when we claim that something is in a person‘s interests?  It is a common 
part of the currency of both philosophical and non-philosophical moral discussion, and in 
general we take the view that people have certain interests to be trivially true.  Consider the 
Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy‘s definitions of two different meanings of the word 
egoism: 
1 Ethical egoism is an ethical theory, to the effect that one ought always to act in 
one‘s own best interests; that an action is right if and only if it benefits the agent; that 
what is valuable or desirable is that which benefits oneself. 
2 Psychological egoism is a theory about people‘s actual motivation and conduct, to 
the effect that all action is self-interested. 
 Two main varieties can be distinguished.  One says that disinterested action is 
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impossible, like an uncaused effect, or an uncaused event.  Another less extreme 
variety does not say that disinterested action is impossible, but takes it to be illusory, 
always, or for the most part: scratch the surface, and ulterior motives of self-interest, 
often disguised by pretence or hypocrisy, will be found behind seemingly 
disinterested actions. (Mautner 1996, p. 160) 
 
These two definitions highlight some of the different ways we talk about interest and 
interests.  Ethical egoism is a theory about whose interests we should serve, whereas 
psychological egoism is a theory about what we are interested in: the two need not be the 
same.  The masochist may be interested in things that are not in his interests, and the saint‘s 
interests may not be the main thing in which she is interested.  We might want to make a 
connection between the two - that we ought to be interested in serving people‘s interests, or 
that it is not in my interests to be entirely concerned with the interests of others - but the two 
concepts are distinct from each other.  So when we ask whether non-human animals can have 
interests, we do not necessarily need to hold the view that the answer to this question depends 
on whether there are things in which they are interested.  We might even go so far as to say a 
tree has an ‗interest‘ in getting enough water and sunlight.  However, trying to understand 
what interests are is not straightforward.  A being with interests might be thought to be a 
being who, at least on a prima facie level, ought to have its interests served, but if we are to 
see interests as grounding moral status in some way, it is not enough to see a being who holds 
interests simply as one who has a ‗sake‘ and who should not be used merely instrumentally 
for the sake of others.  This would be to define moral status in terms of interests and interests 
in terms of moral status.  Whether or not this circularity is vicious, it does not allow for any 
dialogue between those supporting animal rights and those who deny them. 
 There is a huge range of views about who or what can properly be said to have 
interests.  Gary Varner argues that it is not just animals, but all individual living organisms, 
that can be thought of as having interests (Varner 1998), while R.G. Frey argues that interests 
are things that can only be properly thought of as pertaining to human beings (Frey 1980).  
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Our answer to the question of who has interests will of course depend on what we think it 
means for someone to have an interest.  If we mean, as some have taken it to mean, that there 
are certain things concerning himself that the person ought to care about, or ought to act to 
promote then the prospect of assigning interests to animals looks less than hopeful: 
Interests suggest much more than that which is indicated by the person's welfare.  
They suggest that which is or ought to be or which would be of concern to the 
person/being.  It is partly for this reason - because the concept of interests has this 
evaluative-prescriptive overtone - that we decline to speak of the interests of animals, 
and speak rather of their welfare. (McCloskey 1965, p. 126) 
 
However, if we take a broader definition, perhaps we might think it acceptable to claim that 
at least some animals can have interests.  McCloskey‘s understanding of what it is to have 
interests again seems to rest upon an agential bias.  Thus even if through interest theories of 
rights we can escape the initial agential bias that afflicts choice theories, whether our interest 
theory of rights also falls prey to this problem depends upon how we understand what it is to 
have interests.  This idea will be explored further in the next chapter. 
Here, benefit theories would appear rather less complicated.  It does not seem fishy or 
mysterious to say that an animal can be benefited.  A dog will benefit from being fed the right 
amount and taken for regular walks, while we might benefit many wild creatures the most by 
leaving them well alone.  Other things can be benefited too.  We can do things that benefit 
plants and trees, or groups of people.
1
  It would perhaps seem that the language of benefit can 
be applied to anything that has what might appear to be some kind of teleology, but this does 
not necessarily mean that any benefit can confer rights or even moral status.  It might even be 
suggested that we can only talk about ‗benefit‘ as having moral relevance for beings that have 
interests of some kind.  These ideas will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
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 Although in some of these cases we might debate whose benefit we are really talking about.  Gardeners tell us 
that some flowering plants ‗benefit‘ from being pot-bound, or from having a restricted nitrogen supply.  What is 
meant here is that they provide the best display of blooms under these conditions.  This happens because the 
plant is put under stress and has evolved to produce offspring when placed in stressful conditions which will 
replicate its DNA in the eventuality that it does not survive.  The panellists on Gardeners’ Question Time often 
warn of the dangers of a plant becoming ‗too comfortable‘ and failing to perform to adequate standards. 
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Chapter 7 - What Would an Adequate Theory of Environmental Rights 
Look Like? 
 
 
So far we have encountered a range of problems relating to the application of traditional 
rights theory to environmental problems.  Some of these relate to particular cases, for 
example the specific difficulties of attributing rights to future people, and issues concerning 
the relationship between rationality and rights.  Some of these problems are more general in 
their scope - the individualistic nature of many rights theories make them difficult to apply to 
cases which cannot easily be explained in terms of relationships between individuals, and 
seem to under-emphasise the continuity between the elements of the natural world of which 
we are a part.  In fact, many of these problems can be summarised and related to each other in 
terms of continuity:  the continuity between the human and the natural, the continuity of past, 
present and future, and the continuity of ecosystems and natural environments.  Many 
traditional theories of rights tend to make overly stark divisions between the rational and the 
non-rational world, between agents and patients, and between individuals.  They also operate 
best within a static time slice which does not take account of how cultures, communities, and 
natural systems alter in terms of their membership and their defining characteristics over 
time.  This tendency to divide the present from the future, the human from the natural, and 
the individual from the culture and society, means that theories of rights can often struggle to 
take account of the types of continuity with which I am concerned.  I am not suggesting that 
we cannot examine these issues separately (the structure of this thesis would suggest 
otherwise) but rather that our conceptual distinctions should not entail a conceptual division. 
 What follows will be a brief overview of what we have covered so far, and how it 
relates to the themes that I have mentioned above.  I will follow this with an analysis of the 
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problem and what forms possible solutions might take. 
1. The Landscape of Rights 
The first three chapters consider what it is for a moral theory to be a rights theory.  Of course 
there are many answers to this question, but the aim here was to identify the main features 
that stand out and should be objects of our examination in subsequent chapters.  I started with 
a historical approach to rights theory.  This was necessary for a number of reasons.  Firstly, 
we cannot fully understand our current political and ethical thought in a cultural vacuum, and 
in order to understand the culture surrounding our concept of rights, we must understand its 
background and history: how contemporary ideas have evolved and why.  This project also 
helps us in the difficult task of trying to identify what it is for something to be a theory of 
rights.  We probably can‘t consider the ius of Roman jurisprudence to be equivalent to the 
contemporary understanding of rights, but at the same time, it shares some interesting 
features with it.  Our notion of rights is closer to that envisioned by John Locke, although we 
also saw how it has been altered and refined since then.  One thing demonstrated by this is 
that, even if we can compose a list of features that something must have in order to be a 
theory of rights, we cannot consider this to be the final and ultimate form that a theory of 
rights can take.  Rights theories can stand (and indeed have stood) a great deal of revision, 
and should be understood as dynamic concepts that can evolve over time to embrace new 
challenges and problems. 
 Certain features do however stand out as part of the modern conception of rights.  The 
most prominent of these is perhaps that we see rights as applying to a subject rather than just 
to a state of affairs or a right thing to be done.  This is what is sometimes termed ‗subjective‘ 
right, rather than the ‗objective‘ right of previous times.  This is one of the features that gives 
rights their special appeal, because as I have argued in previous chapters, it allows for an 
ethic which is explicitly centred on the patient, or the subject of moral concern.  However, we 
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have also often seen that the very notion of being a right-holder (and in many cases the notion 
of being the subject of moral concern in general) is often bound up with the notion of agency.  
This is particularly the case with modern ‗choice‘ theories of rights, although it can also be 
the case for certain interest-based theories, depending on how one characterises an interest. 
 A second feature that characterizes modern theories of rights follows from this.  This 
is the idea that granting the right must be in the interests of, or to the advantage of, the right-
holder.  Again, this is a feature that did not exist as part of the roman idea of ius that I 
discussed in chapter one.  If I have a right to something, it is generally expected that this is 
something that is in my interests or will benefit me in some way.  This is even the case for 
things which might in some respects be to my disadvantage (for example the right to make 
unhealthy lifestyle choices) because despite the fact that making such choices is damaging to 
my health, the advantage of having freedom or autonomy is considered to be in my interests 
(more will be said about the ways in which freedom is important in the next chapter). 
 Another feature that emerged with the onset of a modern conception of rights is the 
notion of moral or natural rights, rights that we have in virtue of being born, and which do 
not depend upon any legal system or government.  These rights have traditionally been 
viewed as being contingent in some way upon certain features of the right-holder.  As we 
have already seen, these features have often been ones that are usually associated only with 
human beings, although some coherent systems of rights accounting for the rights of animals 
have also been developed.  The important thing to note here though is that these features are 
not dependent upon living in a particular society or state, they are intrinsic features of the 
right-holder.
1
  Some more recent theories have moved away from this view, seeing moral 
                                                          
1
 This is of course part of the purpose of a Lockean state of nature account.  We remove man from his present 
day legal and political context, and ask what is owed to him and what he owes to his fellows when legal and 
political constraints are disregarded.  Perhaps accounts of this kind (and with them the explicit use of the 
language of ‗natural right‘) went into decline with the rise of accounts of humanity as more culturally and 
historically constructed. 
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rights as things which ought to be made legal rights.
1
  Rights of this kind are not dependent 
on the right being instituted by law, but they are dependent on the existence of legal systems, 
or at least on the notion and possibility of legal systems.  This is perhaps a similar concept to 
J.S. Mill‘s idea of ―certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights.‖ (Mill 1999, p. 122)  Thus it is perhaps 
wrong to say that natural rights and moral rights are precisely the same thing, but nonetheless 
in either case we are dealing with rights which do not need to be laid down in positive law to 
have validity.  This view has both advantages and disadvantages.  If we take rights to be a 
natural feature of a being, then we may be accused of naïve realism.  On the other hand, if we 
can provide a more sophisticated account of how rights can be predicated of beings with 
certain natural features, then this would allow us to hold a theory that links the ethical to the 
realm of politics and justice without the need to posit non-natural properties or entities.  
Again, more will be said about how this might be achieved in the next chapter. 
 The final major feature which I will mention here is the link between right and duty.  
Almost all moral rights theories make some link between right and duty (or at least between 
right and obligation).  With many rights theories, this link is direct and clearly explicable 
(either in Hohfeldian terms, or by using a different system).  However, some have rejected 
the claim that a right requires a straightforward and direct link to a duty, and in fact it is only 
rights narrowly construed as Hohfeldian claims that correlate to duty in this way, as we saw 
Tim Hayward argue in chapter four of this thesis (Hayward 2005, p. 51).  Other Hohfeldian 
‗rights‘ such as privileges do not necessitate a direct link with a specific duty (Hohfeld 1919). 
 In addition to these clearly identifiable features of most theories of rights, there are a 
number of nuances and associations which the language of rights carries with it.  Rights are 
generally associated with liberalism and individualism.  The language of rights is usually less 
                                                          
1
 For example, the concepts of rights used by Hayward (2005) and Lercher (2007) discussed in chapter four. 
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popular on the communitarian left.  This is arguably to do with concerns following from 
Marx‘s critique of rights that we saw in Chapter two, and related to more recent arguments 
from Joseph Raz (sometimes thought to occupy a middle ground between liberalism and 
communitarianism) which claim that while rights have their place, a right-based morality 
cannot account for common goods (Raz 1984).  This is also an issue for some conservative 
thinkers because of the Benthamite concern that individual rights detract from the 
associations that we have with the state and the rule of law. 
 Relating to Bentham‘s criticism is the nuance that the language of rights carries with 
it of justice, law and politics.  Perhaps this may be one of the ways in which we can seek to 
distinguish rights from other moral demands or claims.  Rights, even if we hold the Lockean 
notion of pre-political natural rights, seem to carry with them some political demands.  Often 
these are demands about what our government ought to do - where the government may or 
may not interfere with our behaviour, and which things ought to be enshrined in law.  In this 
way, rights are seen as a type of standard or benchmark up to which legal and political 
systems ought to measure.  This role of rights has become particularly prominent in the field 
of human rights over the course of the last century.  This is not to deny the fact that there are 
generally thought to be in personam rights held against people who do not occupy positions 
of political power, and rights in rem against everyone, regardless of their political status. 
 Rights are also often associated to some degree with notions of autonomy, liberty and 
rationality.  This is not just in the sense that people are seen as having rights to liberty: many 
theories of rights have the notion of liberty and autonomy at their very foundation.  
Rationality is closely linked with these concepts because the importance of liberty is 
fundamental to the ability of human beings to make rational autonomous choices about how 
to live their lives. 
 Finally, rights have a certain nuance of urgency, of a particular strength of moral pull.  
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To say that someone has a moral claim to something suggests that they ought to have it, but 
to say that they have a right to it seems to imply that they must have it.  Sometimes this is 
systematized in terms of rights as trumps.  In other cases, rights can be defeated more easily, 
but still carry with them a strength of demand.  In many cases however, rights seem to be 
concerned with cases of special moral importance and urgency.  To say that I have a right to 
something means that, at the very least, the person who denies me the content of my right 
must provide an extremely stringent justification. 
 The project of describing what it is, or what it might be, to have a right, was the 
concern of the first three chapters of this thesis.  The subsequent three chapters applied 
different aspects of the central question of the thesis to some difficult cases.  As we shall now 
recall, these chapters raised several problems for some traditional theories of rights.  
2. The Scope of our Concern 
Which are the entities with which an environmental ethicist ought to be concerned?  
Obviously, we can examine the various physical components of our natural environments:  
human beings themselves, other animals, plants, rocks, water, and so on.  Beyond this we 
might look to categories of being: animal, vegetable and mineral perhaps, or sentient and 
non-sentient, rational and non-rational.  We may also want to group particular entities 
together in other ways, according to what species they are a member of, what role they play 
within an ecosystem, what ecosystems they participate in, and what social or kinship groups 
or populations they operate as a member of.  Beyond even this, we might want to consider the 
grand totality of life itself, or even the grand totality of natural objects (either on our planet, 
or in the universe- although most environmental philosophers would primarily be concerned 
with the former). 
 It may be that we ought to be concerned with all of these different layers or levels of 
existence.  However, the fact that we are concerned with all of them need not imply that we 
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should properly consider all of them as reasonable candidates to be subjects of rights.  It may 
be that we are only concerned with some of them because we consider them to be merely 
instrumentally important.  Many people only attribute value to plants and minerals because 
they are necessary for animal life, this is different from the claim that they have the kind of 
value in themselves which would enable us to describe them as subjects of rights.  It can also 
be claimed that having a good-in-oneself is not sufficient for the attribution of rights.  A 
choice theorist might think that animals should not be made to suffer unnecessarily for the 
good of the animals themselves, but that this does not amount to a right of the animals not to 
suffer. 
3. The Role of Rights Theory 
Our views on these matters will depend heavily on what theory of rights we decide to adopt.  
A theory which rejects the notion of anything other than individual rights will struggle to 
attribute rights to species, populations, cultures and so on.  A theory under which rights 
supervene on rationality will exclude at least some categories of animals.  However a more 
liberal definition of what it is to hold rights might be more accommodating of animals and 
various different levels of existence beyond the individual. 
 Our analysis will also vary according to what we consider environmental rights to be.  
In chapter four, I take them to be rights concerning the aspects of the environment that in 
some way impinge on or have particular significance to the right-holder - in other words, my 
environmental rights are the rights that I have concerning my environment.  This means that 
the fulfilment or omission of any duty with which the right correlates must have an impact 
upon the environment in such a way that it affects the right-holder.  This includes some 
instantiations of the traditional rights to liberty and property, but I have also suggested that 
there might be what I term ‗essentially‘ environmental rights, rights for which interference in 
the environment of the right-holder is the only way to violate the right, and for which this 
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interference is what makes the act a right violation.  In other words, the right cannot be 
disentangled from ideas about the environment of the right-holder.  I argue that this category 
of right can do useful work in explaining the way that we feel when we experience something 
like a burglary or being incarcerated.  It is not simply the privation of property or freedom to 
which we react, although these are distressing things in themselves, but also the fact that our 
natural surroundings have been taken from us, violated or interfered with.  The specific type 
of unease or discomfort that we feel because of these things feels more personal or intimate 
than many of the traditional conceptions of rights can accommodate, because these are 
experiences of being estranged from or deprived of our habitat in a way that seems to threaten 
our very identity or integrity.  This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
 Similar things could be said about certain non-environmental rights, such as a right 
not to be physically harmed or touched against our will.  A rape victim might find it difficult 
to describe her situation in terms of a violation of life, liberty or property - rather, it seems to 
be a violation of self: of what it is to be a person, and specifically of what it is to be oneself.  
In a similar way, because we identify ourselves so thoroughly with our environments, a harm 
to one‘s environment can be a harm to oneself in more than just an instrumental way.  I 
would have reason to feel distressed if my house had been occupied against my will by an 
unknown intruder, even if no property were taken, and no threat posed to my physical health 
or possessions. 
 I take it to be uncontroversial that, if there are any rights at all, there are 
instrumentally environmental rights (rights whose violation will affect our environment) and 
I make the further claim that an essentially environmental right would have explanatory 
power over the moral relationship that people can have with their environments.  Thus, in the 
absence of good arguments against essentially environmental rights, there seem to be good 
reasons for positing environmental rights of both types for currently living human 
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individuals.  There are a few difficulties that need to be resolved here, not least the problem 
of dealing with conflicts of environmental rights of different types (as I discussed at the end 
of chapter four).  While this problem applies to all areas of rights theory, it looms particularly 
prominently in the case of many environmental problems because of the complex nature of 
environments.  The interrelations between individuals, cultures, species, and biological 
organisms mean that many of us assume multiple roles: agent and patient, victim and 
perpetrator, consumer and biological organism.  We saw many of the kinds of problems that 
this can raise in chapter four. 
 This poses a challenge to traditional theories of rights, which are often very much 
concerned with simple relationships between individuals, or between an individual and the 
state.  This brings us back to Marxist criticisms that theories of rights are alienating, although 
perhaps this problem operates on a more theoretical level than Marx‘s original claim.  The 
claim here is not that rights encourage us to hold each other at a distance (although this may 
well be a consequence of this view). Rather, the idea is that rights, traditionally conceived, 
cannot adequately make sense of the fact that our environmental interests are intricately 
interwoven with the environmental interests of others.
1
  These difficulties have arisen in the 
discussion of environmental rights of currently existing human individuals.  However, 
establishing where other cases (future people, animals, plants etc.) fit in terms of the structure 
of environmental rights is an even more difficult affair. 
4. Future People 
In chapter five, I considered the advantages and the difficulties of ascribing rights to future 
people.  This is an important consideration when assessing environmental rights because 
environments (and our interactions with them) are not static in time.  The temporal extension 
of an environment is just as crucial as its spatial extension.  Just as I argued in the first 
                                                          
1
 This is not only a problem for environmental rights, but for questions of rights that arise when discussing other 
large-scale global problems such as world poverty and hunger.  Many of these complexities are discussed by 
various authors in Pogge 2007. 
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chapter that we could not fully understand rights without a sense of their history, we cannot 
understand environment as purely spatial without a sense of the temporal.  This is the case 
because we cannot understand ourselves without understanding where our ideas come from.  
In addition, to think about the natural world is to think about change, not time-slices, and the 
same must be true for our relationship with it.  Thus we cannot consider our environment 
without considering its future, and its impact on future human life.
1
 
 A right-based view has the advantage that theories of rights often speak of what is due 
to people in virtue of their humanity, rather than their specific identities.  Thus the universal 
nature of rights may help to overcome the non-identity problem.  On the other hand, there are 
also some serious difficulties with taking a right-based approach to these cases.  Rights are 
often said to supervene on particular properties of the right-holder (rationality, humanity, 
interests etc.).  If it is the case that we cannot ascribe properties to future people, then it is 
hard to see how we can ascribe rights to them.  This is a problem which, while faced by other 
theories that take the notion of moral status as very important, might be escaped by more 
agent-centred approaches that do not require the attribution of properties to moral patients.  
Additionally, benefit theories of rights will find the non-identity problem particularly 
problematic, since they rely on the ability to choose between benefiting someone (and 
honouring their right) and not doing so (and violating their right).   
                                                          
1
 I would also argue that such a project should ultimately involve both an understanding of the history of our 
relationship with the environment, and that we should consider what we owe to people who are no longer alive.  
The first point is obvious, since assuming that what I have argued up to this point is correct we need to 
understand the roots of our current environmental problems to understand and improve our patterns of thought.  
The second point is slightly less obvious, but if we hold that a full picture of our environment, our patterns of 
thought and our identities cannot be gained without an examination of the past, we must at least consider 
whether we should privilege current and future people over those who no longer live. 
Many thinkers have given interesting and enlightening consideration to the history of our 
environmental attitudes and practices, which is a topic that goes beyond what I can examine here.  See for 
example Ausubel (1996), Frank (1997), Passmore (1995), Simmons (1995) and White (1994). 
On the question of whether we can attribute any environmental rights to the dead, we cannot mould the 
environment which the people of the past inhabited, so the question of environmental rights is not quite so 
relevant to them.  It may however be argued that (as people with an emotional and physical investment in the 
environment that we inhabit today) they have some right that we guard our inheritance wisely.  I hope to 
consider this question in the future. 
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 I argue that, depending on what theory of time and theory of rights one chooses to 
adopt, it can be problematic to think of our obligations to future individuals in terms of rights.  
Two solutions present themselves: firstly, we may be able to think about the rights of future 
people in terms of backward signification (although this may be problematic depending on 
our theory of time and theory of rights); and secondly, we may be able to think about the 
rights of groups that will continue to exist in the future.  While the more technical 
metaphysical aspects of these questions are crucial to finding a final answer to these 
problems, they cannot be examined in this thesis, and I suggest merely that these two 
approaches seem promising.  In different ways, they both point towards a particular way of 
viewing ourselves and our relationships with others.  Backward signification, at least if it is to 
confer moral duties, relies on the view that what is important about our lives is the networks 
of meaning that we inhabit, created by our common cultural and social lives.  In a different 
way, group rights depend upon a similar notion.  This will be expanded upon in the next 
chapter. 
5. Groups 
If we can attribute rights to groups, we may be able to say that the whole group, including its 
past, present, and future members, has rights.  This is not the same as saying that the future 
members of the group have rights at present, but rather that they will come to inherit the 
rights that they have in virtue of being a member of that group.  In this way, we escape the 
existence condition, because the group currently does exist, and we arguably escape the non-
identity problem. 
 However, in order to accommodate a theory of group rights, we must at least to some 
extent move away from the historical tradition of natural rights, which whilst supposedly 
universal in its scope, tends to be particular in its application, applying to individuals 
considered in isolation, rather than to groups or communities.  Such a move is not necessarily 
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implausible however (especially given what I noted earlier about the fluid nature of the 
history of rights theories) and would also tie in well with the previous discussion about the 
complex interrelatedness of people in the modern world, particularly in the context of 
environmental problems. 
6. Animals 
Chapter six considers the role of animals in relation to the issues we have considered so far.  
A discussion of animals is necessary here because, if we adopt a right-based ethic, the 
question of whether animals can have rights is likely to affect our environmental decisions in 
a dramatic way.  The challenge here concerns theories of rights which rely heavily on the 
rationalist enlightenment notions of reason, autonomy and agency to describe what it is to 
have a right, and which distinguish between rational man who is capable of giving consent, 
and irrational beasts which cannot in any way participate in frameworks of right and duty.  
This relies on the further supposition that agency requires the capacity to act for consciously-
held reasons, and that animals cannot do this.  This is most obviously the case for choice 
based theories of rights, where to have a right is to have the ability to waive the right.  But it 
is also arguably true of any interest based theory of rights which understands interests in 
terms of what one ought to be interested in (since again the notion of ‗ought‘ and agency is 
brought into the definition of what it is to be a right-holder).  Defining interests in the absence 
of these notions becomes a very tricky problem.  We can think of them in terms of benefits, 
or what it is to be a good example of the type of creature that one is, but of course we can talk 
about what is beneficial to a plant, or what it is for something to be a good pair of spectacles, 
but that does not mean that we would automatically ascribe interests to the spectacles or the 
plant.  
7. Summary of the Key Problems 
Most of these problems can be summarised in relation to one theme.  They all arise because 
192 
 
theories of rights, and the tradition from which they arise, fail to take account of the 
complexity and continuity of the world.  Many political philosophers have become too 
accustomed to viewing the individual self as a sealed unit which only interacts on a 
superficial level with the objects and other people which surround it.  This sealed unit is 
dramatically set apart from the rest of the world because it is essentially rational autonomous 
and free, and thus not subject to the rules of natural causation.  This is clearly not an accurate 
reflection of human life.  We rely utterly on our environment for our continued existence, our 
physical selves are formed from the same material as it, and arguably we can only understand 
ourselves with reference to the relationships we have with people and objects which are 
external to ourselves.
1
  It has been said that theories of rights are embedded in a conception of 
the world which cannot make sense of human life as it is actually lived - as part of the natural 
world. 
 To an extent this is an extension of the kind of criticism we have encountered from 
Marx and from Joseph Raz.  Marx claims that theories of rights are active in the process of 
alienation, creating boundaries and spaces between individuals, and Raz claims that right-
based theories cannot account for collective goods.  We can see that our criticism above can 
operate alongside both of these criticisms.  Rights might be taken to embody and perpetuate 
the view that people are to be viewed as hermetically-sealed units and they might also be seen 
as unable to accommodate our reliance on our environment as a collective good. 
 The real question here then is whether a theory of rights necessarily falls prey to these 
objections, and (if rights are still tenable) what a theory of rights which can escape them 
might look like.  As we have seen, what it means for something to be a right has not remained 
static, but theories generally viewed as theories of moral rights have the following features: 
 ‗SUBJECTIVE‘ - The right is held by a particular subject. 
                                                          
1
 For an interesting and detailed examination of the ways in which we relate to the natural world, see James 
(2010). 
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 ADVANTAGEOUS - The right is in some way to the advantage of the right-
holder. 
 
 NATURAL/MORAL - The right does not depend on being accepted by any legal 
or political institution. 
 
 LINK WITH DUTY - The right has some implications for what actions or 
inactions are required of others. 
 
In addition to this, theories of moral rights often have the following nuances or associations: 
 INDIVIDUALISM - The right is possessed by an individual or embodies 
individualistic concerns. 
 
 CONNOTATIONS OF JUSTICE, LAW OR POLITICS - while not depending on 
acceptance by a legal or political institution, a right often has implications for such 
institutions in terms of how they should behave or which powers they should be 
granted. 
 
 LIBERTY, AUTONOMY, RATIONALITY - Rights are associated with notions 
of rational autonomy and freedom, and thus are often only attributed to those 
whom we can properly consider to be agents. 
 
 STRENGTH/URGENCY - A right is thought of as making special demands with 
a particular strength or urgency that is lacking in other moral terms.  Thus they are 
often thought to trump other considerations or exercise a particularly forceful type 
of moral pull. 
 
Notice that, at least on a surface level, the criticisms that we have seen apply mostly to the 
additional nuances or associations, rather than to the main features of rights.  So the idea that 
environmental problems are too complex to understand in terms of direct links between 
individuals is not a problem that applies to rights in virtue of their advantageousness or their 
natural or moral character.  It is perhaps arguable that this relates to the fact that rights apply 
to subjects and are linked with duty, because we need to identify subjects and duty-holders.  
However, if we accept that the subject of a right can be a group or some other form of 
collective entity, the idea of subjective rights become less problematic.  If we add to this the 
view that the holders of the related duties may be many and widespread, or that there may be 
duties that are held by groups of people, then this is less of a problem.  The real issue here is 
the association between rights and individualism.  In order for a theory of rights to do the 
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work of environmental ethics, we must have an outlook that places emphasis on levels of 
existence beyond the individual.  Other entities must have their place within any adequate 
theory.  A workable theory of rights must (at least for our purposes) be less individualistic in 
its outlook. 
 Consider also the problems that we encounter when looking at future people.  
Initially, the difficulty might appear to be the subjectivity of rights.  If rights are to apply to a 
particular subject, we must be able to posit a particular subject for their application.  In the 
case of future people, the subjects do not exist, and their identities are not determinate.  
However, I suggested that an appropriate response to this might be to look, once again, 
beyond the unit of the individual.  If we can ascribe rights to groups, cultures or traditions in 
which people participate over time, this can have a temporal extension into the future just as I 
might have rights concerning my own welfare which extend beyond the present moment.  
Thus the problem is moved from a problem about subjectivity to a problem about 
individualism.  If rights are necessarily individualistic, this still won‘t do, but if we can 
achieve a theory of rights which is not limited in this way, we can make some sense of the 
obligations that we may have concerning those people with whom we will share no time on 
this planet. 
 Again, when we look at animals, the problems that we face with the application of 
rights theories are problems of association or nuance rather than with those things that I 
identify as central features of a theory of rights.  Animals are subjects of moral consideration, 
they can be advantaged or disadvantaged, we can have duties toward them, and this may be 
for reasons which are independent of (or even contrary to) any legal or political obligations or 
prohibitions.  Thus the problem lies with the association of rights with agency, autonomy and 
freedom.  If we must attribute these features to someone or something in order for them to be 
a holder of rights, then we cannot meaningfully talk about the rights of (at least some) 
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animals.  However, if we relax our understanding of rights and choose to relax or weaken this 
association, animals may still be right-holders.  Notice that this only applies to some rights.  
If we have a view that different rights can depend upon different features of the right-holder, 
this does not exclude the possibility that there can be rights held by groups and by animals, 
but also some rights that can only be held by individual people.  Nobody wants to argue that 
cats have a right to a school education! 
 Thus the cases that we have examined point to two main problems with traditional 
theories of rights, neither of which, I would argue, is essential by definition to a rights theory.  
These problems lie with the individualism of rights theories, and their strong association with 
liberty, autonomy and rationality.  Perhaps the case for saying that these are not central or 
definitional features needs some more work.  Once this work has been done, this still does not 
demonstrate that such a theory of rights can actually hold.  Perhaps they are intrinsically 
linked with the central features that I identified, or perhaps they are somehow the glue that 
holds the central features together in a coherent theory.  To demonstrate that a theory of 
rights can function without these secondary associations, we need at least a sketch of what 
such a theory might look like. 
8. The Positive Case for Rights 
Given the problems that we have encountered with the ability of rights to accommodate an 
environmental ethic, one might legitimately ask whether the language of rights is doing us 
any good at all.  Do these problems not give us good grounds to abandon a right-centred 
ethic, at least in our dealings with environmental problems? 
In answer to this, there are a number of reasons why we might want to retain rights 
theories, or at least to embrace a theory which has certain important features of a theory of 
rights.  Firstly, there is a certain sense in which, regardless of any theoretical difficulties, 
claims of rights can be justified.  In the philosophical sphere, rights are a source of 
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disagreement and often confusion, but in our everyday (and usually less philosophical) lives, 
the picture could not be more different.  People talk frequently of their rights or the rights of 
others, and while it might be questioned whether the right being claimed is actually one that 
is held, there is rarely (if ever) explicit confusion or disagreement about what a right actually 
is, or whether there can really be such a thing. 
 There seems, at least superficially, to be an implicit understanding of how the term 
‗right‘ is meant.  The experience of having one‘s rights violated is a very real and very 
distressing one, and the language of right-violation is a very appropriate one to describe our 
reactions to certain situations (remember the example I gave in chapter four of the sense that 
one‘s home has been invaded by an intruder).  In this way, claiming that one has a right 
seems to be giving voice to a lived emotional experience of a moral wrong.  This strongly 
emotional aspect of what it is to have rights and to have them violated is perhaps one of the 
things that is often missing from the dry philosophical accounts of rights in the Hohfeldian 
tradition.  Some might argue that this way of thinking about our ‗lived‘ moral experience 
might lead to a selective form of emotivism, suggesting that claims of right have no real 
cognitive content, that they are merely a way of bewailing certain things that are done to us 
and lacking in truth value.  However, to some extent this will depend on how we analyse 
emotional responses.  Most of us accept that people can have emotional responses that are 
inappropriate or ill-judged, so the claim that rights have a strong emotional aspect will not 
necessarily imply either that all rights-talk is mere emotional bunk, or that all rights-talk is 
valid.  We may be able to look at someone‘s sense that they have their rights violated, and 
ask to what extent that feeling is justified.
1
 
 A further claim might be that, lacking as they are in any kind of standard of judgment, 
rights can multiply indiscriminately into a plethora of meaningless right-claims.  The 
                                                          
1
 For a more general examination of the role of emotion and appropriateness in moral language, see Nussbaum 
(2006) 
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‗Clapham omnibus‘ understanding of rights is often criticized by professional thinkers on the 
grounds that it is bandied about indiscriminately and overused.  To illustrate this, a quick 
Google search on the phrase ―I have a right to‖ yielded millions of results, including ―I have a 
right to express all my feelings‖, ―I have a right to buy whatever I want‖, ―I have a right to 
marijuana‖ and ―I have a right to broadband‖.  Clearly, we would want to object to some of 
these right-claims (if they are meant seriously) as self-absorbed, self-indulgent and 
unjustified, but as the previous paragraph makes clear, the acknowledgement that rights are 
often used in an emotive and frequently thoughtless way does not stand in the way of doing 
anything useful with them. 
 A related point, which is arguably superficial but nonetheless important, relates to the 
rhetorical and political application of theories of moral rights.  This is probably what John 
Stuart Mill was recognising when he denied the coherence of ‗abstract right‘ and yet wanted 
to make philosophical use of ―certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by 
tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights.‖ (Mill 1999, p. 122)  Mill recognised 
some theoretical difficulties or problems with the concept of rights as it was understood in the 
natural rights tradition, and yet he found the notion of rights useful in describing certain 
essential or important interests which should on no account be harmed.  This may be because 
of the popular acceptance that the notion of rights had gained in describing what was morally 
due to one. 
 Perhaps there are two separate but related points here then: a point about the rhetorical 
force of rights language; and a point about how in philosophical terms, there is no moral 
concept which asserts the same kind of moral pull or urgency as rights do.  So to take the 
example of a moral right not to suffer the effects of climate change, we might consider the 
language of moral rights to have two advantages.  Firstly, the recognition of such a right 
could have important legal and political consequences.  Many politicians would accept the 
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point that we really should do something about climate change, but shrug their shoulders and 
mention the many other pressing concerns that weigh upon them, but it would be more 
difficult for them to accept that there was a moral right at stake and remain inactive.  This 
rhetorical pull exercised by moral rights is a consequence of the moral pull that rights are 
thought to exercise.  So in the climate change case, the right does not simply have the result 
of psychologically requiring immediate action, but it also means that it requires it morally.  
Whether a right is considered to be a trump, or just a moral claim of particular strength or 
urgency, to assert that something is a right is to assert that it cannot be ignored or left alone.  
It is a priority case, and must in general be afforded more importance than those concerns 
which we do not consider in terms of rights.  This would seem to be the type of political and 
moral strength that we need when we are dealing with situations as extreme as the one that 
currently faces our planet.  So rights, or at least something very like them in their degree of 
moral and political pull, could be an important tool in environmental ethics. 
 Certain thinkers have suggested that rights occupy a difficult theoretical space in that 
they are both moral and political concepts.  The argument is that this can lead to a confusion 
between the moral and the political which is likely to be a hindrance rather than a help to 
reaching genuine moral understanding.
1
  This is certainly a real concern.  If we are not 
careful, it could be very easy to confuse legal rights with moral rights, especially as moral 
rights have a legal or political nuance, and arguably legal rights have moral connotations.  
However, as long as the terms are used carefully and with thought, I would argue that this is a 
certain advantage of rights as part of the moral philosopher‘s toolkit.  Certain moral 
requirements are very political by nature, especially concerns which affect our common life 
to the extent that environmental concerns do.  To frame environmental concerns in terms of 
rights can help to highlight the essential political importance of these issues. 
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 For example, Mary Midgley makes an argument of this type (Midgley 1983, chapter five). 
199 
 
 Another possible advantage to using rights discourse in the field of ethics relates to 
the idea that rights are applied to a subject, and thus the language of rights puts special moral 
emphasis on the moral patient rather than the moral agent.  In superficial terms then, rights 
look to the potential victims of wrongdoing rather than the potential wrongdoers.  This idea 
could be central to environmental ethics, as many environmental ethicists suggest in one way 
or another that we ought to shift our focus from the human agent to the earth, its systems, its 
non-human inhabitants, and its weak and vulnerable human inhabitants.  Depending on which 
of these we regard as possible right-holders, the language of rights may have the advantage of 
framing moral requirements in terms of who or what they are required for, rather than who 
they are required of.  Of course, whether this is possible depends greatly on what we say 
about what it means to be a right-holder, and as we have seen, some theories of rights seem to 
equate moral considerability with the capacity for moral consideration.  This would apply to 
choice theories of rights, and to interest theories which ground interests in agency or even in 
moral agency.  To the extent that they do this, theories of rights are agent-centred theories, 
but to the extent that they do not, they are patient-centred, and may be of use in 
understanding some environmental moral issues. 
 In conclusion then, environmental concerns seem to demand a moral theory which has 
the urgency and strength of rights theories, and which also has an emphasis on the moral 
patient (or ‗subject‘).  On the other hand, we are looking for a theory which is less 
individualistic in its outlook than much of the natural rights tradition, and which places less 
emphasis on rational agency.  To the extent that we can have a theory of rights which fits 
these criteria, we have good reason at least to consider environmental problems in terms of 
rights. 
9. Why are Theories of Rights Often Individualistic? 
It is sometimes said that rights are a particularly individualistic notion because they have their 
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origins in the social contract tradition.  The thought is that only individuals can make rational 
decisions, and that therefore only individuals can participate in a social contract and accept 
all of the rights and responsibilities which accompany it.  This analysis is mistaken.  Whilst it 
is true that rights are often a feature of contractualist theories, they arguably predate them by 
a considerable margin (as we saw in the first chapter of this thesis).  Secondly, many social 
contract theorists believe that rights exist prior to and independently of any social contract - 
this is what is meant by natural rights.  The rights do not depend on any rational agreement 
or participation.  Even if it is the case that it is rationality that grounds both natural rights and 
the social contract, but it is not the contractualist nature of the theories which directly implies 
individualism.  Finally, while it is sometimes thought that only individuals can act rationally, 
there is a good deal of literature on collective rationality and collective action.  Any thesis 
which suggests that there is such a thing as collective responsibility must rely on such notions 
(at least if we make the assumption that agency is necessary for responsibility
1
).  The 
argument that rights are (or should be) associated with the social contract tradition gives us 
no prima facie reason to think that the individual should be the sole locus of concern of a 
theory of rights.  So why do we continue to make a connection between theories of rights and 
individualism? 
 Perhaps this is something to do with notions of ‗tyranny of the majority‘ or the idea 
that there are limits to what we can do to an individual for the sake of a greater good to 
society, as Dworkin argues.  Perhaps rights exist in part to insulate the individual against 
claims of greater common good.  This is not really decisive in making rights theories 
individualistic.  Are individuals the only unit that needs this kind of protection?  Perhaps we 
might make claims for the value of cultural practices, ways of life, and so on. In some 
circumstances these might be thought to outweigh purely utilitarian considerations or the 
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 It might be argued that Cooper‘s argument for collective responsibility that we saw in chapter five does not 
depend upon attributing agency to groups. (Cooper 1968) 
201 
 
concerns of other people or groups.  If the individual sometimes needs insulating against the 
claim of the greater common good, perhaps certain common goods also need protecting 
against other concerns.  It might be objected that this would create difficulties in weighing the 
rights of the individual against the rights of a group.  As I have argued earlier, this ought not 
concern us too much, as we are already well-versed in considering conflicts of rights between 
individuals. 
10. Why are Theories of Rights Often Agential/Rationalistic? 
Perhaps some of the appeal of the view that one must be a rational agent in order to be a 
right-holder is that we are drawn to theories which exhibit a certain degree of balance or 
symmetry.  We look for a set of criteria to determine which beings we might regard as having 
moral rights, and one of the elegant solutions that presents itself is to say that these match the 
criteria which determine which beings have moral duties.  If we do this, it might be supposed 
that we can simply draw a ring around the classes of beings that theories of justice involve 
and leave it at that.  The set of right-holders is identical to the set of duty-bearers.  Thus the 
patients involved in a theory of rights are the same as the agents involved in such a theory.  
The difficulty with this view is that theories of justice often exist precisely because of 
inequalities of power and ability.  Those who are weak and cannot exercise very much 
agency need to protected against those who are strong and extremely able.  This is very often 
the case for the types of rights which do not arise from a contract. 
 So given that we can reject many of the reasons for associating the capacity to have 
rights with the capacity for rational agency, we must ask whether it is possible to have a 
theory of rights which operates without this assumption.  The view of rights as uniquely 
associated with rationality is part of the view that I have mentioned elsewhere in this thesis 
that denies the continuity of people with their own bodies, with other people and with the 
natural world that they inhabit.  This is often, as I remarked, tied up with the notion of 
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Cartesian dualism, but this should not lead us to suppose that all dualisms are by their nature 
pernicious.  The question is, whether any conception of a right can survive if it can no longer 
feed upon the biases of its tradition.  This of course depends on exactly what one means by a 
right.  Some proponents of an agential conception of rights may be tempted to claim that they 
are right by definition: a right is the sort of thing that can only be held by a rational agent, and 
therefore only rational agents can have rights.  This is unhelpful and uninformative.  If we 
choose to understand rights in this way, then indeed it is true that only rational agents can 
have rights. 
 However, if it is true that moral rights can only be held by rational agents, it is 
nonetheless also the case that we can support the attribution of something suspiciously like 
them to non-rational beings, and potentially to non-agents.  By this I mean that there is 
nothing internally inconsistent in holding a view that is focused on the subject of moral 
consideration, which is to the advantage of that subject, which is not dependent on a legal or 
political framework‘s acceptance, and which prompts or requires action (it has a link to moral 
duty). 
11. What Might an Adequate Theory of Rights Look Like? 
This means that theories of rights cannot rely on choice, or indeed on interests if ‗interests‘ 
are defined in terms of what one ought to be interested in.  If rights are going to do all this 
work, they also arguably need to be applicable to groups.  This means that whatever criteria 
ground rights cannot be criteria that can only be ascribed to individuals.  Interests is initially 
one way of doing this, because all it means is that the person, group, etc. in question has some 
good, there is something that it is to be a good or flourishing example of that thing.  The 
problem is that the language of interests is rather vague, and is loaded with baggage because 
of the double meaning of the word ‗interest‘. 
 One possible solution to this is to apply the language of need.  If rights (or at least 
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certain rights) are grounded in needs, then this escapes any requirement or concern that the 
right-holder must be considered in terms of agency.  Rather, they are placed in the position of 
a moral patient.  A need is something which can require a response or make a demand of us 
as agents - it can exercise a moral pull.  It is not entirely certain whether a needs based rights 
theory should be seen as a species of interest based theory, or as a type of theory all of its 
own.  Certainly, it would appear that what we need is in our interests, although not all 
interests are needs. 
12. Needs 
There are strong parallels between cases of need and cases of right.  Consider the argument 
from the last chapter, when I highlighted the difficulties surrounding approaches to rights 
based on benefit.  I gave the example of a choice between giving Bill Gates five pounds, and 
simply flushing the note down the toilet.  The fact that Bill Gates would be benefited (albeit 
very slightly) by my donation does not make it the case that he has a right to my money.  
Then consider cases of obvious right-violations such as theft or torture. 
 What is it that gives a prisoner the right not to suffer torture, but which does not give 
Bill Gates the right to my five pounds?  The obvious response is that someone has a duty in 
the former case, but not in the latter.  We have a duty to refrain from torture, but no duty to 
donate money to billionaires.  But what is it that grounds the duty and the right in the torture 
case, but not in the other?  Both Bill Gates and the torture victim have an interest in certain 
actions being performed or refrained from, and both stand to benefit from the performance or 
non-performance of those actions.  One major difference seems to concern the needs of the 
moral patient in each of these cases.  There is a very real sense in which the prisoner is 
experiencing an occurrent need not to be tortured, while Bill Gates does not need my five 
pounds (unless, perhaps, he were stranded in a station without his sizeable wallet, but then it 
would not be clear that we had no duty to help him).  In fact, many of the rights that are 
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considered uncontroversial might be thought to be rights to things that we need in some sense 
or another.  In a way we might then say that rights of a certain kind are a tool for emergency 
situations, to be applied when someone‘s most basic needs are at stake.  This is certainly the 
way that the language of rights has often been applied in the past, as a weapon against 
slavery, torture and oppression.  It would probably not be possible to explain all rights in 
terms of needs.  Rights of contract for example can‘t be understood in these terms (Bill Gates 
does have a right to my five pounds if he lent it to me in the first place).  The rights that may 
be based on needs are what some people would call ‗basic rights‘, or ‗universal rights‘1. 
 Some thinkers, such as David Copp, argue that there is a right to have one‘s basic 
needs met (Copp 1998).  He formulates this as a positive right that is held against the state, 
since he argues that there would be a difficulty in identifying the holders of obligations if 
such a positive right were to be held in rem.  What Copp means by ‗basic needs‘ is ―things 
that a person requires regardless of her goals or desires‖ ( p. 123).  This does not however 
imply that the way that these needs can be met does not vary from person to person and from 
culture to culture: 
It will be helpful to bear in mind this distinction between the basic needs and the 
forms of provision.  Every human needs a nutritious diet, but differences in 
metabolism, gender, climate, health, and so on contribute to differences in what kinds 
and amounts of food a person must have in order to meet this need.  Everyone needs a 
sense of self-respect, but different things are required in different cultures and 
circumstances in order to sustain this sense.  And there are relevant differences 
between people due to differences in their psychologies.  Every human has basic 
needs that are the same at some level of description as those of every other human, 
even though the forms of provision may vary from person to person and circumstance 
to circumstance, depending on a variety of factors, including culture. (p. 123) 
 
Copp articulates this notion further in terms of choice and autonomy, suggesting that what is 
vitally important is not that one lives in the healthiest or most comfortable possible way (one 
might decide to be an ascetic, and this would not always be considered a ‗blight‘ on one‘s 
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 More commonly, these would be likely to be referred to as ‗human rights‘, but this term would obviously 
exclude many of the objects of my concern in this thesis. 
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life) but that one is able to ‗choose and to live a standard life‘.  From this, Copp makes the 
step (I think mistakenly) of concluding that all basic needs can be understood in terms of 
what are necessary minimal conditions for autonomy or rationality.  It is one thing to say that 
autonomy and rationality is a vital element of human life, and another to say that it is the only 
or the most basic one.  Copp then argues that such needs should be understood as rights 
because the special status of rights has three aspects, aspects which he argues are shared with 
basic needs: 
First, rights have priority over the ordinary goals and duties of the state and over the 
goal of promoting the general welfare.  Rights can be overridden only in the interest 
of a goal or duty of special urgency.  Second, rights can be claimed as their due by the 
people who possess them.  Right holders are wronged if their rights are abridged.  
Third, a person who claims something to which she has a right does not thereby 
demean herself or undermine her grounds for self-respect or self-esteem.  On the 
contrary, a person with proper self-respect and self-esteem would claim the things to 
which she had a right, unless she had a good reason not to. (p. 127) 
 
I would agree with Copp to the extent that this describes many of the rights that are held by 
presently existing adult human beings.  But Copp‘s conception both of a right and of a basic 
need is far too agential a conception to do the work that we need it to do.  He views both 
rights and needs as things that ‗can be claimed by the people who possess them‘.  This is 
clearly not true of needs, even if we take Copp‘s narrow view that needs are basic conditions 
for agency and autonomy.  If one lacks something that one needs for agency and autonomy, it 
is quite plausible that one would be unable to claim it precisely because of this lack.  It might 
also be said that the same applies to rights – those who lack freedom of speech cannot claim 
their right to it.  Thus it would appear that agency and autonomy is not a condition for having 
a right, even among the less problematic examples that do not involve animals, future people 
and so on. 
 However, if one looks at to the more minimal features of a right that I have described 
earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis, it does seem to be the case that what we 
would usually regard as needs does fit the bill.  Needs are ‗subjective‘ in the sense that there 
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are subjects of needs, they are natural properties of their subjects, in that they do not rely on 
legal or political institutions to define or create them, and they appear to generate duties, in 
that (at least very often) they prompt action from states or individual moral agents.  They also 
often make demands of a particular strength or urgency, and can have implications for the 
institutions of law and politics.  They also do not necessarily have to be understood in terms 
of liberty, autonomy and rationality, although in the case of human beings, many needs will 
be understood in such terms. 
 One question that this raises is whether in fact we require the language of rights when 
we can talk about needs in this way.  However, I feel that this may be something of a red 
herring.  Rights have a history of describing the relationship between right-holders and the 
duties that are owed to them in a way that needs do not, and so it is at least arguable that the 
best way to talk about the moral demands of needs is through the language of rights.  One 
person who objects to this approach is Onora O‘Neill, who argues that the moral demands 
made by needs cannot be adequately captured by theories of rights (O‘Neill 1998).  However, 
many of O‘Neill‘s objections are based on the points that rights must be capable of being 
claimed and being waived, a view that I have already argued against.  She also argues that 
rights must be attached to assignable duties, and that this simply isn‘t possible in instances 
where massive global problems such as world hunger need to be addressed.  However, some 
have attempted to address this problem.  As we have seen earlier in the thesis, some deny that 
there is always a simple and easily explicable link between a right and a duty.
1
  Some support 
the notion of what are sometimes pejoratively called ‗manifesto rights‘, rights which prompt 
us to create and assign duties, while others have other ways of explaining how our rights can 
correlate to duties when dealing with complex global issues.  Thomas Pogge, for example, 
thinks that some rights impose duties on everyone to participate in political institutions in 
                                                          
1
 See Ashford 2006 and Hayward 2005. 
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particular ways: 
Understanding human rights in this way does not turn them into manifesto rights: 
each member of society, according to his or her means, is to help create and sustain a 
social and political order under which all have secure access to the objects of their 
civil rights.  This demand, so abstractly put, is unspecific but, within any particular 
social context, quite specific.  In a society where domestic servants must often suffer 
inhuman and degrading treatment from their employers, citizens have a human-rights-
based obligation to help institute appropriate legal protections as well as perhaps a 
literacy program or unemployment benefits. (Pogge 2002, p. 75) 
 
The task of defining needs is not an easy one, and we will come to this in a moment, but an 
interesting feature that we see emerging here is that the content of the right (i.e. what it is a 
right to) begins to determine the structure of the right (how it generates duties).  This may 
therefore be a way of getting around the problem that many of the accepted lists of rights 
might seem a bit arbitrary.  Once the content and structure of a right become more clearly 
linked, the purpose of the right becomes clearer.  If at least some rights are based on needs 
and the moral demands that they place on others, then this helps to determine both what such 
rights we should have and why we should have them. This I believe must be a feature of how 
we define a right if we are to escape the spiraling lists of trivial rights that we increasingly see 
people claim. 
 This is not to say that other theories of rights have not attempted to explain the 
specific rights that we have in terms of how rights are structured (and vice versa), the more 
rigorous ones certainly have.  Hart‘s argument, that if there is one fundamental right it is the 
natural right of all people to be free, is based on the view that the very nature of rights is 
based in the fact that we are moral creatures, and that the only morality that can exist must 
exist against a background of autonomy (Hart 1955).  Thus the essence of humanity itself and 
the view that there are moral rights implies that we must be allowed to be free.  As I 
suggested earlier, this is only part of what it is to be human, and we delude ourselves if we 
regard ourselves as completely free and autonomous agents, but in a way what Hart is 
presenting here is (in a very loose sense) a needs-based view.  He argues that we have a right 
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to be free because that is an essential element of what it is for us to be who we are.  In order 
to be human beings we must be autonomous, and this is part of the reason why we must have 
a right to autonomy. 
 We might thus extend this view to say that we should be understood to have a right to 
access all of our basic needs.  I have a right to eat and drink, and to be provided with shelter, 
because after all without these things I cannot survive, let alone be free or autonomous or any 
of the more abstract things that are thought to be essential to our humanity.  Anything that we 
need to ensure our existence might thus be regarded as the content of a right.  Need in this 
sense is understood in ontological terms.  X‘s needs are those things that X needs on order to 
continue to be X (or possibly an X‘s needs are the things that that X needs in order to 
continue to be an X).  We might take this a little further and speak about needs teleologically.  
Perhaps we have certain needs in order to function well as the types of being that we are.  
This is the approach taken by Martha Nussbaum, who argues that our needs, and the state‘s 
obligation to meet them, are based on what she calls a ―thick vague conception‖ of a good 
human life (Nussbaum 1998)
1.  Nussbaum‘s account ultimately comes down to notions of 
reason and autonomy as definitive of human need, but we could imagine a teleological 
account of human identity and corresponding needs which does not rest upon these 
foundations alone (I will attempt to explore this to some extent in the next chapter).  Both of 
these views can be understood in terms of identity conditions – what I need in order to 
continue to be me, and what I need in order to have a good life for the type of thing that I am.  
This view would have a number of positive things to recommend it, but also faces some 
serious potential problems. 
 On the positive side, a theory of rights placed within the context of needs may be a 
move toward a naturalistic explanation of rights.  If a right is based on a need, or even is a 
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 A similar view is suggested by Len Doyal (1998) although this view is again based on conceptions of agency 
and autonomy in a very fundamental sense. 
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particularly salient aspect of a need to which we must respond, then it appears that we could 
potentially recognize right-holders and the rights that they possess by identifying their needs.  
As I previously noted, it also seems a good way to connect the content and the structure of a 
right and to avoid an ever growing list of seemingly arbitrary rights.  We can challenge need-
based right-claims (as opposed to, for example, promise-based ones – I do not maintain that 
all rights are necessarily based on needs) on the basis of need.  In addition, this approach 
would not require language use or rationality of something in order for it to have rights.  
Animal rights would be unproblematic so long as animals can be considered the types of 
things that can have needs in the relevant sense. 
 There are however a number of potential problems with this approach.  It may appear 
extremely demanding.  This demandingness springs from the number of rights that might 
then impose duties upon us, the number of entities that we may have to class as right-holders, 
and (perhaps greatest of all) the extreme version of the right to life that this might imply.  We 
would be faced with a great number of right-claims because the plight of the poor and 
starving would become a question of rights.  We would have to recognize these concerns as 
creating concrete duties, rather than simply prompting benevolence or charity.  A great 
number of entities might be classed as right-holders because (if needs are defined as some 
kind of identity condition) we might find ourselves asking questions about the rights of 
bacteria, trees, tables and chairs.  The right to life might pose a problem because if one has a 
right to whatever it is that is essential to one‘s identity, then this might force us to extend 
lives at all costs in order for the right-holder‘s identity to persist. 
(12a) A Need-Based Right to Life 
So would a need-based theory of rights force us to extend life in this way?  Of course, there is 
a sense in which it probably would not do so.  There is no reason why rights of this kind 
would have to be completely indefeasible.  At the very least, different rights might compete 
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for our resources since there is no way that we can possibly meet all needs.  So perhaps 
extending someone‘s life, even if they have a very limited capacity to experience and act 
upon the world, would not be a duty if other need-based rights could overcome the right to a 
very limited kind of life. 
 Another consideration is that mortality is in some ways a very important part of our 
identities.  If it were possible for us to extend life indefinitely, the immortal beings whom we 
would create would lack a very important aspect of what it is to be a human being.  Thus the 
ending of our continued biological existence is not necessarily something that should be 
striven against at all costs, because the ultimate (albeit unachievable) goal of this would be to 
transform us into something that we are not.  The concern therefore is not necessarily an 
indefinite temporal continuation of the individual, but the preservation, insofar as it is 
possible, of their integrity and identity.  In the same way, although they may not be aware of 
it in the same way, death is part of what it is for any animal to be what it is.  The continuation 
of life should not always be an ultimate and overriding right, because other rights can 
dominate it in so far as it stands, and the ultimate aim of such a right would be 
transformation, not preservation, of nature.  Of course, none of this implies that there is no 
right to life, either for people or for animals.  The claim is that because of the inherent 
finitude of life, its indefinite continuation could not be considered a need in any morally 
relevant sense. 
(12b) Too Many Right Claims? 
So perhaps a need-based theory of rights would not call upon us to extend life indefinitely.  
But what of the other extreme claims that it might make?  If all identity serving needs are the 
basis of rights, then we would be faced with a great number of claims.  A massive proportion 
of the world‘s population is living in poverty.  Many millions of people suffer from 
debilitating illnesses; many more people are victims of physical or psychological abuse.  In 
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some ways, all of these conditions impact upon identity in a negative way, whether it means 
not having the resources to do anything beyond day to day survival, or whether it means 
being emotionally crippled and robbed of the confidence or self-esteem that one requires in 
order to feel truly at home with oneself.  Do all of these things constitute needs, and are they 
all the sorts of needs that generate duties in such a way as to create rights? 
 Of course, the demandingness of this theory of rights will depend to a great extent 
upon the identities of the duty-holders.  Many people would think that a theory imposing a 
duty upon every individual to live just above the poverty line in order to serve the needs of 
the many millions of people in the world would be overly demanding.  But not all rights are 
rights held against everyone.  Some rights are held against specific people or groups in 
particular roles, such as governments, families or other people who might be considered to be 
in a position of moral responsibility.  We should also note that if this is a problem for a 
needs-based theory, it is also a problem for many other theories which advocate positive 
rights (i.e. rights imposing a duty to act rather than to forbear from acting).  If we hold that 
there are rights to many of the things listed in the UN declaration of human rights, then these 
rights will prompt many demands on people whether they are need-based or not. 
 Additionally, it would be possible to take a weaker position according to which there 
were negative need-based rights, but not positive ones.  So a right based on a need to a livable 
environment may not impose obligations upon us to campaign for changes in international 
law, or to spend our weekends cleaning the streets.  Rather it might just impose obligations 
on us not to damage the environment in a way that impacts negatively upon the lives of 
others.
1
 
 (12c) The Wrong Sort of Claimants? 
The third point that I mentioned as a possible objection to a need-based view of rights is that 
                                                          
1
 Although many have made the case for positive rights in similarly demanding situations (e.g. Caney 2007). 
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if we understand needs in terms of identity – either in terms of some kind of teleology or 
goal, or in terms of continued existence – then this might lead to a whole set of rights-claims 
made on behalf of trees, rocks, bicycles, tables and so on.  Some may wish to accept these 
claims and acknowledge that at least some of these objects, strange though it is to say it, 
might be talked about in terms of rights.  However, I suspect that many more people would 
want to reject such conclusions.  Animal rights perhaps, but bicycle rights no.  Part of the 
way that we can answer this is in terms of whether the observed teleology or identity of the 
object is something imposed on it by human beings, or whether it has some form of internal 
organising principle that lends it its integrity.  We can also help to unpick these notions by 
asking what types of identity we are concerned with.  Identity can be understood on a variety 
of different levels: numerical, biological, psychological, narrative and phenomenological, to 
name but a few.  Perhaps some, but not all of these levels are of the kind that can generate 
moral claims.  These ideas will be explored further in the next chapter. 
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___________________________________________________________ 
 
Chapter 8 – Environment, Identity and Rights1 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. „Essentially‟ Environmental Rights 
 
In previous chapters I have raised the notion that while we may apply rights to life, liberty 
and so on in situations which have an environmental dimension, there may also be a stronger 
sense of an environmental right.  A right where what is at stake is not merely one‘s Lockean 
negative freedoms or one‘s property, but rather a different and very deep relationship that the 
individual person or creature has with its environment.  The involvement of environment in 
these cases is not a merely circumstantial or instrumental means by which some other right is 
honoured or violated, it is bound up with what makes the right a right.  In this chapter I will 
expand on this notion with reference to theories of identity.  The basic point is that, in certain 
circumstances, a violation of an organism or person‘s environment can be a violation of the 
organism or person itself.  This means that we are considering the possibility of 
environmental rights which are based on the idea of preserving the integrity, wholeness or 
flourishing of the right-holder, rather than by referring to something external to that organism 
to which the organism has a right.  This ties in with the discussion in the previous chapter 
about need-based rights.  If we understand my needs either in terms of what I need in order to 
continue to be me, or in terms of what I need in order to have a good life for the type of thing 
that I am, we would need some kind of theory of identity.  A right based on these types of 
need would ultimately be a right against fragmentation, or a right to self-realisation of some 
kind. 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to Thom Brooks, Beth Hannon and John and Judy McKinnell for their lively and helpful 
suggestions and comments on this chapter. 
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One reason why we might wish to consider the possibility of essentially 
environmental rights is that we condemn environmental degradation not simply on the 
grounds that it is deleterious to certain external human (or non-human) needs, interests or 
projects in a simple causal fashion, but also because of the perceived degradation of the 
environment itself.  Having said this, we are in very controversial territory when we start to 
talk about ‗intrinsic value‘ in nature, in the sense that the value is entirely independent of 
human or animal interests.  This might prompt us to look to some sense in which a human 
being or animal‘s environment is important for them in terms that are closer to its sense of 
self or identity than its purely instrumental value can account for.  A violation of an 
environment is not simply wrong because it thwarts some other interest, but because that 
environment in itself is important to us as us.  At present, this is a somewhat vague and 
indistinct notion.  The ‗self‘ is not necessarily identical with the ‗sense of self‘, and there are 
many different ways of formulating what I mean when I refer to my ‗self‘.  The bulk of this 
chapter will be concerned with how some of these notions might be clarified and fleshed out 
in terms of concepts of environment.  After this, I will attempt to articulate how this might be 
important to moral theory and theories of rights. 
One way of understanding these notions might tie in with David Cooper‘s ‗older‘ 
conception of environment as a field of special significance and meaning to the creature 
whose environment it is.  Thus we would be talking about a right concerning vital aspects of 
our identities which cannot be described purely in terms of our liberties or even purely in 
terms of our rationality.  In developing his theory of rights, Hart looked deep into the notion 
of what it was to be human, and found autonomy and rationality at its core.  This for him tells 
us what elements of the self should be dignified with the ascription of rights.  But perhaps 
there is more that is central and fundamental in this sense than Hart identifies.  Perhaps the 
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very heart of the self is indissolubly bound up with its environment and its dependencies as 
much as it is with its rational autonomous independence. 
 Later in the chapter, I will suggest that we might consider environment as the content 
of a right in much the same way as we do liberty, because both play similar roles in our 
identities, but for now let us consider David Cooper‘s understanding of an environment in a 
little more detail: 
On that conception, an environment is what a creature knows – and knows in a 
certain way... The relevant kind of knowledge is practical, unreflective 
familiarity. (Cooper 1992, p. 169) 
 
A further essential feature of a creature‘s relation to its environment needs to be 
brought out.  To speak in the language of phenomenology, this relation is an 
‗intentional‘ one.  An environment, that is, is something for a creature, a field of 
meanings or significance.  It is not simply that its environment matters to the 
creature... The point is rather, first, that the items in one‘s environment are those 
which are brought into relief, ‗lit up‘, through occupying places within one‘s 
everyday practices... second, that the items within it signify or point to one 
another, thereby forming a network of meanings.  It is this which confers 
cohesion, a certain ‗wholeness‘, on an environment. (Cooper 1992, p. 170) 
 
So when we talk about an environment on this conception, we are talking about a realm of 
‗practical, unreflective familiarity‘ and furthermore, a ‗field of meanings or significance‘ 
which is bound up with one‘s practical activity and internally cohesive in the sense that 
Cooper conveys.  The link between human/animal activities and environment is thus a strong 
and nuanced one.  It is a small (but nonetheless significant) step from this assertion to the 
claim that environment is at least in some sense partially constitutive of the self.
1
  Not only is 
our environment a realm of special significance for us, but we are diminished, made less as 
individuals, through the privation of it.  Consider for example David Brower‘s evocative 
description of a condor: 
A condor is 5 percent feathers, flesh, blood and bone.  All the rest is place.  Condors 
                                                          
1
 A position of this kind is presented in Freya Matthews‘ book The Ecological Self  which understands human 
and animal identity as fundamentally bound up in its environment.  Matthews is however more committed to an 
holistic account of the earth and the cosmos than the arguments in this chapter would require.  Matthews‘ 
position is compatible with the views presented here, but is not a necessary consequence of them. (Matthews 
1991). 
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are soaring manifestations of the place that built them and coded their genes.  That 
place requires space to nest in, to teach fledglings, to roost in unmolested, to bathe 
and drink in, to find other condors in and not too many biologists, and to fly over wild 
and free. (Brower 1981, p. 275) 
 
The implication is that the condor‘s environment is not simply something outside the condor 
which has its own wholeness and cohesion by virtue of its significance to the creature.  
Rather, to talk about the condor is in part to talk about the type of environment that it 
inhabits.  If we were to remove the condor from the environment of which it is a ‗soaring 
manifestation‘, we are left with the five percent that is feathers, flesh and bone.  In a sense, 
we would no longer have a condor at all, but a diminished fragment of one.  Removal of a 
creature from its environment can be a fragmentation of its unity, a destruction of the 
integrity of its very being. 
 One question that this raises is whether we are talking about the importance of the 
species or the importance of the individual.  After all, the place that has ―space to ...fly over 
wild and free‖ seems to be an essential aspect of what it is to be a condor, and not to be a 
particular condor.  Do we want to extend our analysis of what can be violated this far, or 
would it be safer to stick to isolated individual units of sentience?  I will not rule out the 
possibility that we may be able to attribute rights to species, but this may not be a necessary 
consequence of this way of articulating the condor‘s relationship to its environment.  The 
environment is important to the condor in a particular way because it is of the species that it 
is.  Thus species can have an important role to play without being in itself a moral patient or 
right-bearer.  Additionally, we can say that species, like environment, is indissolubly bound 
up with the individual, presenting us with a threefold interdependence.  An environment (in 
Cooper‘s sense) is incoherent without a creature whose environment it is, the creature when 
estranged from the environment is estranged from itself and from what it is to be a member of 
its species, and the species is non-existent without individuals (although, as I claimed about 
groups in chapter five, it does not rely upon the existence of any particular individual) and is 
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diminished through estrangement of individuals of that species from their natural 
environment. 
 For all this to be true, our environment, or our relationship with it, must be integral to 
our identity, but what might we mean when we talk about something having significance for 
identity in this way?  Identity can be understood and interpreted in a great many ways.  We 
might mean simply numerical identity – the type of relation that any object bears to itself.  Or 
we may be talking about personal identity, and if we are, we might understand this identity 
biologically, psychologically, or in terms of narrative.  The type of identity that we are 
talking about is going to affect whose environment can be violated, in which ways, and with 
what moral implications.  This might help to illuminate what we mean when we talk about 
concepts such as benefits, needs or interests which might be thought to ground rights. 
2. Qualitative and Numerical Identity 
 
Identity in its most general sense in philosophy is understood as the relation that makes things 
identical.  This can be meant in two ways.  Qualitative identity is a term used to describe 
objects which share common qualities or properties.  This is a relative term, in that objects 
can be qualitatively identical to a greater or a lesser extent.  So, for example, two organisms 
of the same species and genus will exhibit a higher degree of qualitative identity than two 
organisms of different species or genera.  Leibniz‘s law implies that two objects which have 
total qualitative identity (i.e. they share all their properties in common, including spatial and 
temporal location) are in fact the same object.  That is, they are numerically identical. 
(Leibniz 1969)  Numerical identity is used to describe the relationship that something has to 
itself, and this is often understood in terms of how the identity of a given object persists over 
time: what it is that makes the pen on my desk the same pen that was in my pocket yesterday, 
and not just a pen of the same physical appearance and made of similar materials. 
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 Qualitative identity may be helpful to some extent, in that it can potentially give us 
tools to talk about how individuals fit into categories such as species, genus, culture etc.  It 
can also be used to rank organisms as sentient or intelligent to a greater or lesser extent than 
each other (in a given respect, a pig may have a higher level of qualitative identity with a 
human being than an ant, but a lesser degree of qualitative identity with a human being than a 
bonobo).  However, this is a fairly straightforward thought, and not altogether in line with 
what we need from a theory of identity.  Even if qualitative identity helps us to describe what 
a species is, it doesn‘t on its own help us to understand what might be meant by the unity, 
wholeness or integrity of a species, organism or person.  To do this, we need a theory about 
what makes the species, organism or person itself, and not just about how it relates to others. 
 Can numerical identity be any help to us?  Certainly, we are asking questions about 
what makes a person or a creature that person or creature, and what it is for that identity to be 
eroded or fragmented.  However, theories of identity of objects as famously understood by 
Frege and Quine can only get us so far (Quine 1963, Frege 1969).  It makes no substantial 
difference according to these theories whether we are talking about the numerical identity of 
a rock, a bicycle, a plant, a monkey or a man.  We need a specific account (or some specific 
accounts) of identity that describe a ‗thicker‘ sense of identity than the rather thin and 
abstract concept of numerical identity can accommodate.  We need an account that 
distinguishes the sort of identity that people have from the sorts of identity that inanimate 
objects have.  Unless there are further moral consequences, nobody would accuse me of 
performing an immoral act if I deconstruct my bicycle and sell its constituent parts.  There 
has to be something that confers a special kind of identity on humans (and perhaps on other 
organisms) that numerical identity cannot cover.  To put it differently, we are looking for 
something rather more akin to a theory of personal identity. 
 
219 
 
3. Personal Identity 
 
We need to understand why it is important to maintain the integrity of identity of humans and 
some non-human animals, but not of bicycles or rocks
1
.  This must be something closer to 
what is meant by personal identity, although it would be very hasty to assume at this point 
that identity of the relevant sort can only be displayed by those whom we might categorise as 
persons.  This is because ‗person‘ may be taken to be a purely moral category, denoting those 
organisms to which we afford special moral importance.  For example, in his article 
‗Abortion and Infanticide‘, Michael Tooley uses the term ―as a purely moral concept, free of 
all descriptive content.‖ (Tooley 1972, p. 40) and James Rachels and William Ruddick have 
very little time for the concept because it is a ―prescriptive or normative notion with 
pointedly little descriptive content‖ (Rachels and Ruddick 1989, p. 225). 
According to these interpretations, ‗person‘, if we are to use it at all, assumes that 
those whom we label ‗persons‘ have a special type of moral status.  But as we have seen, 
there are some who would regard trees, species and ecosystems as morally important in their 
own right, and even if we agree with them it would still seem a leap too far to describe these 
entities as persons.  To use a term such as ‗personal identity‘ to describe the types of identity 
that we regard as morally important would thus put us in danger of begging the question. 
4. Biological Identity 
 
The entities which are regarded as having moral importance in their own rights are usually 
biological, at least in part.  Humans, animals and plants are all biological organisms, and 
ecosystems, environments and the much heralded Gaia, while not necessarily to be 
considered wholly biological, have biological components which are essential to their 
                                                          
1
 There are some thinkers who argue that natural objects such as rocks do have some kind of moral standing, 
such that there is a prima facie demand that we protect their integrity.  My aim here is not to dismiss such views, 
but rather to attempt to establish why, in normal discourse, we do not regard inorganic natural objects in this 
way.  I wish to identify some feature of humans and animals that distinguishes them from ‗mere things‘, in that 
they are proper objects of moral regard.  Later I will claim that we may be able to attribute moral importance to 
some ‗mere things‘ (I will give the example of Ayers Rock) in terms of the roles that they play in human or 
animal identities, although this will not amount to describing them as being the proper subjects of rights. 
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function and identity.  Thus it seems that biological theories of identity may be one very 
sensible place to start.  Some thinkers regard the significant criterion of human or personal 
identity to be a biological one, and human lives thus to be understood as biological lives.  
They argue that ―we are essentially human animals, not minds or persons, and that our 
persistence conditions are biological, not psychological.‖ (DeGrazia 2005, p. 8).  What is 
meant by the claim that we are essentially biological entities, rather than psychological ones?  
David DeGrazia‘s answer is that what we are essentially is the thing that we cannot cease to 
be and still remain us.  He gives the example of Ariel, a college student.  At some point in the 
future she will cease to be a college student and yet remain herself.  DeGrazia maintains that 
she is still herself as long as she is the same biological organism: 
Ariel can exist qua person only if she retains... mental life.  But, if I am right, Ariel 
can exist, even as a nonperson, so long as the human animal that she is, survives – in 
which case continuing the life of a particular human animal is her de re persistence 
condition, and being a particular (living) human animal is her essence.  In general, X 
is an essential property of a thing if that thing cannot exist without having property X.  
If property X is both necessary and sufficient for the thing‘s existence, then X is the 
essence of that thing. ( p. 29) 
 
DeGrazia provides five related major reasons for supposing that we are essentially biological, 
rather than psychological (personal) entities: 
1. The ―fetus problem‖: It makes sense to say that I was once a foetus.  Foetuses lack 
psychological capacities, so there once was an entity that was me but was not a 
psychological person. 
2. ―The problem of explaining the relationship between you, the person, and the early 
human organism‖: What happened to the foetal predecessor when the person 
emerged?  It doesn‘t seems a fair description to say that it died, which is how we 
understand the end of a biological life, but to say that its existence continues would be 
to maintain that two numerically distinct beings are associated with one body, which 
also seems implausible. 
3. ―The challenge of explaining the relationship between you and the permanently 
unconscious being that will succeed you if you enter a PVS [Permanent vegetative 
state] before biological death occurs‖: If personhood ends when psychological 
capacity ends, how does the biological organism that exists in the PVS originate?  It 
does not appear to have come into being in any of the usual ways that we understand 
the origins of biological life. 
4. ―The problem of implying that we are not animals‖: In the case of the PVS, we might 
maintain that the person has died, but the biological animal persists.  This implies that 
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the person cannot be the animal.  The person is therefore not an animal, ―apparently 
contradicting biological fact‖ 
5. ―A problem about counting conscious beings‖: we generally presume that ―higher‖ 
animals are conscious.  If we suppose that we are persons rather than animals (see 
above) there would appear to be two conscious beings, one a person, one an animal, 
coexisting in the same physical space. (paraphrased from DeGrazia 2005, 31-32) 
 
There is not time here to analyse these arguments in great depth, and they are not without 
their flaws (what, for example, if we were to suppose that the foetus is not me, but merely 
something that changes into me?).  But it is certainly true that even if we are not at the most 
fundamental level biological entities, whatever type of existence we have is usually 
contingent upon our biological existence, and biological factors will have an important 
relation to whatever type of identity that we do have.  Theories of biological identity might fit 
well with much of the work that has been done by many authors to support the moral status of 
animals and to develop an environmental ethic.  A view which identifies us as human 
organisms suggests a degree of continuity with other life on the planet which cannot be 
supported by more dualistic approaches.  This notion of continuity is often regarded as more 
environmentally ethical than views which make stark distinctions between man and nature, 
although as I argued in chapter four and elsewhere, it is not necessarily the notion of a duality 
that is destructive, rather it is the way in which dualisms can on some occasions lead to 
unnecessary divisions and simplifications. 
So according to a biological view of identity, what determines the continuity of my 
identity over time is the continuity of a certain set of biological processes.  So how are we to 
understand these processes and the ways in which they determine identity?  The following is 
Eric Olson‘s answer to this question: 
The parts of an organism, like those of a fine watch, are connected together in such a 
way that each has a role to play in enabling the organism to achieve its ends—survival 
and reproduction. No part can fulfil its function without the others; the entire structure 
will collapse... unless all or nearly all of its parts do what they are supposed to do... it 
seems reasonable to say that a living organism is anything that has these ―life-giving‖ 
features—metabolism, teleology, organized complexity—and whatever further 
properties necessarily go along with them, such as self-directed growth and 
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development, an internal genetic plan, low internal entropy, and perhaps the capacity 
for evolution by natural selection. (Olson, 1997, pp. 128-130) 
 
So, according to Olson, the important features that we are looking for must be a complex 
interweaving of dynamic systems which interact to ensure the survival (and perhaps 
reproduction) of the organism.  The different systems are all significant to one another‘s 
functions, and together form one self-sustaining structure.  This can be distinguished from, 
say, a human kidney removed from a body and kept ‗alive‘ by a machine.  The kidney does 
not behave as any kind of self-directing or self-sustaining unit.  Olson also articulates the 
concept of an organism through setting it in contrast to its environment.  An organism is a 
unified whole which has a ―self-controlled boundary‖ through which it interacts with its 
environment ( p. 130). 
Olson explains the intuition of the importance of the brain in identity, not in terms of 
a psychological theory of identity, but rather in virtue of the special organising and sustaining 
role that the brain plays in the function of the body.  He argues that were we to remove an 
organism‘s brainstem and add an artificial brainstem that would fulfil its functions (even in 
the presence of almost complete psychological continuity) the identity of the organism would 
not persist because it would no longer be self-regulating and self-sustaining.  The artificial 
brainstem is not a part of the organism, and nor is a pacemaker or a dialysis machine: 
It makes no difference whether the machine is inside your skin.  The Jezail bullet Dr. 
Watson carried around inside his shoulder was never a part of him. Strictly speaking, 
it was a part of his environment. We cannot add parts to an animal by implanting 
rocks into its abdominal cavity. And what goes for your dialysis machine and 
Watson's bullet goes for the artificial brainstem as well. It is not caught up in the 
metabolic processes going on in Tom's headless remains; so it is no more a part of any 
living organism than your dialysis machine is a part of a living organism. Thus, there 
is no animal made up of Tom's headless remains together with some mechanical or 
electronic contraption. ( p. 135) 
 
But is Olson correct in drawing so stark a division between the living organism and its 
environment?  Perhaps the notion of a self-regulated ‗boundary‘ which marks where the 
living organism ends and its environment begins is altogether too convenient.  A theory 
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which states that we are biological entities must take some account of biological theories 
about what an organism is.  Many such theories reject the view that an organism (or at least 
the proper object of our concern when examining organic life) is a neat parcel of organs 
wrapped in skin which forms a clear boundary between the internal organism and its external 
environment. 
To take a parallel from a non-biological account, compare the way that David Cooper 
describes an environment with its networks of meaning and signification conferring 
wholeness, and the description of the biological organism quoted from Eric Olson, according 
to which an organism‘s biological processes are interwoven and mutually supportive ‗like 
those of a fine watch‘.  There does seem to be some case for arguing (against Olson) that, just 
as the functioning internal parts of an organism might be considered to be criteria of its 
identity, elements of its external environment which perform a similar role may be just as 
important in understanding that organism‘s identity.  It might therefore be argued that we 
cannot decouple the organism from its environment in this way, and that its identity extends 
into the world.  It can be responded that Cooper is discussing an organism‘s intentional 
relationships with its surroundings, while the types of processes that Olson describes are on a 
different, biological level.  This is certainly true, but as we will see, similar claims may be 
made about an organism‘s biological relationship with its environment. 
 These claims can be made with varying degrees of strength, making the environment 
more or less integral to the identity of the organism and in a variety of different ways.  To 
illustrate the point, let us imagine we were to meet someone who had never heard of a tiger.  
We want to demonstrate to them what it means for something to be a tiger.  We might take 
them to the zoo so that they could see tigers close at hand.  They would soon ascertain that a 
tiger was a large, striped creature with four legs and whiskers.  But what would the 
experience of seeing the tiger in a zoo teach them beyond that?  They might suppose that a 
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tiger is a type of creature that walks around in small circles and that eats meat that has already 
been slaughtered by another creature.  If we really want to demonstrate what a tiger is 
actually like, we must show it in its natural habitat, the place in which it has evolved, where it 
exhibits traits and behaviours that we regard as natural to that creature, rather than imposed 
from outside. 
Roberts of Born Free USA ..says ...―Money spent on zoo tigers should be spent on 
protecting habitat for wild tigers. "There's an expenditure of millions if not tens of 
millions of dollars on captive tigers. If we really want tigers and not just a shell of the 
beast we call the tiger, the real emphasis needs to be first and foremost in the field." 
(McCarthy 2008, emphasis mine) 
 
This view is not confined to animal rights activists and environmental campaigners, but is 
also (as we shall now see) important to the methodology of biological research. 
(4a) Evolutionary Theory 
 
Although external factors have in some way shaped the tiger‘s evolution, and its natural traits 
are products of external influence, they have over countless generations been internalised in 
the very coding of the creatures.  Evolution dissolves the distinction between what is internal 
and external to a creature.  The outside environment has been internalised.  The distinction 
between the creature and its surroundings is only made sharp when the surroundings do not 
resemble the natural environment of the creature and have not been internalised in this way.  
This thought is in line with Richard Dawkins‘ ‗extended phenotype‘ thesis, which argues that 
a creature‘s phenotype (the observable characteristics of an organism) cannot be understood 
as existing within the boundaries of the flesh of that creature, but rather extends out into the 
creature‘s environment. (Dawkins 1982)  He considers the case of a caddis fly, which builds 
a shell from minerals that occur in its natural environment.  Dawkins argues that in any 
relevant sense, this ‗shell‘ is no less a part of the organism‘s phenotype than the shell of a 
snail or a mollusc. 
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 Other theories in biology go even further than this, suggesting that not only is natural 
selection a means by which organisms are able to internalise their external natural 
environment, but that the causal links between the organism and its environment are more 
complex and reciprocal than Dawkins‘ theory can accommodate.  Developmental systems 
theory argues that genes are only one aspect of a large developmental system, in which 
organisms and the environment mould and develop one another.  We should thus look 
beyond the internal biology of the individual to the whole system.  This then is not simply a 
case of the external environment being internalised in the genetic coding of the individual and 
species, or influencing the individual‘s phenotype.  The environment in its raw, uncoded form 
is inextricably bound up with the creature‘s development and identity, and in turn, the 
creature changes and develops the environment of which it is a part.
1
 
 For example, Richard Lewontin argues that the Darwinian method of viewing the 
organism unrealistically alienates it from its external environment ―by making an absolute 
separation between the internal processes that generate the organism and the external 
processes, the environment, in which the organism must operate‖ (Lewontin 2000, p. 42).  
Instead, he argues that a central feature of biological organisms is that they do not exhibit a 
rigid boundary between what is external and what is internal: 
The softness of the boundary between inside and outside is a universal characteristic 
of living systems... At every moment natural selection is operating to change the 
genetic composition of populations in response to the momentary environment, but as 
that composition changes it forces a concomitant change in the environment itself.  
Thus organism and environment are both causes and effects in a coevolutionary 
process. (pp. 125-6) 
 
Lewontin provides a great number of biological examples to back up his case, but in a sense, 
he is saying nothing that we do not already know once we consider it.  We are, and have 
always been, aware that life on this planet (human and otherwise) is active upon its 
                                                          
1
 The thoughts in this thesis on evolutionary theory owe much to some suggestions from Beth Hannon, for 
which I am very grateful.  I am also indebted to Beth for the thought that work on extended cognition could be 
relevant to this thesis. 
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environment.  To take an example from non-academic life, farmers have practised crop 
rotation to maintain the condition of the soil for centuries, indeed in some parts of the world 
for thousands of years
1.  This would not be the case if it weren‘t for practical knowledge 
about the ways in which plants can alter the environments in which they grow.  Even when 
many farmers replaced crop rotation with intensive agriculture in the aftermath of the second 
world war, they recognised the effects of organisms upon environments in the application of 
far greater quantities of artificial fertilizers to replace nutrients lost from the soil, and now 
many of the disadvantages of this type of monoculture are being increasingly recognized, 
hammering the point home even further.  This may be taken as an underestimation of the 
radical nature of Lewontin‘s claims, but this is not the case.  My point is that the view of 
organisms as simply passively influenced by their changing environments has never held 
sway in practical life in the way that it frequently has in evolutionary theory.  This reinforces 
the need for a new way of regarding biological organisms that tallies with the way that we 
have always known them to behave. 
 Not only have we been aware for millennia of the effects of organisms upon their 
environments, we have also been aware at least since Darwin and probably before, of the 
extent to which environments shape organisms.
2
  Over the course of the twentieth century, it 
has become increasingly apparent how intimate these two-way relationships are.  In a sense 
then, Lewontin‘s thesis has given a definite shape to a growing body of biological research. 
So if we take developmental systems theory, or indeed the extended phenotype thesis, 
seriously, then Olson is rather quick in his supposition that biological organisms have clear, 
                                                          
1
 While usually associated in this country with the middle ages and the subsequent developments during the 
British Agricultural Revolution, there is evidence of crop rotation of various kinds in ancient Greece and Rome 
(White 1970) receiving even a brief mention in the first book of Virgil‘s Georgics (Virgil 2004, I, 43-49 and 63-
70).  It is also thought to have origins in parts of Africa and Asia (see the Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2009 
entry on ―Crop Rotation‖) with significant developments during the Arab Agricultural Revolution in the eighth 
to thirteenth centuries (Watson 1983). 
2
 To give an early example, the ninth century Islamic scholar Al-Jahiz writes about  the role of environment in 
determining the features of animals, and a ‗struggle for survival‘ in his Book of Animals (Zirkle 1941). 
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self-regulated boundaries that distinguish them sharply from their external environments.  To 
a greater or lesser extent, our biological identity appears to be at least partially constituted by 
our environment.  The old hegemony of internal ‗self‘ and external ‗other‘ does not seem to 
describe the world as many biologists observe it.  For this reason, if we are to embrace 
DeGrazia and Olson‘s thesis that we are essentially biological entities, our essential identities 
are fundamentally bound up in our environments. 
5. Psychological/ Cognitive Identity 
 
But biological theories are by no means the only (or the most popular) way to understand 
personal identity.  Even if it is true that in a certain basic sense we are essentially biological 
entities, this does not necessarily mean that it is this biological identity that is of most 
fundamental importance to our moral or practical concerns.  The fact that I was once a foetus 
and may one day be in a PVS does not automatically imply that the ‗me‘ that existed then and 
may exist in the future is worthy of the same level of moral consideration as the ‗me‘ that 
exists for the time that I am conscious.  We should not confuse the sense of ‗essential‘ which 
refers to a thing‘s essence with the less technical sense of the word that refers to what is of 
utmost importance or what must be done.  Our biological identity is certainly important – I 
have written here and in previous chapters about the dangers of forgetting that we are animals 
or a part of the natural world – but it is not going to tell us the whole story about what matters 
to us and about us as people and as creatures of the world. 
Proponents of biological criteria of personal identity are often arguing in response to 
neo-Lockean psychological theories of personal identity.  According to such theories, the 
main criterion for identity (and the persistence of identity over time) is mental – 
psychological or cognitive – and commonly understood in terms of the persistence of 
memory.  What makes me myself is a particular set of stable personality traits, ideas, 
memories, or a continuous relation or flow of these traits, ideas or memories.  We might 
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expect theories that situate identity in the mind to place less importance on the person‘s 
environment as an aspect of his or her identity.  This is clearly going to be the case if we hold 
the view that what determines my identity is my consciousness, or the thoughts and 
impressions that occupy what we might regard as the ‗foreground‘ of our minds.  My 
environment might be reflected in my internal consciousness, but this is a world away from 
saying that it is a constituent of it.  My environment, while I am often aware of it, does not 
itself form part of my being aware, part of my subjectivity.  How can it be? Trees, buildings 
and rocks cannot experience things, so how can they be part of this mysterious inner ‗me‘ 
that is defined by my experiences? 
To answer this, we need to realise there are considerable problems with understanding 
identity just in terms of the things of which we are conscious.  There are recognised problems 
with a Lockean memory-based account.  A person can arguably persist through memory loss 
if they retain certain values and character traits: 
Though it is memory that makes us aware of our own continued existence over time, 
the various other continuities [values, character traits etc.] have great importance.  We 
may believe that they have enough importance to provide personal identity even in the 
absence of memory. (Parfit 1984, p. 208) 
 
A feature of these background traits and dispositions is that we are not always consciously 
aware of them.  My set of values does not occupy the foreground of my consciousness at any 
given moment.  Indeed, in the case of certain things that we might regard as constitutive of a 
person‘s identity (personality traits, talents etc.) they may never be apparent to the person in 
question, but only to external observers.  It would seem that a plausible mental or 
psychological account of personal identity must involve more than simply the conscious 
experiences or memories of the person in question.  In fact, many psychological theories 
would claim that a great deal of what is significant about a person‘s individual identity relates 
to what goes on in their ‗subconscious‘ mind.  If this is the case, is it still plausible to say that 
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such an account of personal identity must preserve a sharp boundary between the self and the 
environment? 
(5a) Extended Cognition 
 
Psychological theories of personal identity might initially be thought to retain a sharply 
drawn distinction between self and other.  Such a view is not immediately incompatible with 
Lewontin‘s views about biological organisms, since if we do not hold a biological criterion 
for personal identity, we need not assume that everything that can be true of how biological 
organisms are defined is true of how we define ourselves.  Thus we could agree that an 
organism‘s identity is partially constituted by environment, but reject the notion that this 
holds true for the psychological self.  Perhaps the natural conclusion of such a view would be 
that non-sentient organisms are best understood in terms of their environments, but that the 
most striking or relevant features of sentient beings (and perhaps especially human beings) 
are not to be understood in this way. 
 There are a number of points that can be made against this type of view.  Firstly, to 
say that our most striking or relevant features are psychological ones is not the same as the 
denial that we have any other important features.  The assumption that what should be most 
valued or prized about my being is whatever goes on in my mind does not provide reasons to 
reject altogether the importance of my existence as a biological organism.  It might be 
claimed that what matters about me is psychological, but what matters to me and for me is 
often not.  My very psychology is bound up with the interests that I have in my physical and 
biological being.  If that physical and biological being extends beyond the boundaries of my 
skin, then so does the extent of my self-interest.  In this sense the biological organism does 
matter to my identity, all the more so because the psychological self identifies with it.  For 
example, the psychological self usually has a gender that conforms to biological sex. 
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A second reason to reject the stark distinction between self and environment on the 
psychological model is that aspects of the mental, as well as the biological, may extend 
beyond the brain and skull and into the environment.  The environment might be thought to 
be an essential aspect of one‘s identity if, for example, it plays an essential role in one‘s 
cognitive processes.  This claim may be asserted with varying degrees of strength.  At its 
most minimal, it may take the form of the view that at least some important cognitive 
processes and activities are only possible if the mind is allowed to interact with certain 
features of the external environment.  In a more radical form, it might be argued that the mind 
itself is extended beyond the skin of the individual organism, and hence that the self is 
constituted in part by features of its environment. 
 The weaker claim could be supported by anyone who believes that many of our 
cognitive processes are dependent on what we encounter and observe.  So, for example, if it 
is thought that we would not be able to have certain ideas about number or categories in the 
absence of an observable environment, then the environment is essential to many of the 
important functions of our cognitive processes.  A human being or a non-human animal 
without certain things in their environment would not be a human being or whatever type of 
animal that they are in the absence of certain features of their environment that allow them to 
develop cognitive characteristics that we attribute to that type of creature.  They would be in 
a sense cognitively incomplete, fragmented or deficient without these features.  What would 
be violated by removing them from their environment, or destroying their environment, 
would be things that are central to their flourishing and their identity.  Environment would 
therefore be regarded as a necessary condition of the type of life that we recognise as 
valuable. 
 The stronger claim calls upon theories of extended cognition to a much greater extent, 
arguing that features of the environment are not just prerequisites for the function of certain 
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cognitive processes, but are actually themselves functioning parts of those very processes.
1
  
This is very much the type of theory suggested by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998).  
They suggest that we should adopt an ―active externalism, based on the active role of the 
environment in driving cognitive processes‖ (p. 1).  What Chalmers and Clark mean by this is 
that aspects of the environment are not just props that cognitive processes latch on to, rather, 
the way that we shape the external environment and that it feeds back into our cognitive 
processes give it a much more integral and active role: 
The human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.  All 
the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does.  If we remove the 
external component the system‘s behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if 
we removed part of the brain.  Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts 
equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head. (p. 2) 
 
This is in its own way a very radical claim.  If it is true, what we have grown up to regard as 
our internal private realm actually extends out into the world.  Even our mental processes 
cannot necessarily be regarded as ‗internal‘ in any meaningful sense.  Clark and Chalmers are 
quick to point out that extended cognition does not necessarily imply an extended 
consciousness, which as we have already seen seems far less plausible, but what it does imply 
is that thought itself is not an entirely ‗internal‘ process.  They back this view up with support 
from the cognitive sciences, and on the grounds that it provides a simple, natural explanation 
for many mental processes in which we engage.  To take an example likely to be familiar to 
anyone reading this thesis, consider Matthew Ratcliffe‘s application of these ideas to the 
process of writing a piece of academic work: 
To produce the final draft of this chapter, I used external resources in a variety of 
ways.  Many of the ideas were generated by engaging with others‘ work and 
discussing ideas with them.  I did not retain these ideas ‗in my head‘ but took detailed 
notes of references, quotations, claims, arguments and a range of my own semi-
developed views.  I then sat at a computer, surrounded by a nest of notes, sketched a 
                                                          
1
 The use of terms such as ‗function‘ and ‗processes‘ are not intended to suggest a mechanistic approach.  I use 
them because they are commonly applied in philosophy of mind, but it would, I suggest, be a mistake to take 
these metaphors too seriously. 
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rough plan, added in some key quotations, elaborated some points, wrote a few 
successive drafts, used a computer spell-checker, printed out the finished product, 
marked certain passages and made critical notes, typed out a revised draft, read the 
book as a whole and then further fine-tuned this chapter.  During the process of 
writing and rewriting, ideas came to me that I had not thought of before, as though the 
act of writing itself were partly responsible for their genesis.  Furthermore, while 
reading through a printed draft chapter, I found myself able to see ambiguities and 
weaknesses in the argument that I had not been aware of before writing it or while 
writing it. (Ratcliffe 2007, pp. 109-110) 
 
Ratcliffe observes that the cognitive processes involved in formulating his ideas do not all 
seem to happen purely ‗inside his head‘.  There is an interplay between mind and the external 
world that generates his thoughts, even at the abstract level of writing a chapter in a 
philosophical work. 
But recall that many theories of psychological identity revolve not around cognitive 
processes as such, but around things such as memories, dispositions, values and beliefs.  Does 
the view that some of our cognitive processes extend into the environment mean that the 
mind itself - or whatever we believe it is that has these memories, dispositions and so on - is 
extended?  Clark and Chalmers believe that it is, or at least that it can be.  They argue in 
particular that our beliefs can exist in the ‗external‘ environment, rather than in our minds.  
They use the example of Otto, an Alzheimer‘s disease sufferer, who keeps vital information 
in a notebook that he carries with him at all times.  The notebook plays the role for Otto that 
biological memory would usually play.  So, if he hears of an exhibition that he wants to go to 
at the Museum of Modern Art, he checks his notebook for the location: 
Clearly, Otto walked to 53
rd
 Street because he wanted to go to the museum and he 
believed the museum was on 53
rd
 Street.  And just as Inga had her belief even before 
she consulted her memory, it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the museum 
was on 53
rd
 Street even before consulting his notebook.  For in relevant respects the 
cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory 
plays for Inga.  The information in his notebook functions just like the information 
constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies 
beyond the skin. (p. 6) 
 
This is not just how things are for Otto, an Altzheimer‘s sufferer.  It has been widely 
observed by many folklorists that their informants from non-literate oral traditions have 
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enormous aural memory capacity.  Most people in literate societies do not share this capacity 
because we have transferred the material that would have been ‗stored‘ in our memories 
‗beyond the skin‘ to written media.1  This suggests that it is commonplace to use features of 
the external world in roughly the same ways that we use some of our ‗internal‘ mental 
faculties.  A natural conclusion to draw from this is that we need, to some extent, to rethink 
how we understand the identity of the self.  If we accept a psychological or cognitive theory 
of personal identity, and our psychology and cognition, and if my thought processes do not 
end at the boundary of my skin, this suggests that elements of my self are continuous with my 
environment.  This conclusion is touched on by Clark and Chalmers: 
What, finally, of the self?  Does the extended mind imply an extended self?  It seems 
so.  Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; 
my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense part of who I 
am... To consistently resist this conclusion, we would have to shrink the self into a 
mere bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep psychological 
continuity.  Far better to take the broader view, and see agents themselves as spread 
into the world. (p. 9) 
 
Note that this view about psychological or cognitive identity appears to be a direct mirror of 
Lewontin‘s views about biological identity.  Not only does the environment play an important 
role in determining the identity of the individual, but this is a two-way process.  The sense in 
which the boundary between individual and environment is eroded is created by the fact that 
the individual alters and adapts their environment, which in turn plays an important role in 
altering and adapting the individual (this is what is meant in the earlier quotation by a ‗two-
way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own 
right‘).  Note also that the views to which these theories are responding appear to contrast 
with each other.  Lewontin‘s views about the role of biological organism, gene and 
environment are presented in response to a view in which the environment is active, ―the 
organisms themselves being nothing but the passive medium through which we see the 
                                                          
1
 I am very grateful to John McKinnell for this example.  See Bowra (1966, pp. 429-30) and Ong (1982, p. 146) 
for specific examples of this phenomenon. 
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external world‖ (Lewontin 2000, p. 44).  Clark and Chalmers by contrast argue against a 
‗standard‘ version of externalism, according to which ―the relevant external features are 
passive.  Because of their distal nature, they play no role in driving the cognitive processes in 
the here and now‖ (p. 2).  This is significant if we believe that there ought to be some kind of 
parallel between what we observe at the biological level and what we observe at the cognitive 
level.  Whether this would be a reasonable supposition is not something that I can comment 
on in significant detail, but we might have some reason for holding that, if cognitive 
processes supervene on biological ones, we might expect to see parallels between the two in 
these respects.  If this is the case, then an active externalism coupled with a developmental 
systems approach might seem more harmonious than a ‗standard‘ externalism combined with 
a ‗standard‘ Darwinian biology.  Indeed, if we want to retain the notion that there is some 
validity in both the Darwinian approach and the ‗standard‘ externalism, we might well wish 
to modify both of these views by introducing the notion of a two-way process, rather than 
simply denying the active force of either the organism or its environment.  Were it simply a 
one-way process, the distinction between what is internal and what is external, what is active 
and what is passive would remain, but once the process is understood in terms of ‗coupled 
systems‘, these distinctions become less significant. 
Clark and Chalmers also briefly mention that theirs could be a view with ethical and 
social implications, suggesting that ―it may be, for example, that in some cases interfering 
with someone‘s environment will have the same moral significance as interfering with their 
person‖ (p.9).  This would of course only apply in cases where aspects of the environment are 
in fact - or could be predicted with a high degree of probability to be in the future - part of 
someone‘s cognitive processes.  Not only must this be the case, but we may also suggest that 
this is only true when something else that is readily available cannot do the same job, and 
where the cognitive processes involved are central or important aspects of the person‘s 
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identity.  Nonetheless, the notion that our selves extend into the environment, and that this 
can have serious moral implications, is a powerful one, and potentially a way of 
understanding ourselves that could have very positive implications for environmental 
philosophy.  As Clark and Chalmers put it, ―once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, 
we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world‖ (p.9). 
6. Narrative Identity 
 
Some theories of personal identity portray a person‘s life as an ongoing self-written narrative.  
Thus we should see human identity in terms of the cohesive ongoing narrative that an 
individual creates.  It is argued that this approach accounts for our usual practical concerns in 
a more convincing way than other accounts of identity: 
The question ―What am I?‖ seldom arises, except among the very philosophical. The 
question ―Who am I?‖ is more common.  It might raise the issue of numerical identity 
but, if someone asks the latter question in earnest, she probably suffers from amnesia 
or another mental disturbance. The more ordinary sense of ―Who am I?‖ inquires 
about one‘s identity in a familiar sense of the term that we may call narrative identity. 
Such related questions as ―Who shall I become?‖ or ―In what direction should I take 
my life?‖ ask about what we may call self-creation. (DeGrazia 2005, p. 78) 
 
DeGrazia‘s view is that numerical identity, understood in a biological way, is necessary in 
order for us to pursue our practical concerns, but it is not sufficient.  While we do have an 
interest in maintaining our biological lives, these lives are given meaning and significance by 
our conscious experiences, as outlined in a Lockean psychological account, and also by our 
projects, values, aspirations, and so on (whether they are conscious or subconscious).  It is 
important to us that we are subjects of experiences, but also that we are agents who act upon 
the world and shape our own destinies.  This involves the ability to identify with our future 
selves, and have hopes and aspirations about what becomes of us. 
Another way to capture how we value psychological continuity is to think in terms of 
our self-narratives or inner stories. Each of us has a mental autobiography, an 
extremely detailed story of what we have experienced and done and a perhaps less 
detailed account of what we intend, or at least hope, to experience and do. This 
autobiography is not a mere listing of personal events and intentions. The story is 
richly colored by a sense of one‘s own beliefs, desires, values, and character – which 
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affect which events are remembered and how they are remembered, make sense of 
and even help determine plans for the future, and shape the overall self-conception of 
an enduring protagonist. (DeGrazia 2005, p. 80) 
 
DeGrazia maintains that when an individual‘s basic needs are satisfied, he or she is able to 
engage in the active narration of their own life stories, and that this self-narration is one of the 
things that we value when we say that someone‘s life is going well.  In this respect, liberty 
and autonomy is an important element of the narrative view, a point that I will return to later. 
Another observation that can be made is that, while we speak of ‗a life narrative‘ many lives 
seem to lack one consistent narrative thread.  This is not simply to say that one occupies 
many roles during one‘s life and that one can be many things to many different people, but 
that sometimes a life may lack a lived cohesion to the person who experiences it.  Present 
events may not make sense in the context of past events, and past events may not come to 
invite new nuances or meanings in the light of what happens subsequently.  In a sense then, 
some lives may lack a unified narrative flow.  Some authors write of the importance of a 
sense of unity in a person‘s narrative.  While our biological identities (understood, in 
DeGrazia‘s view, in terms of numerical identity) remain consistent throughout our biological 
lives, our narrative identities may be fractured and lack unity.  This can be a destructive and 
negative force in a person‘s life.  Thus it is not just liberty and autonomy, but also a certain 
unity, which serves as a measure of when someone‘s life is going well: 
In what does the unity of an individual life consist?  The answer is that its unity is the 
unity of a narrative embodied in a single life.  To ask ‗what is good for me?‘ is to ask 
how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion.  To ask ‗What is the 
good for man?‘ is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in 
common. (MacIntyre 2007, pp. 218-9) 
 
So what might lend a coherence or unity to our lives?  Part of this will relate to the way that 
events in our life hold significance in terms of each other.  Philosophical questions that I 
asked my parents as a child (and the responses that I received) might loom large in my 
personal narrative because of the course that my life has taken.  If instead I had chosen to 
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become a farmer, other events from my childhood might have been singled out as significant 
to my narrative.  But these events, and the significance that we lend to them, do not exist in a 
cultural vacuum.  We are able to make some sense of our lives and the roles that we occupy 
because we have notions of which lives can be lived and which roles can be occupied.  These 
notions arise from wider cultural narratives that inform our ideas about identity.  So for 
Alasdair MacIntyre for example, narrative is not just the prerogative of the individual 
narrator.  Our narratives are partially shaped by the personal, cultural, and historical backdrop 
against which we perform.  The roles in which I cast myself, and the ways in which I relate to 
the world, are informed by factors that have their origins long before my birth: 
The story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from 
which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from 
that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships.  The 
possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide. 
(MacIntyre 2007, p. 221) 
 
I have already made the case in the first chapter for the view that an understanding of our 
present moral concepts and values must be sensitive to the history of those values, taking on 
board Mary Midgley‘s point that, for example, our current ways of thinking are shaped by 
patterns of thought that evolved in the ancient world.  Narrative theories of identity take this 
point to another level.  If we think that our histories and cultures are woven through our 
identities, then this must surely have an impact upon how we articulate what is valuable about 
human life and human activity.  Moral theories that rely on notions of personal identity must 
take account of the extent to which our identities are formed by historical and social factors.  
The history of our ideas is therefore not only useful in helping us to understand what role 
those ideas might play today, but is also a factor in helping us understand what sort of beings 
we are.  Successive events in history have not simply given us new ways of thinking about 
the world (to take a pertinent example, the revisions of right-based moral language that tend 
to occur at times of political upheaval) they have also been incorporated into our story about 
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what we are.  This may help us to think our way through objections that ‗moral entities‘ such 
as rights are bizarre metaphysical fictions.  Beings like us have rights embedded in our 
personal narratives because we have a cultural life and cultural history that requires these 
ways of thinking.  This does not necessarily reduce to a cultural relativist conception of 
morality, simply to the view that certain modes of moral discourse are appropriate to certain 
historical realities.  Remember also that while our narratives might change in response to the 
cultural conditions that we inhabit, the fact that we are the type of beings who create 
narratives will not.  This means that those identities that we construct are likely to have a 
moral importance regardless of the precise shapes that our stories take.  It is also notable that 
(perhaps partially in response to psychological and biological facts about the types of beings 
that we are) many patterns of myth, and also presumably the personal narratives that reflect 
them, are repeated time and time again across a multitude of cultures.  This is not to say that 
if you scratch the surface, our values and concepts are all the same at heart.  This is simply 
not true, and at worst pernicious, allowing us to regard all perpetrators of evil acts as simply 
people who got lost somewhere on the road between value and action.  Instead my claim is 
that while our identities and self-conceptions are heavily influenced by cultural factors, this 
does not make us complete aliens to one another (i.e. to those whose cultures or backgrounds 
differ significantly from ours). 
If we take these views seriously, human or personal identity cannot be understood 
simply at the level of the individual.  Once we ask questions about what it is that makes a 
particular person who they are, the world floods in.  In fact, we should not even see it in 
terms of the world ‗coming in‘ from outside.  The cultural and historical environment that an 
individual inherits is already there, very much present at the heart of his or her personal 
identity.  But what we are talking about here is the ‗cultural environment‘, the world of 
norms, roles, ideals and so on that is created by groups of human beings.  Does this bear any 
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significant relation to the physical environment, or is it simply a convenient use of metaphor?  
What role, if any, does our natural and physical environment play in the creation of our 
personal narratives? 
 Part of the answer to this is going to come back to what has already been said about 
cognition.  If our thought processes extend into the world, then so, surely, do our narratives.  
Consider again Otto‘s notebook.  The record that he keeps is a record of the things that are 
significant to him.  It is a self-selected chronicle of the things that he values.  He would not 
after all write down the location of the Museum of Modern Art if that were not a place that he 
could envision himself visiting.  We all do similar things.  We create things, accumulate 
things, and surround ourselves with things in order to aid our memories, give us certain 
experiences, put us in mind of past events and future aspirations, and so on.  The objects that 
we accumulate, the things that we create, and the way that we arrange things in our own 
immediate environments are not simply a reflection of the narratives that we create, they are a 
part of them.  Were I to shape my environment in a way that was not consistent with my self-
professed life narrative I might be accused of being inauthentic or misleading in the stories 
that I tell about myself.  For example, a friend might reasonably ask ‗Why do you claim to be 
a Lou Reed fan if you have none of his records but own the entire back-catalogue of The 
Spice Girls?‘.  In the absence of an explanation of this anomaly, my record collection would 
not just be evidence of the fact that my life is not what I claim it is - it would be a concrete 
instantiation of that fact.  Thus my narrative extends into the world, with objects in my 
environment acting as part of the way that my narrative is formed. 
 So the way that we shape our environment is part of our process of shaping our 
personal narrative.  But to say that this is the whole picture is to overemphasise the impact of 
the narrator on the environment and to underestimate the role of the environment on the 
narrative.  The process is not one-way.  Obviously, if the act of changing the world around us 
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is part of the act of self-narration, what types of narrative are possible will be in part a 
product of what is ‗out there‘.  We cannot change our environment in a God-like way, 
summoning things out of thin air.  Our creative acts, including the ways in which we shape 
our lives, are limited by the kinds of environment that we inhabit.  One could not, for 
example, become a sea-fisherman in the Central African Republic.  The combination of 
environment and vocation would not have their place alongside each other (at the same time) 
in the same narrative.  This may be described in terms of individuals‘ narratives occupying a 
place within the wider narrative contexts that they occupy.  We might criticise the aspirations 
of the wannabe fisherman in the Central African Republic on the grounds that the narrative 
that he wishes to create for himself is incompatible with the wider narrative that he occupies.  
Whilst I am largely concerned here with the ways in which an environment, and in more 
specific terms a natural environment, can limit and shape our individual narratives, this is not 
the only way in which a wider context can shape our narratives.  For example, we might 
regard the extremes of the current minority trend of ‗vintage living‘ as bizarre and perhaps to 
a certain degree flawed
1
.  People involved in vintage living decorate their homes in their 
chosen time period, wear the clothes, drive the cars and listen to the music of the time.  To 
the extent that this is a hobby in a society that embraces a wide range of leisure-time 
activities, we may regard this as a perfectly acceptable (albeit unusual) way to spend one‘s 
time and money.  But some of the people who participate in this seem to engage with their 
time period (or at least with their imagined idea of it) on a more fundamental level.  Consider 
the following remarks made in an interview by some women living ‗vintage‘ lifestyles: 
I admit I am in retreat from the 21
st
 century.  When I look at the reality of the world 
today, with all the violence, greed and materialism, I shudder.  I don‘t want to live in 
that world... I try not to interact with the modern world too much at all.  Shopping in 
supermarkets is an ordeal, and I only recently realised that Tony Blair is no longer 
Prime Minister as I don‘t read newspapers – they are just too distressing. 
 
                                                          
1
 Thanks to David Cooper for suggesting this example. 
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I have spent so many happy hours sourcing retro furniture and kitchen gadgets for our 
home, and gradually we are eradicating every trace of the modern age.  We aren‘t 
friendly with anyone who doesn‘t share our love of the Forties.  Some people might 
think I am hiding my head in the sand, harking back to an age that has long gone.  But 
to me, the 1940s was a time when people were much more friendly to each other – 
they really cared about their neighbours.  As it is, I hardly know the people who live 
next to us. (Daily Mail Online, 2008) 
 
The problem with these modes of living might be articulated by saying that the people with 
these views are attempting to live personal narratives that are divorced from the wider 
narrative environment that they inhabit.  This leads to seemingly contradictory attitudes such 
as desiring a 1940s lifestyle on the grounds that it was a time when people ‗really cared about 
their neighbours‘ despite hardly knowing one‘s own neighbours and not being friendly with 
anyone who does not share one‘s love of the 1940s.  It is one thing to say that one dislikes or 
wishes to reject certain features of the contemporary world, and quite another to believe that 
an adequate response is to attempt not to live in it.  Like it or not, our personal narratives 
(including perhaps our rejection of certain features of the world that we inhabit) are shaped 
by the narrative context that we inhabit or have inhabited.
1
  This is what MacIntyre means 
when he talks about our social identity.  He also draws our attention to the fact that ―rebellion 
against my identity is always one possible mode of expressing it‖ (p. 221).  The example of 
the extreme participants in the vintage living movement vividly evokes the distinction 
between rebellion against one‘s social identity and the attempt to ‗cut oneself off from‘ or 
deny it.  Similarly, we might want to criticise cultures which encourage aspirations or goals 
that are largely incompatible with the prevailing social and cultural conditions.  We might say 
this of any culture that encourages all its members to ‗pull themselves up by the bootstraps‘, 
                                                          
1
 It is not just the environment that we currently inhabit that has an effect upon what forms our narratives can 
take.  We must consider both past environments that we have inhabited, and the past of the environments that 
we currently inhabit.   For example, Hungary‘s leader at the outbreak of the Second World War was Admiral 
Horthy.  He was an admiral despite Hungary (like the Central African Republic) having no coastline and no 
navy.  His rank dated from when the Austro-Hungarian Empire still existed and had held the port of Trieste.  
The fact that Horthy retained this title, although slightly eccentric, makes sense.  It makes sense in virtue of the 
history of the political and physical geography of Europe.  Aspects of Horthy‘s narrative identity would look 
very peculiar in relation to his environment and narrative context if we were to take a simplistic notion of 
identity based on present environment alone.  Thanks to John McKinnell for alerting me to this. 
242 
 
when no provision exists for this to be a possibility for many of them.  A culture whose ideals 
centre on personal narratives that are incompatible with the conditions that it creates is an 
incoherent and inauthentic one. 
As we have seen, the factors connecting our environments with our narrative 
identities are made even more interesting when we reintroduce the role of culture.  Culture, 
environment and personal narrative have a complex three-way interdependence.  We have 
seen that culture informs the types of narrative that individuals can have.  The type of story 
that we tell about ourselves is strongly informed by our historical and cultural backgrounds.  
But it is also the case that there is a rich interplay between culture and environment that 
shapes our narratives and which our narratives feed back into shaping. 
 To take an example that is close to home, Durham Cathedral was probably built on 
the site that it occupies because it is an ideal defensive position.  In this sense, the natural 
environment supplies the explanation for why the city was founded.  However, the position of 
the cathedral is also explained in terms of mythology.  The monks who carried Saint 
Cuthbert‘s remains settled on the location because of the instructions given by Saint Cuthbert 
in a vision to the monk Eadmer.  The founding of the cathedral, together with the legends that 
surrounded it, influenced both the way that Durham grew as a cultural centre, and the way 
that the landscape was subsequently changed. In a poem that also makes reference to Eadmer 
and the mythology surrounding the city, Sir Walter Scott was inspired to write the following 
lines: 
Gray towers of Durham!... 
...Yet Well I love thy mixed and massive piles 
Half church of God, half castle ‗gainst the Scot 
And long to roam those venerable aisles 
With records stored of deeds long since forgot (Scott 1858, p. 520) 
 
These words were subsequently engraved into a stone on Prebends Bridge in the city.  Thus 
the natural environment of the area led to cultural developments there (the building of the 
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cathedral) which involved an alteration of the environment.  Scott was impressed by what he 
saw (in a sense, it impressed upon his personal narrative) and this was written back into both 
the culture and the environment of Durham.
1
  It is quite plausible to maintain that this 
interplay of cultural and environmental factors might impress upon a person‘s individual 
narrative.  Reading the words of Scott engraved on the bridge might lead an inhabitant of the 
city to gaze over to the ‗mixed and massive piles‘ across the river and feel the gravity of their 
history as significant to their own sense of place and identity and as informing who they are.  
If that inhabitant happened to be an artist, a writer, an architect or a local campaigner, they 
might (as Scott did) feed something back into this interplay between personal narrative, 
cultural heritage and environment. 
 This is not an unusual isolated example of the ways in which cultural identity, 
narrative identity and environment interact.  This is the way that our lives are continually led.  
We cannot therefore understand narrative identity as something distinct from environment or 
from culture.  The stories that we tell about ourselves are inextricably bound up with place as 
well as with history.  This is true on a grand scale (consider the significance of Uluru, 
otherwise known as Ayer‘s Rock, to the Aboriginal people of that area) but also on a more 
mundane level.  Were we to replace the places in any person‘s story with other places, every 
other part of the story would alter.  The cultural and historical significance of the place and 
the other people who occupy it would shift every detail of the story.  The person in question 
would arguably be numerically the same individual, but their identity in the sense that they 
and the people around them understood it would be utterly different.  They would be the 
same biological organism, but not the same person.
2
 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly, in this particular case, Scott is among other things commenting on the role of places in cultural 
memory.  So even the very notion that environment can be a reservoir of cultural and historical significance has 
been inscribed back onto the physical environment. 
2
 It is worth noting that the narrative view has its critics.  See, for example Galen Strawson (2004).  However, 
many of the arguments levelled against a narrative view are aimed at a conception of narrative as fully explicit 
and entirely self-told, views to which this argument is not committed.  An interesting discussion of the different 
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7. The Moral Dimension 
 
The main point that seems to come out of this is that each of these different ways of 
understanding personal identity point toward a similar conclusion about the role of the 
environment in identity.  If we understand all of these factors as having at least something to 
say about who or what we are, environment comes into play in our identities over a wide 
range of interrelated levels.  There is no level of thinking at which we can understand 
ourselves as the caricature of the Cartesian ‗ego‘, radically cut off from the outside world.  It 
is of course important to bear in mind that there are a number of different ways of 
understanding environment, as well as a range of ways of understanding the self.  Cooper has 
a phenomenological conception of environment, and describes our relationship with it in 
terms of intentionality.  Other writers have a more naturalistic outlook, describing 
environments as sets of physical objects.  Nonetheless, however we look at it, environment 
seems to be fundamental to the identities of organisms. 
 So how does this translate to moral questions, and to the case for environmental rights 
more specifically?  One answer lies in the way that we talk about what it is for a person to be 
oppressed or undermined.  We often understand this in terms of a certain fragmentation of 
identity, something that lessens a person by removing part of their self.  People who are 
removed from part of what is essential to themselves are fragmented and alienated from 
themselves.  Karl Marx writes about estrangement from one‘s human potential or species-
being, and feminists write about patriarchal dominance as a divisive and fragmenting force 
upon those who it oppresses: 
Sexual objectification occurs when a woman‘s sexual parts or sexual functions are 
separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere instruments, or else 
regarded as if they were capable of representing her… Sexual objectification is a form 
of fragmentation and thus an impoverishment of the objectified individual (Bartky 
1990, pp. 35-36) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
levels on which a narrative view can operate can be found in the work of Peter Goldie (2003).  It should also be 
noted that I do not make the claim that our identities can be exhaustively understood in purely narrative terms. 
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To continue on a similar theme, we can look to Raimond Gaita‘s examination of our 
understanding of the terribleness of rape: 
We think of rape as terrible in ways that can only be appreciated if we assume that a 
woman‘s sexuality can be precious to her.  If sexuality were properly seen as an 
instrument of pleasure and other purposes, as an instrument which can, contingently, 
bring something more serious in its train, or introduce us to something more serious… 
then it would be hard to see why rape should not be judged as a species of assault, or 
as something which could adequately be characterised in some variant of the thought 
that a woman has exclusive rights to her body. (Gaita 2002, p. 189) 
 
Gaita argues that these are insufficient ways to characterise what is so terrible about rape, 
since this would reduce rape to equivalence with mugging.  He also argues that we cannot 
simply characterise rape as an assault that is aggravated by trauma ―because the question 
naturally arises as to why a relatively minor assault should occasion such trauma‖ (p.189).  
Instead, Gaita maintains that we have to look to the special relationship that a woman has 
with her own sexuality: 
Whether or not it is physically brutal, rape is a violation of woman‘s sexual being.  
Because there would be no rape if there were genuine consent, we tend to focus on the 
consent, and therefore to see rape, wrongly, as in essence a particular violation of 
autonomy aggravated by physical injury.  (189-190) 
 
The notion is that rape is in some sense a violation of an aspect of the woman‘s identity, a 
violation of the self.  In a similar way, I want to maintain that the degradation, removal or 
subversion of a creature‘s environment should be understood as particularly bad or harmful to 
that creature, not just in terms of the fact that this might constitute a violation of a right to 
liberty or property, but rather because of the relationship that exists between creature and 
environment, the particular modes of habitation that are essential to the identity of that 
creature.   
The rapist in Gaita‘s examination violates the woman‘s sexual self.  This could be 
analysed in various ways, but were we to take a line consistent with Bartky‘s analysis, we 
could say that the woman‘s sexuality and sexual organs have been used as a means to 
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someone else‘s pleasure with no regard accorded to the rest of her identity.  Her sexual self 
has been violated in that her sexuality and self are treated as though they are divisible.  She 
has, against her will, been alienated from herself.  To be estranged from one‘s environment is 
also to be alienated from oneself, and thus become a fragmented being, in the same way that 
Bartky understands estrangement from one‘s own sexual identity.  This acts as a diminishing 
or impoverishing force.  To impose such fragmentation upon other beings without 
justification is to participate in a dominating, oppressive or objectifying process.  Thus by 
understanding a creature‘s environment as an essential element of its identity, we get closer 
to articulating the real significance of what is lost or violated when the creature and that 
environment are separated. 
 But which organisms can be talked about in this way?  Understanding the different 
levels at which environment interacts with identity may be a key to understanding how and 
why different types of being might have moral claims concerning their environments.  The 
types of fragmentation that are often cited as examples of oppression seem to come in at a 
narrative or a phenomenological level.  It might be claimed that only human beings can have 
a personal narrative, while some non-human animals have some kind of phenomenological 
and psychological identity, and all living organisms have biological identities.  We might also 
claim that cultures, groups, societies and so on can have narrative identities while lacking 
biological ones, and that our narrative identities can exist after our deaths and perhaps even 
before our births.  So which types of identity confer a prohibition against fragmentation? 
 There is nothing morally wrong in itself with taking my bicycle apart.  Can we say 
anything more about biological entities?  It doesn‘t seem to be wrong, for example, to cut a 
stick of rhubarb from the plant or to peel a potato, although we might find it aesthetically 
insensitive or even morally objectionable to fell a giant redwood.  If biological integrity 
always had to be respected in all cases, it would make human survival virtually impossible, 
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and yet in certain cases we value the biological integrity of rare, beautiful, or otherwise 
exceptional organisms.  There does seem to be something rather more wrong than potato 
peeling about the naughty schoolboy‘s activities of pulling the wings off flies or killing ants 
with a magnifying glass, and torturing or maiming higher mammals seems obviously morally 
objectionable.  This seems to present us with a layered conception of what matters morally in 
identity.  Ruddick‘s view is that ―the only value of biological life [is] instrumental, being 
necessary for biographical life‖ (Ruddick 2005, p. 503).  Perhaps this is something of an 
overstatement, at least to the extent that we regard biological life as being instrumentally 
valuable only in as much it is necessary to the biographical life of the being in question. 
However, there may be something in the view that we value biological integrity in 
certain contexts because it forms a part of our narratives.  In this sense, certain living 
organisms in the natural world have a particular type of moral importance to us, but this 
moral importance is based on more than a merely pragmatic or instrumental purpose that they 
serve to us.  The biological integrity of such organisms matters to us, in itself.  The Bodhi tree 
in India, a fig tree that is sacred to many Buddhists, is not only morally or spiritually 
important because it serves some purpose in reminding people of their sacred stories.  It is 
certainly not important merely for some wider practical purpose.  It is important because it is 
a part of the narrative with which those Buddhists identify.  This is not the same as saying 
that the tree is important because it is instrumental to that narrative, rather it is important 
because it forms part of the fabric from which the narrative is constructed.  In this sense 
biological integrity, and not only our own biological integrity, can be significant in narrative.  
Neither is it the case that a moral importance attached to biological integrity here implies that 
an indefinite extension of the life of the biological organism in question is desirable.  The 
current Bodhi tree, a pilgrimage site for many Buddhists, is not the original tree under which 
Siddhartha Gautama achieved enlightenment, though it is said to be a direct descendent of it.  
248 
 
What matters is that the tree should be treated in a manner appropriate to the narrative, not 
that it is allowed to live forever.  If we think then that an organism‘s environment is (or at 
least can be) part of its biological integrity, organisms whose biological identities form part 
of our cultural and personal narratives need to be considered on the level of environment as 
well as on the level of the individual.  While our claims to a cohesive narrative identity can 
be overridden by other concerns, it would seem reasonable to assume that it is a prima facie 
good that narrative identity should not be fragmented. ‗Integrity‘, in the widest sense (not 
simply the ‗integrity‘ of a moral agent) is what makes us what we are.  Fragmentation of such 
integrity might therefore be compared to killing, although a strange kind of killing that goes 
by degrees rather than working with a binary opposition of alive or dead.  
Extra ethical questions creep in when we move to the level of organisms that have a 
psychological identity as well as a merely biological one.  Some animals that we commonly 
regard as conscious may have biological identities that are significant to people‘s narratives 
(consider temple bulls in Hindu tradition, or the cultural significance attached to racehorses 
or hunting dogs) but they also have psychological lives of their own.  Thus we might afford 
their psychological integrity an importance of its own.  If environment forms part of their 
psychological identities then, considerations of an animal‘s environment may be necessary if 
we are to preserve that psychological integrity.  This may lead to conflicts between the 
environment suited to the animal‘s role in our narrative identities, and the environment suited 
to the animal‘s own psychological integrity.1  How we should deal with these cases is likely 
to vary according to the degree to which environment is an essential component of the 
creature‘s identity, and the degree to which they form an essential part of our personal 
narrative.  It would seem unreasonable to hold that, if we believe non-human animals to be 
conscious at all, their psychological integrity should always be trumped by the stories that we 
                                                          
1
 Although in many cases it can also lead to mutually beneficial circumstances, such as the relationship between 
a shepherd and his dog. 
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want to tell about ourselves.  On the other hand, if an animal were to suffer a degree of 
estrangement from environment that could not be regarded as greatly significant, this might 
be less important than essential elements of a person‘s sense of identity.  The important thing 
is that we regard both of these levels of identity as morally significant. 
In addition to their psychological identity, some creatures have narrative identities.  
Are humans alone in this, or can we say that animals have biographical lives in this sense?  
One‘s immediate instinct is to reject this view, but perhaps this is due to the bias that the 
terminology of ‗narrative‘ or ‗biography‘ gives to the subject.  How can a creature write or 
tell the story of its life when it lacks linguistic capability?
1
  In a sense though, these words are 
only intended in a metaphorical sense here.  This varies to some extent according to which 
theory of narrative or biographical identity that one chooses, but there are a couple of reasons 
to think that a life narrative needn‘t rely on linguistic faculties.  Firstly, as we have seen, we 
needn‘t understand a life as entirely ‗written‘ by the person living it.  Our narratives are the 
product of a number of practices, allegiances and communities in which we play a part.  This 
means that we are not the sole authors of our biographical or narrative lives.  This point 
weakens the demand that the subject of the life in question must be capable of language.  The 
second point to note is that, as I have articulated it, creating our narrative or biography is very 
much to do with how we act in the world.  We create our lives by interacting with our 
environments in particular ways, making the environments that we manipulate (and which 
manipulate us) parts of our narrative.  Thus our narratives are built in the vocabulary and 
grammar of what surrounds us, rather than merely in our linguistic systems. 
 It is of course very much true that human beings value language – we value our oral 
and written traditions, we use particular labels to reinforce or alter our identities and we 
                                                          
1
 It is not entirely certain that human beings are the only language users.  However, for the sake of argument I 
will assume here that they are.  A very interesting case here concerns the question of whether honeybees can be 
described as language users because of the elaborate ‗waggle dances‘ that they perform which convey 
information about the location of rich sources of nectar.  The dances appear to communicate the ―distance, 
direction and desirability‖ of the patch of flowers concerned (Crist 2004). 
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sometimes remember past events and articulate our aspirations about future events in a 
written or oral way.  It is undoubtedly true that language helps us to make sense of things, 
acts as a trigger to memory, bestows meaning on certain objects and events and so on.  It 
would be a mistake to think that our lives are not richer and more meaningful because of the 
language that they involve.  However, this does not suggest that it is a necessary condition for 
a biographical or narrative life as understood above, simply it is an enriching factor.  And 
indeed, as James Rachels argues, certain non-human animals seem to have a lot of the 
characteristics that we regard as most defining of our biographical lives: 
Do animals have lives?  Some of them clearly do not.  Having a life requires some 
fairly sophisticated mental capacities, which simple animals do not have.  Consider, 
however, a psychologically complex animal such as the rhesus monkey.  Rhesus 
monkeys live together in social groups; they have families and care for one another; 
they communicate with one another; they engage in complicated activities; they have 
highly individualized personalities.  And they are clever: one team of researchers 
noted that they ‗can indeed solve many problems similar in type to the items used in 
standard tests of human intelligence‘.  Although their lives are not as complicated as 
ours, emotionally or intellectually, there seems no doubt that they do have lives.  They 
are not merely alive. (Rachels 1986, p. 33) 
 
To the extent that this is true, we can say that animals have biographical lives, and that 
environment is at least as important to animal lives on this level as it is to human ones.  In 
fact, perhaps in the absence of language and theoretical structures, it becomes even more so. 
 Another interesting feature of this type of identity is that it can arguably be displayed 
by groups as well as by individuals.  Societies, nations, cultures, tribes and families all have 
their narratives.  These are networks of stories, artefacts, places and people of particular 
significance to that group.  In the case of groups, they may be less distinct or harder to 
identify than in a personal narrative, but they are there nonetheless.  So if we want to 
maintain that narratives are among the things that are morally important, or among the things 
that determine morally important entities, we may be able to look beyond the level of the 
individual and speak of the moral importance of the narrative life of a culture.  Environment 
here is going to be especially significant to narrative.  Every culture has stories that connect 
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people to places, places that have been the environment of the people of that culture in the 
past, and often places that will supposedly be their environment in the future, as well as to 
places that have immediate practical familiarity to those people.  In the case of cultures 
however, the narrative identity of the culture is not contingent on any psychological or 
biological identity of the culture as a whole, but rather on the collective psychological and 
biological existence of its people.  These identities do not remain stable; biological and 
psychological identities ebb and flow as people die and are born, and as people leave or join 
the cultural group.  While we can talk about a unity or wholeness of a culture‘s narrative 
identity, it would be a mistake to talk about this as though it depended on a rigid set of 
identity criteria.  One of the hallmarks of a living culture is that it relies on a dynamic and 
changeable set of interrelations.  This will, of course, include interrelations with the 
environment. 
8. Why Rights? 
 
I have made the case that we may legitimately regard a being‘s environment as integral to the 
identity of that being.  This is true on several levels, and regardless of which type of theory of 
identity, if any, we take to be paramount.  However, it may then be asked why I see fit to 
frame questions concerning the illegitimate violation of a being‘s identity in terms of rights.  
There is no simple answer to this question, but a couple of points should be made in favour of 
rights discourse in these situations.  One reason for drawing attention to the connections 
between fragmentation or estrangement and oppression or domination is to highlight the 
suitability of rights language to describe what has gone wrong in these situations.  If we 
assume that rights language is suitable to describe the plights of oppressed minorities, and we 
situate the injustice of these situations in the way in which those people are fragmented or 
diminished by the process of domination, we have a good prima facie reason to think about 
the environmental parallels in the same way.  Secondly, drawing on an argument based on a 
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narrative theory of identity, I would like to argue that if the right to liberty can correctly be 
thought of in terms of rights, we can make similar claims about our environments.  James 
Rachels and William Ruddick argue that a ‗biographical‘ notion of the self can make sense of 
the weight that we afford to liberty (Rachels and Ruddick 1989): 
It is not that Liberty is sacred in virtue of whatever intrinsic or instrumental value it 
may have, but rather that it is integral to a biographical life: Without Liberty (or rather 
certain specific liberties) someone can have no biographical life at all. (Ruddick 2005, 
p. 505) 
 
The notion here is that liberty is valued in the way that it is because it is a necessary condition 
of having a life, in the sense that life is valuable.  Liberty is an essential constituent of such a 
life.  If we think that environment is a constituent of a valuable life in an analogous way, then 
we ought to value our environment in a similar way that we value liberty.  This would 
provide us with a reason to think that the language of rights may be appropriate for describing 
the way that we relate to our environments in the same way that it is appropriate for talking 
about the way in which we value our personal liberty. 
 So why should we suppose that liberty is a constituent of what Rachels and Ruddick 
call a ‗biographical life‘? I will briefly outline their argument for this, before considering 
whether we can apply the same line of thought to the environmental aspects of our identities. 
They begin by looking at the different answers that have been given in response to the 
question of why we value liberty.  They look at theories that claim that liberty has intrinsic 
value ―simply because of what it is in itself‖ (p. 221), in particular the comparison that 
Gregory Vlastos makes between the value of liberty and the value of enjoyment (Vlastos 
1962).  They claim that this comparison in fact gives us reasons to doubt that liberty has 
intrinsic value.  The value of enjoyment (taken as the archetypal case of intrinsic value) is 
‗transparent‘ and readily understandable.  This is not the case, they argue, for liberty.  They 
also look at theories that claim that liberty is instrumentally good, in that it is ―desirable 
because of the pleasure and other consequences it produces‖ (p. 223).  This they argue is also 
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an objectionable view, because it would imply that in circumstances where the consequences 
of the liberal and the illiberal decision were equal, there would be no reason to choose the 
liberal one.  Finally, they look at the view that liberty is ―necessary for self-realization‖ (p. 
223).  By this they mean the view that liberty is valuable because it is a necessary condition 
for developing one‘s human potential.  This view, propounded by Joel Feinberg, is the 
approach that Rachels and Ruddick find most promising.  It is distinct from the notion that 
liberty is an instrumental good, in that it holds that liberty is a necessary condition for a good 
human life, and not just something that will in some circumstances contingently lead to good 
consequences
1
 (Feinberg 1973): 
The point is not that such self-development is a consequence of being free; it is that 
freedom is one of the important conditions without which this personal growth cannot 
take place.  Freedom makes such growth possible, although it does not make it 
inevitable. (Rachels and Ruddick 1989, p. 224) 
 
Rachels and Ruddick suggest that John Stuart Mill‘s approach in On Liberty brings in 
elements of all of these explanations of the value of freedom.  They also suggest that any 
adequate theory of liberty must account for why each of these three views is appealing, even 
if some of the might be mistaken.  Rachels and Ruddick argue that liberty is a necessary 
condition for ‗having a life‘: 
The idea we propose is: Without liberty, a person cannot have a life.  We do not mean 
that a person without liberty cannot have a good life, or a productive or satisfying life, 
or anything of that sort.  The point is more radical than that.  It is that, without liberty, 
a person cannot have a life at all. (p. 226) 
 
A distinction is made between ‗having a life‘ and ‗being alive‘.  ‗Being alive‘ describes the 
situation of Olson‘s ‗human organism‘, it is describes the situation of a ―functioning, self-
preserving organism‖ - it could describe a foetus, or a human being in a PVS.  ‗Having a life‘ 
                                                          
1
 Already we see here some parallels with the ways that we have been thinking about environment.  Many of the 
existing pieces of work on environmental rights consider the environment to be the content of a right because it 
is instrumental to achieving things that are more commonly considered to be the content of rights claims.  
However, it is arguable that this is insufficient.  We value our environments (and particularly our natural 
environments) for reasons that cannot be explained purely instrumentally in these senses.  This reflects my 
thoughts in the opening section of this chapter on the ways in which we may find an ‗intrinsic‘ value in 
environment without necessarily maintaining that it is valuable independently of our concerns. 
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is however ―a notion of biography rather than biology‖, determined by what we do, what we 
think and feel, and how we relate to others (p. 226). 
In losing their biological existence, the usual victims of homicide necessarily lose 
their biographical lives as well.  But it is the latter, not the former, that is the morally 
objectionable loss and is the proper object of moral protection.  To the extent that 
people have ceased to have biographical lives (as, for example, the irreversibly 
comatose), killing becomes less objectionable... And to the degree that animals of 
other species lack the capacity for lives, to that degree our objections to killing them 
(painlessly) for food, clothing, and scientific study diminish.(p. 227) 
 
This is not quite the same concept as personal identity.  Rachels and Ruddick favour the 
notion of ‗having a life‘ over the idea of ‗being a person‘.  Personhood, they argue, is a 
variable notion according to context, is often no more than a moral concept that begs the 
question, and is associated on the whole with notions of equality (‗all persons are equal‘) 
rather than liberty.  Liberty is a concept that protects and develops human differences rather 
than ignoring or disregarding them.  Personhood, they argue, cannot therefore capture the 
value of liberty, but the notion of ‗having a life‘ can. 
 So those who we object to killing are those who are ‗subjects of a life‘ understood as 
outlined above.  This notion of a life is understood in a broadly narrative sense.  Having a life 
involves having a sense of ‗self over time‘, involving plans, hopes, projects and regrets.  
They also argue that it is possible for a person not to be the subject of a life.  Those who live 
in slavery, and have no time in which they have the freedom to develop relationships, engage 
in projects, and so on, are not subjects of a life.  They ―have no social existence apart from 
their masters; they are, accordingly, ―socially dead persons,‖ remaining forever ―unborn 
beings (non-né)‖‖(p. 229).  Few people are, in fact, total slaves to this extent.  Even people 
living in captivity will often have some time and space to have a life: ―Real slaves may have 
biographies, but only because they are not total slaves‖ (p. 230).  Thus somebody can only 
have a biographical life of this kind to the extent that he or she has liberty: 
Liberty makes lives not beautiful, but possible.  But this is not to say that liberty is 
like air, causally necessary for lives.  Rather, it is like motion, a component of living.  
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Liberty constitutes our lives through the free choices and actions that embody it (p. 
231)
1
 
 
Let us draw a comparison here with the way that we relate to our environment.  Obviously, 
the air that we breathe, the food that we eat, and so on, are causally necessary for life.  They 
are causally necessary in order for us to have biological lives, which in turn is a causal 
requirement for a human biographical life.  Our environment also plays an important role in 
our activities.  It is causally necessary to the projects and commitments that we have.  But 
does a person‘s environment play an even more fundamental role than this?  Previously in 
this chapter, I have made the case for thinking that environment is not just causally necessary 
for having a life, but also that it is a component of it.  Certainly on the biographical level that 
Rachels and Ruddick are speaking of, environment is not just a subject of our narratives, but 
an integral part of them.  Thus if we understand liberty as being properly considered a right 
because of the role that it plays at the heart of human identity, we must be able to say the 
same things about environment. 
 But what of non-human animals?  As I argued in the previous section, there do seem 
to be some good reasons for supposing that some non-human animals can, to some extent, 
have biographical lives. Is the consequence of Rachel and Ruddick‘s view that to the extent 
that they have biographical lives, animals also have rights concerning their environments?  
This comes back to the old chestnut of what types of being can be the possessors of rights.  
However, Rachels and Ruddick may have come some way toward providing an answer to 
this.  If what gives liberty (usually considered the most fundamental right) its ultimate 
importance is its role as constitutive of biographical identity, this would seem to suggest that 
the reason we value it is because we value that biographical identity.  It would not be absurd 
to conclude from this then that the proper subjects of rights are those beings who are capable 
                                                          
1
 Of course, Rachels and Ruddick are not arguing that it would be acceptable to do what we wanted to anyone 
who was a total slave in this sense because they would not be a subject of a life.  Rather, for beings who can be 
subjects of a life, it is the right state of affairs that they are allowed to be. 
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of having biographical identities.  Otherwise we would be arguing that what gives liberty its 
status as a right is separate from what gives it its status as a valued moral and political 
concept. 
 But can we only talk of the importance of biographical identity in this way, or might 
other types of identity be able to confer rights?  It seems plausible that we might be able to 
say some similar things about psychological identity, although without any sense of a 
‗biographical life‘ in the way that Rachels understands it, there would be a thinner conception 
of identity, constituted by fewer elements, and thus fewer actions that would constitute right 
violations.  Following on from this, it seems that any rights conferred in this way at the 
biological level (when no psychological or narrative identity is present) would be of a weaker 
and more defeasible form.  As we have seen though, these types of identity do not function 
entirely independently of each other. 
Biological and psychological integrity can be important to biographical lives.  This is 
true of our own biological and psychological integrity, and of the integrity of other beings 
that feature significantly in our narrative lives.  And indeed, for people and other animals in 
normal situations, biological and psychological identity are necessary conditions for the 
existence of a narrative identity.
1
  This way of understanding what confers rights may help to 
explain the intuition that, while we are happy to ascribe rights to human beings and certain 
non-human animals, we are less happy about talking in this way about (for example) trees.  
What some people might find surprising is that this view potentially allows room for us to 
ascribe rights to cultural groups and communities without ascribing rights to plants or to 
inanimate objects.  Proponents of group rights and group moral status sometimes struggle to 
articulate why we should afford importance to entities that have no biological or 
psychological existence of their own.  Arguably though, they do have narrative existence, 
                                                          
1
 I use the term ‗normal situations‘ to avoid bizarre ‗brain in vat‘ style thought experiments.  These are certainly 
useful for thinking about what is metaphysically possible, but arguably less so in the consideration of what is 
practically important to us. 
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albeit contingent upon the biological and psychological existence of their members.  For this 
reason, a theory such as this might allow us to speak about obligations concerning future 
generations in rights terms.  The rights of a cultural group will involve obligations towards its 
future components, some of them people who are not yet born.
1
 
 One question that might be raised at this point is whether this confers on all 
communities an equal right to exist.  For example, are we morally obliged to respect the 
integrity of organisations or communities whose aims we find hateful?  A possible answer 
here is that we do not have such obligations to the extent that the group is destructive to the 
integrities of other groups, individuals or creatures.  If the destruction of such integrity is 
taken to be so fundamental to the identity of that group that it could not exist intelligibly 
without that aim (we might, for example, say such things about racist or murderous 
organisations) then it would be incoherent to support the continuous existence of that group 
simply for the reason that we wish to preserve integrity.  We would then have to decide 
whether the integrity of that group, or the integrity of what it sought to destroy, was a more 
weighty concern.  We could not simply wish the end of all destroyers of integrity, since this 
might lead us (for example) to cull all tigers because of their detrimental effects on the 
integrity of their prey.  We need to resist the notion that anything that destroys another 
being‘s integrity is not entitled to an integrity of its own.  This may be a tricky problem to 
solve, and I suspect the solution will be very complex.  However, a number of points might 
help us to pick our way through such minefields. 
To begin with, we should bear in mind that if we are taking a right-based approach to 
these issues, there are many existing theories about how we should deal with competing 
rights claims.  This is not a problem that is unique to the approach that I am suggesting here.  
                                                          
1
 It could be maintained (as it is for example by Alasdair MacIntyre) that our narratives can continue after our 
deaths. From this we might conclude that we can have certain kinds of obligations to people whose biological 
lives are over.  A narrative view might then support the views on obligations to the dead that I have suggested in 
chapter five and elsewhere. 
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This may mean that we have to accept some notion of prima facie or ‗manifesto‘ rights (as 
we saw in chapters four and seven) or it may mean that we can accept only negative rights 
(i.e. rights imposing duties not to act).  If we take the first option, the ways of thinking about 
identity that I mentioned earlier in the chapter may go some way toward providing us with a 
framework for thinking about whose rights may be defeasible.  A variety of levels for 
thinking about identity will provide us with sets of rights-claims that are more or less strong 
and more or less nuanced.  The degree to which the integrity of the being in question is being 
violated will feature in our decisions, as will the level and complexity of the identity that is 
under threat.  This means that we might want to give greater precedence to lives that are a 
rich interplay between narrative, psychological and biological factors than to those which are 
merely biological.  This does not mean however that human interests will always win out.  If 
my integrity is at risk of a small diminution if a total fragmentation of a more basic level of 
life is to be avoided, the more basic level of life might win out.  To pervert Hume for my own 
purposes, it would not be reasonable in all circumstances to prefer the destruction of the 
world‘s species to the scratching of my little finger.1 
9. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the thesis that we can explain environment not just as an external 
entity to which we have a particular right, but also as an important element of the self, to 
which we have rights in the same way that we have rights over other crucial elements of our 
identities.  I have looked at the way that environment is involved in identity on the biological, 
psychological and narrative levels.  It would be a mistake to treat these levels as entirely 
independent.  They speak to each other continually.  My psychological and narrative 
identities are both contingent upon my possession of a biological identity, and are also 
informed by what happens to me at the biological level.  Thus we have an interweaving 
                                                          
1
 Although my little finger might win out in some cases.  We would not necessarily want to preserve the 
existence of even non-fatal bacteria that have major negative impacts upon human life. 
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between body, mind and narrative that engages the world on every level.  In this sense, many 
of the ways in which we experience the world are the product of a continual ongoing 
exchange between our narrative, psychological and biological selves.  So it seems not only 
true that environment, as well as liberty, can be understood as a fundamental component of 
‗having a life‘, but that this life, even when understood in the narrative sense, is not 
independent of biology or psychology.  Human integrity of identity (and arguably integrity of 
identity of certain animals) will involve all these factors.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I mentioned a tension that exists between some 
environmental ethicists, who maintain that we must reject rights on the basis of their 
individualism and anthropocentrism, and some environmental activists, who welcome rights-
discourse as an appropriate vocabulary for dealing with environmental problems.  I addressed 
this tension by looking at theories of rights, including their historical origins, and identifying 
which features are arguably definitive of theories of rights.  This also drew out the extent to 
which theories of rights have evolved over time to reflect the political and intellectual 
contexts in which they have existed.  I then applied a number of ways of thinking about rights 
to a range of challenging cases that are faced in environmental ethics. 
My central claim is that if we accept that environmental problems cannot be 
adequately addressed by theories that are anthropocentric and individualistic, this still does 
not preclude the possibility that certain types of theories of rights can address these problems.  
I made the case for a theory of rights that takes the same kind of form as interest or benefit 
theories of rights.  I acknowledged that the notion of ‗interest‘ is a difficult one to formulate, 
but suggested that we may be able to proceed if we adopt a view that at least some rights are 
based on needs, where ‗need‘ is understood in terms of identity.  In the final chapter, I began 
to address ways that we might think about identity.  I argued that there are several levels on 
which environment is partially constitutive of identity, and that this can in some cases confer 
rights that are ‗essentially‘ environmental. 
Areas for Future Research 
This thesis is in many ways a precursor to the substantive project of formulating a detailed 
theory of environmental rights.  It argues that such a task is possible and worthwhile, rather 
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than outlining the precise form that such a theory can take.  There are various questions that 
need to be examined in further detail if a more concrete system of environmental rights is to 
be developed.  Firstly, there are questions surrounding which types of rights can be 
understood in these ways: can we have environmental rights that are positive as well as 
negative, in rem as well as in personam, and so on?  Some tentative answers to these 
questions have been suggested in various places in the thesis, but more work needs to be done 
here if a detailed theory of environmental rights is to be developed from them.  As I have 
suggested, there may be some help at hand in theories that deal with rights in the context of 
other complex global issues, such as those that suggest that there is a right not to suffer from 
poverty.  At the very least though, I think it is reasonable to suppose that there are negative 
environmental rights that impose duties on all of us, and that there may be some positive 
environmental rights that impose duties on governments and international institutions.  In the 
future, I would like to pursue further research in this area. 
A second question relating to the formulation of a theory of rights is whether we 
would want to develop a moral theory based entirely on rights, or whether rights would be 
one moral concept among others in a wider moral theory.  I remain open about this question, 
but it may be that while many environmental concerns can be discussed in terms of rights, 
there are wider elements of our moral lives (for example, supererogation) that cannot be 
accommodated adequately by a wholly rights-based approach. 
Another area that needs to be explored further concerns how, and in which 
circumstances, the environmental aspects of identity can be said to confer the kinds of needs 
that should be understood in terms of rights.  One question that deserves further attention is 
whether we make a significant distinction between the built environment and the natural 
environment, and whether the natural environment confers any special kinds of rights.  Much 
of what has been said in the preceding chapters can be applied equally well to natural and 
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man-made environments, but the concern of a lot of environmental philosophy is with the 
natural.  We may therefore want an account of whether natural environments are particularly 
significant in some way, and whether estrangement from nature should be considered to be 
some form of ‗self-estrangement‘.  One approach to this may be to say that natural 
environments are fundamental because they provide the necessary conditions for the 
existence of all other types of environment.  My identity is largely shaped by human factors, 
and other people with other backgrounds may be shaped by rather different human factors.  
Ultimately though, these factors depend on the existence of a natural environment, and 
natural environments are therefore the ultimate contexts within which all our lives are lived.  
Exploring these ideas further may even enable us to get beyond David Cooper‘s concept of 
an environment towards some coherent notion of what might be meant by the environment.  
The problem with this view is that if we are to take the Developmental Systems approach to 
evolutionary theory (according to which the object of our concern is the ever-developing 
dynamic between organism and environment, rather than the organism alone) it might be very 
difficult to determine what we mean by a ‗natural‘ environment, at least for a human being. 
A further avenue for exploration is the application of such theories to concrete cases.  
In this thesis I have considered the idea of rights to such things as an ‗adequate‘ environment, 
an environment essential to one‘s flourishing, to one‘s identity, and so on.  What I have not 
had the opportunity to explore in detail is the ways in which this might be cashed out in terms 
of specific issues or problems.  These have featured by way of providing examples, 
illustrations and thought experiments, but not as the subjects of detailed analysis.  An issue 
that I would be particularly interested to explore would be the environmental rights of certain 
groups of indigenous peoples in cases where the landscape is bound up in their mythology 
and cultural life. 
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This covers some of the more general points that come out of this thesis, but many 
more possibilities for further research present themselves at various points in the different 
chapters.  For example, chapter five observes that different metaphysical theories of time are 
likely to have a bearing on our views about the moral status of future people.  However, these 
views and their implications are not fully explored, and I make no commitment to any 
particular theory of time in the thesis.  The same might be said of the notion of group rights, 
which I sketch out, but do not fully develop (although some indication of how this might be 
done is given in chapter eight).  There remain some interesting questions about what types of 
group are subjects of moral concern and possible subjects of rights.  I take human cultural 
groups as the prime example, but some of the idea explored here may be applicable to other 
kinds of groups.  In the context of environmental ethics it would be interesting to see if they 
could be applied to communities of animals, to species of organisms, to ecosystems and 
perhaps even to the earth itself, which is sometimes claimed to be a self-sustaining system in 
its own right. 
These questions will relate closely to the questions raised in chapter eight about what 
types of identity can confer rights.  I maintain that narrative identity and psychological 
identity can confer them.  I also observe that these types of identity often have a complex and 
co-dependent relationship with biological identity, which can affect our narratives and 
psychology.  However, I leave it open whether biological identity is the type of thing that can 
confer rights.  One way to approach this might be through Gary Varner‘s account of 
‗biological interests‘.  Varner argues that ―every living organism has an interest in the 
fulfilment of the biological function of each of its components‖ (Varner 1998, p. 74).  Varner 
also claims that interests of this kind have normative implications, suggesting that although 
sentient creatures have priority, all organisms‘ interests ought in principle to be protected.  
Taking an account like this as the basis of a theory of rights may be thought to jar with the 
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presumption of equality that runs through many theories of rights, and these difficulties 
would have to be resolved.  One solution might be to say that biologically founded rights are 
on an equal footing with regard to each other, but are subservient to psychological and 
narrative based rights.  This would enable us to claim that all beings with a given right 
possess that right equally, but that some beings can have rights of a more demanding kind 
than others.  We may be able to use Dworkin‘s notion of ‗trumps‘ here, claiming for example 
that psychologically founded rights can trump biologically founded ones.  As Dworkin 
accepts, trumps might not always be thought to be absolutely decisive.  They can be 
overridden when other demands are unusually extreme.  I am not certain at present whether 
biological rights can be defended, but this gives us some idea of how we might approach the 
question. 
Two Possible Criticisms 
Obviously, I cannot anticipate all the objections that might be raised to what I have suggested 
in this thesis, but I like to conclude by mentioning two criticisms that immediately come to 
mind.  Voltaire once observed that the Holy Roman Empire was ―neither holy, nor Roman, 
nor an empire‖ (Voltaire 1963, pp. 683).  Similarly, a critical response to some of the 
‗environmental rights‘ that I propose in this thesis might be that they are neither 
environmental nor rights. 
The first of these criticisms is aimed at the concept of ‗essentially‘ environmental 
rights, which I ground in theories about the identity of the right-holder.  My claim is that 
these rights are environmental in a fundamental sense, because environment is a component 
of the identity of the right-holder.  Therefore a violation of environment becomes a violation 
of self.  This is not the same as ‗instrumentally‘ environmental rights, which are only 
environmental since environmental means are employed to serve other rights (liberty, 
property and so on).  The objection here is that the ‗essentially‘ environmental rights that I 
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describe are not environmental in any more fundamental respect than the other environmental 
rights that I mention, since the ultimate aim of the right is to preserve the integrity or 
flourishing of the self.  Thus these rights are also instrumental in that they serve an ultimate 
purpose beyond the environmental one.
1
 
To answer this question, I think we need to look to Rachels‘ and Ruddick‘s account of 
the value of liberty.  This account argues that liberty is not to be understood merely as 
instrumentally valuable, nor as intrinsically valuable, ―simply because of what it is in itself‖ 
(Rachels and Ruddick 1989, p. 221).  Rather, liberty is important because it is a component, 
not a cause, of a life: ―this is not to say that liberty is like air, causally necessary for lives.  
Rather, it is like motion, a component of living‖ (p. 231).  I make the case for environment 
occupying a similar role to liberty as a component of identity.  Of course, we can still 
maintain that essentially environmental rights are instrumental in the sense that they are 
necessary to identity, but in this sense, other rights including the right to liberty would be 
merely instrumental.  The sense in which both rights can be considered instrumental to 
identity relies on a relation of constitution, not of causation.  Thus I argue that rights to 
environment can operate on the same fundamental level as rights to liberty and need not be 
considered valuable only to the extent that they are derived from more basic rights. 
The second criticism that my account might face is that at least some of the kinds of 
environmental rights that I propose are not in fact rights.  There could be a number of reasons 
for holding this view.  One might hold that rights are things that can only be applied to agents 
or to individuals, or that require a certain level of rationality or membership of a reciprocal 
moral community.  To an extent I am willing to accept this criticism.  If we define rights in 
the strictest and most rigid sense, this may be the case.  However, I still hold that the 
language of rights is an appropriate medium for discussing moral requirements of the kinds 
                                                          
1
 Many thanks to Beth Hannon and Sue Mendus for raising this concern. 
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that I discuss.  Rights are typically employed in broader senses than the more rigid accounts 
can accommodate (see, for example, the criticisms of Tierney‘s account in section four of 
chapter one) and are also dynamic concepts which have changed over time to reflect the 
social and philosophical challenges that they have to address.  Ultimately then, my answer to 
this criticism is the same as the central claim of this thesis: if certain theories of rights are at 
odds with environmental concerns, we have more reason for developing an account of rights 
that can address these problems than we do for maintaining that the language of rights is 
inappropriate. 
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